Douglas E. Taylor and Belle Taylor Pettit v. Floyd Brown Taylor, Who Sues, etc. by unknown
I - ... ., I 
• 
Record No. 2271 
In the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
at Richmond 
DOUGLAS E. TAYLOR AND 
BELLE TAYLOR PETTIT, 
v. 
FLOYD BROWN TAYLOR, WHO SUES, ETC. 
FROM THE CHANCERY COUR'r OF TBB CITY OF RICHMOND. 
RULE 14. 
1f5. NU1',1BER OF COPIES TO BE FILED AND DELIVERED TO 0PPOS· 
ING COUNSEL. Twenty copies of eac.h brief shall be filed with 
the clerk of the court, and at least two copies mailed or de-
livered to opposing counsel on or before the day on which the 
brief is filed. 
1f6. SIZE A1''D TYPE. Briefs shaU be printed in type not less 
in size than small pica, and shall be nine inches in length 
and six inches in width, so as to conform in dimensions to 
the printed records. 'l'he record number of the case shall be 
printed on all briefs. 
The foregoing is printed ju small pica type for the informa-
tion of counsel. 
M. 13. W A'rTS, Clerk. 
/76 
• 
INDEX TO PETITION 
(Record No. 2271) 
Page 
Proceedings in the Lower Court ...................... 1-A • 
Question Inyolved . . . . .... · .......... !.·............. 2* 
Statement -of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3• 
Assignment of Error . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6* 
. Defendants'. (Appellants') Contentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6* 
(a) Consideration of the deed as a whole unaide_d 
by extrinsic evidence . . . .. ........... ·. . . . . . . 9• 
(b) Intention · as gathered from surrounding cir-
. · · cilinstances and -probable motives of the par-
. · · ties ~ · .. · . . ... -.... -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 • 
(c) Construction placed on the deed by the parties. 14* 
Complainant's- (Appellee's) Contentions and Argument 
in Reply Thereto . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16* 
(a) ,The first sentence of the trust clause does not 
create a fee in Mrs. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . 17• 
(b) . If a fee be created by the first sentence, that 
fee .is cut· down and limited by. subsequent lan-
guage in the deed ........................... 22,,. 
Doctrine of May v. Joynes Has No Application ........ 35* 
The Power· of ·sallie F. Taylor Conferred Upon Her by 
the Deed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39"" 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45"' 
Table of Citations 
Barksdale v. White, 28 Gratt. 224 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23• 
Bristow v. Bristow, 138 Va. 67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22* 
Browning v. Bluegrass, Etc., Co., 153 Va. 20 .. 7*, 23*, 36'\ 40'"' 
Bu,rwell's Exor. v. Anderson, Atlmr., 3 Leigh 348 ...... 35* · 
Cole v. Cole, 79 Va. 251 ............................. 2t«' 
Conrad v. Conrad's Exor., 123 Va. 711 ......... : ..... 36* 
Davis v. Kendall, 130 Va. 175 ........... 22*, 36*, 37'\ 38•, 
39*, 40*, 42*, 43* 
Farrar v. Pemberton, 154 Va. 61 ' ....... -: ............. 34* 
Gaskins v. Hunton, 92 Va. 528 .................... 23*, 24* 
Hickman v. Hickman, 156 Va. 659 ..................... 20* 
Holland v. Vaugha1n, 120 Va. 324 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s• 
I~ INDEX TO PETITION-Continued 
Page 
Honaker v. Duff, 101 Va. 675 .................... .42*, 44* 
Hood v. Haden, 82 Va. 588 .......................... 44* 
Hurt v. Hitrt, 121 Ya. 413 .......................... 22* 
Johns v. Johns, 86 Va. 333 ........................... 43* 
May v. Joynes, 20 Gratt. 692 ........................ 36* 
McCready v. Lyon, 167 Va. 103 ................... 22*, 36* 
Moore v. Railway Co·1npany, 159 Va. 703 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8* 
Morris v. Bernard, 114 Va. 630 ................... 7*, 30• 
Randolph v. Wright, 81 Va. 608 ............... 28*, 29*, 43,it 
Rinker v. Troitt, 171 Va. 327 .......................... 28* 
Schultz v. Carter, 153 Va. 730 . .. . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 7* 
Skinner v. Skinner, 158 Va. 326 ................... 36*, 37* 
Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68, 78 L. Ed. 322 ................ 20*, 22* 
Smythe v. Smythe, 90 Va. 638 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43* 
Stark v. Lipscomb, 29 Gratt. 322 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23* 
Temple v. Wright, 94 Va. 338 ....................... 26* 
. ll . * Trice v. Powe , 168 Va. 397 . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 36 
Vaughan v. V wughan,, 97 Va. 322 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33* 
Wolverton v. Hoffman, 104 Va. 605 .................. 23* 
Wornom, v. Hampton Institu,te, 144 Va. 533 ........... 23* 
Burdick on Real Property, 736 ........... ; .......... 44* 
Code of Virginia, Chap. 254-A (ss. 6140a and 6140b) .... 1-A * 
Code of Virginia, Sec. 5147 . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 * 
13 Cyc. 608 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9* 
31 Cyc. 1088 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 * 
3 Michie's Digest of Va. and W. Va. Reports, p. 522.... 8* 
II Minor's Institutes, 819 .......................... 44• 
Tiedman on Real Property, Sec. 567 ................. 44* 
IN '11HE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT 1-UCHMOND. 
Record No. 2271 
DOUGLAS E. TAYLOR AND BELLE TAYLOR PETTITt 
.A.ppellants, 
versus 
FLOYD BRffWN TAYLOR, WHO SUES IN HER OWN 
RIGHT AND AS EXECUTOR UJNDER-THE WILL OF 
SALLIE F. TAYLOR, DECEASED, Appellee. 
PETITION FOR APPEAL. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Sitprenie Court of .Appeal,s 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioners, Douglas E. Taylor and Belle Taylor 
Pettit, respectfully represent that they are aggrieved by a 
final decree entered by the Chancery Court of the City of 
Richmond on the 27th day of October, 1939, in a certain pro• 
ceeding· therein pending wherein your petitioners and others 
were defendants and the said Floyd Brown Taylor, who sues 
in her own right and as Executor under the will of Sallie F. 
Taylor, deceased, was complainant or :petitioner. .A. tran· 
script of the record in the said proceedmg is filed herewith 
and the parties will be hereinafter designated according to 
the positions they occupied in the trial court. 
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1-A• 8 THE.PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER OOURT. 
This case was brought in pursuance of the provisions of 
the Declaratory Judgments Act, Chapter 254-A (Sections 
6140a and 6140b) of the Code of Virginia of 1906. It was 
heard in the lower court on the complainant's petition or bill 
of complaint; on the answers of the defendants ; on the gep-
eral replication of the complainant to the said answers; and . 
on certain stipulations of counsel which were duly made a 
part of the record. On that hearj.ng the decree, from which 
this appeal is ~ought, was entered. 
*THE QUESTION INV.OL VED. 
The object of this suit is to obtain a construction of the 
deed from Minna Keppler to H. Seldon Taylor, Trustee, dated 
March 22, 1895, and of record in the Clerk's Office of the 
Chancery Court of the City of Richmond in deed book 154-A, 
page 50. By this deed Minna Keppler, "in consideration of 
the sum of Six thousand two hundred and fifty dollars'', con-
veyed certain business prop~rty, which may be briefly de-
scribed as .No. 322 East Broad' Street, Richmond, Virginia, to 
H. SeldoD: Taylor, Trustee: 
'' In trust, nevertheless, for the following purposes, to-
wit: Tbat the said H. ,Seldon Taylor shall hold the same for 
the sole, separate and exclusive use and benefit of his wife, 
Sallie F. Taylor, with power, during the joint lives of the said 
H. Seldon and Sallie F., to sell, exchange or encumber by 
mortgage or deed of trust, upon the written request of the 
said Sallie F. Taylor. Should the said property or any taken 
in exchange therefor, not be alienated in any of the above 
modes, during the said joint lives, and the said Sallie F. 
Taylor should survive her husband, the said property shall 
be held by her for and during her natural life, for her sole 
and separate use, free from the debts, contracts and control 
of any future husband she may take, and at her death shall 
be equally divided among tlie children of the said H. Seldon 
Taylor, then livin~, including· those by his first marriage, as 
well as those by his present marriage. In the event that the 
said -H. Seldon Taylor shall survive his said wife, Sallie F. 
then the said property, or _any taken in exchang·e therefor, 
and not alienated in any of the above modes, shall revert to 
the said H. -Seldon Taylor in fee simple, absolutely freed and 
discharged from all trusts whatever.'' (R., p. 15.) 
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The complainant, Floyd Brown Taylor, contends that un-
der this deed her mother, Sallie F. Taylor, took an equitable 
fee simple estate in the whole of the said property, and that as 
the residuary devisee under her mother's will she now owns~ 
it. The defendants, Douglas E. Taylor and Belle Tavlor 
3* Pettit, 011 the other hand, contend that on *the death of 
the said Sallie F. Taylor, the property passed to them 
and to their half-sister, the' complainant (the three of them 
being the only children of H. Seldon Taylor, deceased, living 
at that time) in fee simple, share and share alike, and that 
each of them now owns an undivided one-third interest in 
the property. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
H. Seldon Taylor, the Trustee in this deed, who will be 
hereinafter referred to as H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., in order to 
distinguish him from his son of the same name, H. Seldon 
Taylor, Jr., was engaged in the real estate business and was 
a prominent business man in the City of Richmond. He was 
twice married, his first wife, Julia Belle Green, having died 
in the year 1881, and he having later married Sallie F. Brown, 
who was his wife when thf' deed in question was executed. 
At that time he, H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., had living children 
by each of his said marriages. · 
No sale, exchange or encumbrance of the property, No. ~22 
East Broad Street, has ever been made since the deed became 
effective. The property has been at all times, and is now, held 
under that deed. The evidence is silent as to who furnished 
the consideration for the conveyance, a substantial one, but 
the reco1:d does not disclose that Sallie F. Taylor had any 
means, and we think it is a fair inference that her husband 
furnished the consideration. During the lifetime of H. Seldon 
Taylor, Sr., the rents collected from the property were placed 
to his personal credit on the books of the firm of H. Sel-
4* don *Taylor & Son and were withdrawn by him from 
time to time (R., p. 70). . 
On February 13, 1930, H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., died leav'ing 
surviving him his widow, the said Sallie F. Taylor, and four 
children, two by his first marriage, Douglas E. Taylor and 
Belle Taylor Pettit, and two by his second marriage, H. Sel-
don Taylor, Jr., and Floyd Brown Taylor, and leaving a last 
will and testament. By the sixth clause of this will he gave 
his son, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr.,. all of his interest in the real 
estate business theretofore conducted by himself and his said 
son under the firm name of H. Seldon.Taylor & Son (R., p. 
22), and the tenth clause reads as follows: 
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''TENTH: I give and devise all· of my right, title and in-
terest in· the house and lot No. 322 East Broad Street, Rich-
mond, Virginia, to my sou, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., as Trus-
tee upon the trusts hereinafter declared. This property was 
conveyed to me as Trustee, by Minna Keppler, widow, by deed 
dated March 22, 1895, and recorded in the Clerk's Office of 
the R.ichmond Chancery Court in Deed Book 154-A, page 50, 
and provides that should I survive my dear wife, Sallie F. 
Taylor, then said house and lot shall, if unsold, revert to my 
estate." (R., p. 24.) 
Sallie F. Taylor survived her husband and, of course, this 
tenth clause of Mr. Taylor's will did not become operative, 
for, as we contend, she had a life estate in the property un-
der the deed of March 22, 1895, and Mr. Taylor's remainder 
interest was defeated by reason of his prior death. At any 
rate, however, about two months after the death of Mr. Tay-
lor, the elder, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., had the following en-
dorsement made on the fire insurance policy issued by the 
Mutual Assurance Society of Virginia, namely, "On and 
after date the assured hereunder is recognized as Mrs . .Sallie 
F. Taylor, Tenant for Life". There was -also other :fire in-
surance on the property carried by the Virginia Fire 
5* and Marine Insurance Company, *for which company the 
firm of H. Seldon Taylor & Son was agent, and the poli-
cies for tlris insurance were issued and signed from _time to 
time by "H. Seldon Taylor & Son, by H. Seldon Taylor, Jr.," 
as ag·ents for the said company, and in each instance the as-
sured was designated as, or the loss was made payable to,_ 
'' Sallie ],. Taylor, Life tenant'' (R., p. 71). 
Likewise, during the period from the death of H. Seldon 
Taylor, Sr., in 1930, to the death of Sallie F. Taylor in 1938, 
as hereinafter sta.ted, deeds of lease for the property were 
sig·ned and acknowledged by" Sallie F. Taylor, Life Tenant", 
as the lessor. One such deed of lease, dated l\fay 11, 1934, 
and one dated .January 8, 1935, are in evidence (R., pp. 72-
81, incl.). These papers were written in the office of H. Sel-
don Taylor & Son by H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., and were signed 
by Mrs. Taylor as the Life Tenant. A similar deed of lease, 
dated December 1, 1937, was drawn to be excuted by -Sallie 
F. Tavlor (R., p. 82). This deed of lease was prepared by 
E. M. Doggett, an employee of H. Seldon Taylor & Son (H . 
.Seldon Taylor~ Jr., having died on October 25, 1936), but 
Sallie F. Taylor was at that time quite m, so Mr. Doggett pre-
sented the deed of lease to Floyd Brown Taylor, the com-
nlainant here, went over it with her and explained the purport 
thereof to her in detail, and she thereupon authorized the 
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execution or acceptance of that lease in behalf of her mother 
as the life tenant and lessor (R., p~ 72). 
Sallie F. Taylor died 011 January 5., 1938 (R., p. 91), and 
this suit was instituted by Floyd Brown Taylor, her only 
6* daughter and the *Executor of her will, on June 25, 1938. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
The court erred in deciding· and holding that by the first 
sentence of the trust provisions contained in the deed of 
March 22, 1895, Sallie F. Taylor took an equitable fee simple 
estate in the said property and that the limitations over con-
tained in the trust provisions following are void; and in not 
holding that Sallie F. Taylor took a life estate only and that 
on her death the said property passed under the said deed to 
the three children of H. Seldon Taylor, deceased, then liv-
ing. 
THE DEFENDANT.S' CONTENTIONS. 
As stated, the defendants, Douglas E.· Taylor and Belle 
Taylor Pettit, contend that, under the terms of the deed in 
question, Sallie F. Taylor took an estate for her life only, 
and that on her death, the property passed to them and to 
their half-sister, the said Floyd Brown Taylor, in fee simple, 
share and share alike. 
In support of this position we maintain that in the applica-
tion of the fundamental rules of construction to the deed, it 
will conclusively appear that such was the intention of the 
parties, and t1iat that intention is made manifest by: 
I 
· ( 1) The proper construction of the languag·e of the deed 
as a wlio]e, unaided by extrinsic evidence; 
(2) The consideration of the surrounding circumstances 
and probable motives of the parties; and, 
7'~' * ( 3) The construction placed upon the deed by the par-
ties. 
The fundamental rules for the construction of deeds have 
been stated by this court time and time again. 
In Morris v. Bernard, 114 Va. 630, some of those rules are 
la id down as follows : 
"(1) That all parts of the deed must be considered and 
that construction adopted which will carry out the intent of 
the parties, which intent must be gathered from the language 
(j ~upreme Court of Appe~s of Virginia .. 
used; that the true inquiry is not what the grantor meant to 
express, but what the words used do express. 
"(2) That where words are used which have a well de-
fined technical meaning, they should be given their techni-
cal meaning. • • • 
'' (3) That i.t is the duty of the court to give the proper 
meaning to every word used in the instrument if possible.'' 
Keith, P., who delivered the opinion of the court in the 
case, said: 
"These propositions are supported by a numerous array 
of authorities; but as they are nowhere controverted, those 
authorities need not be discussed. It is p1·oper to observe, 
however, that all rules of construction have but one object, 
and that is to ascertain the intent of the parties to the instru-
ment to be construed, and that intent when ascertained, if it 
controverts no rule of law or of public policy, becomes the 
law of the case, and full effect must be given to it.'' 
In Browning v. Bluegrass, Etc., Co., 153 Va. 20, at 27, the 
court referred to the foregoing rules of construction, ap-
proved them and said that it was the duty of the court "to 
give effect to the intention of the graniMs so far as it can be 
ascertained from the four corners of the deed itself''. (Italics 
supplied.) 
In Schultz v. Carter, 153 Va. 730, Prentis, C. J., .delivering 
the opinion of the court, said : · 
8>1t *'' As is said in Whitehurst v. Burgess, 130 Va. 577, 
107 iS. E. 630, 632: 'It is a fundamental rule that in the 
construction of. deeds the object of the court is to ascertain 
the true intention of the parties, and that in order to ascertain 
this intention, all parts of the deed should be taken and con-
sidered together.' 
· "The principles of this accepted general rule are thus sum-
marized in 2 Michie 's Digest Cum. Supp., pages 467-8 : 'In 
the construction of a deed the purpose is to ascertain the in-
tention of the parties as gathered from the language of the 
whole instrument, and when so ascertained to give effect to 
such intention, unless to do so violates some principle of law 
inconsistent therewith. • * * 
'' 'In deeds as well as in wills the intention of the maker 
of the instrument, as gathered from all its parts, must pre-
vail unless that intention is contrary to law. • * * . ' When 
such intention clearly appears by according to the words. 
used their natural meaning, no rules of construction should 
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be invoked to defeat that intention. Where the language is 
obscure and doubtful, it is frequently helpful to consider the 
surrounding circumstances and probable motives of the con-
tracting- parties. * * * . '' 
In 3 Michie 's Digest of Virginia and West Va. Reports, 
p. 552 ( 42), this is said: 
"The effect of language used in a deed is to be gathered 
from a careful examination of the whole deed, and not merely 
of disjoined parts, so as to give eff oot to the whole, if pos-. 
sible. '' Numerous authorities are cited in support of the 
text. 
In Holland v~ Vaughan, 120 Va. 324, Prentis, J., delivering 
the opinion of the court, said: 
''No rule for the construction of written instruments is 
better settled than that which attaches great weight to the 
construction put upon the instrument by the parties them-
selves ; * * * . " 
In Moore v. Railway Conipany, 159 Va. 703, the court, speak-
ing through Mr. Justice Gregory, said : 
''In the construction of contracts in which obscurity ex-
ists, great weight is given by the courts to the acts *of 
9* the parties done under the contracts, as an indication of 
their intention. This is known as the rule of practical 
construction. Bridgewater, etc., Corp. v. Fredericksburg 
Power Co., supra; Citizens' Bank v. Taylor, 104 Va. 164, 51 
S. E. 159'.; Holland v. Vaugh(JJYI,, 120 Va. 324, 91 S. E. 122; 
Chick.v. MacBain, 157 Va. 60,160 S. E. 214; Janesville Cotton 
.Mills v. Ford, supra; Jackson Millin_q Co. v. Chandos, supra.. 
Applying the rule of practical construction which involved 
the construction of water grants in the Janesville Case, the 
court said: 'It is well settled that the practical construc-
tion placed by the parties in interest upon doubtful or ambigu-
ous terms in a contract will exercise p;reat and sometimes 
controlling· influence in determining the construction, and 
such rule is founded upon manifestly just principles.' '' See, 
also, 13 Cyc. 608, and notes. 
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CONSIDERATION OF THE DEED AS A WHOLE UN-
AIDED BY EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
We shall hereafter, from time to time and as we attempt to 
answer our opponents' contentions, refer to this particular 
. topic in more detail. For the time being, however, we shall 
content ourselves with directing the court's attention to the 
precise language contained in the trust clause of the deed 
( quoted on page 2 hereof), and with making the following 
observations: 
The real estate was conveyed to H. Seldon Taylor, Trus-
tee, not for one purpose, but for all of the purposes of the 
deed. The first line of the trust clause is : '' In trust never-
theless. for the fo1lowing purposes, to-wit:" The purposes 
which follow arc expressed, one immediately after the other, 
in simple language, and their meaning is too clear to be mis-
understood. The title to the property would be held at one 
time for one purpose and at another time for another pur-
pose, according· to the happening of the events expressly pro-
vided for in the deed, all of which were lawful and 
10* equally *binding on the parties. And since the prop-
erty was conveyed for all of the purposes of the deed, 
it could not have been the meaning· and intent of the deed to 
confer on Sallie F. Taylor a fee simple estate, it is respect-
fullv submitted. 
Who w~R ent.itlccl to the corpus of the estate during the 
joint lives of H. Seldon Taylor and Sallie F. Ta~rlor, his 
wife? No one ]1ad an indcfea8ible rig:ht to the fee while they 
both lived. This is true hP.eanse tl1e ~rantor expressly pro-
vided that if the said Sallie F. Tavlor should survive her 
husband. the estate "at her death ;hall be equally divided 
Hmon~· the chilclrrn of tlie said H. Seldon Taylor, then liviii~, 
includhlg: those by hiR firE:t marringe as well as those by his 
pre~ent marriage.'' The g-rantor further expressly provided 
t.hat in the event '' the said H. Seldon Tavlor shall survive 
his wife, Sallie F., then the said property: or a11y ta.ken in 
excl1a11g-e therefor, and not alienated in any of the above 
modes. shall revert to the said H. Seldon Taylor in fee simple, 
abP.olutelv freed and discharged from all trusts what.ever." 
Tlw COl'l)llS of the estate would ultimately vest in tbe per-
~on (H. s,,]don Tavlor) or persons (H. Seldon Taylor's chil-
rlren) who v\"ere A ltcrnately desig11ated by the grantor to take 
it upPn tlw happening of one or the other event which was 
ohlip;ed to follow, but wltich one was uncertain as long as 
Mr. and Mrs. Taylor both lived. The limitation to the said 
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children was contingent upon H. Seldon Taylor· dying before 
his wife Sallie F. Taylor. The limitation to H. Seldon Tay-
lor was c011tingent upon his surviving his wife, Sallie F. 
Taylor. Both limitations were good. '' Any estate,'' 
11 • says the statute, ''may be *made to commence in futu,ro, 
by deed, in like manner as by will; and any estate which 
would be good as an executory devise or bequest, shall be 
good if created by deed." Code 5147. The limitations them-
s<~lves conclusively show that Sallie F. Taylor did not take, 
and that the grantor did not intend she should take, a fee 
simple estate in the said real estate, it is respectfully sub-
mitted. 
INTENTION AS GATHERED FROivf SURROUNDING 
CIRCUMSTANCES AND- PROBABLE MO-
TIVES OF THE PARTIES. 
In eon~idering the circumstances surrounding· the contract-
ing; parties and their probable motives at the time the deed 
was executed, we find this to be the situation. Minna Keppler, 
the ~;rantor, had no motive other than that of selling her 
property for $6,250.00. She was not related in any way to 
any of the other parties to. the trammction and she was not 
interested in creating· a trust for them. The record shows 
tlrnt Sallie F. Taylor, who, correctly we think, styled her-
self as the life tenant, had no businP-sR experience whatever, 
hut relied implicitly upon ]1er husband, and that he attend~d 
to a11 of her business throughout his entire life, she merely 
Pxecuthw; such deeds and papers as he advised (R., p. 90). 
Sl1e did not furnisl1 the consideration for the conveyance, 
and the onlv motive she lrncl in the entire transaction was 
Rimp]y to do or take just w}mt her husband said for her to 
clo or take. It is certain that the children, some of whom 
might have heen subsequently born, had no motives. It fol-
lows, tlierefore, that only the circumstances surround-
] 2* inp: H. Seldon Taylor, *Sr., and his motives shed any 
liii:ht on the intention of the parties. He was an intelli-
~ent business man of means, ,,1ho had l1een twice married, 
with children by each marriage. He waR interested in mak-
ing· provision for, and protecting against loss, both his wife 
nnd all of his children-a perfectly natural and laudable dc-
Ri1'e. In tliese circumstances, it is fair to assume that he both 
furnished the consideration for the convevance and dictated 
tl1c terms of t.he trust. Jt is certain that he regarded the 
property as his own, for the deed provides that in the event 
he should survive his wife, the said Sallie F. Tavlor, then the 
property '' shall revert to the said H. Seldon Taylor in fee 
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simple, absolutely freed and discharged from all trusts what-
ever.' ' (I tali cs supplied.) 
It is respectfully submitted that these surrounding cir-
cumstances and these motives clearlv show that the intention 
. of the parties, and the Objects and purposes of the deed, were 
to vest an equitable life estate in Sallie F. Taylor, with the 
limited power in her to direct a sale, exchange or encumbrance 
of the property only during the joint lives of the said Sallie 
F. Taylor and .H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., and with the remainder 
at her death to the· said H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., in fee simple, 
if he were then living, and, if not, to all of his then living 
children, share and share alike. · · · 
. By so construing the deed effect will be given to Mr. Tay-
lor's obvious purpose and intention. It waR to preserve and 
protect this property for his wife and for all of his chil-
13* dren in ~case of his death. It is silmi:ficant that the 
power to direct a sale or exchange ofthe property was 
vested in Mrs. Taylor for only so long as they both should 
live, and that she ,vas deprived of that power in case of his 
prior death. It is true that Mrs. Taylor lived for nearly 
forty-three years after the deed was executed and that Mr. 
Taylor also lived for thirty-five years, but he might have 
died shortly after the deed became eff ect.ive and left his wife 
with a long widowhood, during· which sl1e might 11ave remar-
ried and had other children. It was during· this long possible 
period that Mr. Taylor desired to preserve the corpus of the 
estate from waste and dissipation so that his widow would 
receive the income therefrom as long· as she lived and so that 
his children-not hers bv some other husband--would re-
ceive the principal at he; death. As stated, he was a suc-
cessful business man and a real estate operator. He knew 
that he could manage the property and provide for hjs wife 
and children as long as ]1e lived. He also knew that life was 
uncertain and that no matter how long· his' wife's widowhood 
might be he wanted that property kept intact during that 
period regardless of the effect that changing business con-
ditions might have on its value. He also knew that if he 
lived the occasion might arise wl1en in his judgment he 
might think it would be advantag·eous to make a sale or ex-
change of the property, and he did not want it "tied up" 
during that period. The language employed in the trust pro-
vision was chosen to accomplish these very purposes. By the 
express terms of the trust Mrs. Taylor had no power to "re-
quire'' a sale after bis deatl1, and she would have '' re~ 
14tt quired" one in his *lifetime onlv at his direction or re-
quest. She, in effect, said so (R, pp. 90, 91), and he 
knew this to be true. 
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THE CONSTRUCTION PLACED ON THE DE·ED BY 
THE PARTIES. 
From the time the deed of March 22, 1895, was executed 
until Sallie F. Taylor's death in 1938, about forty-three years 
later, there was nothing that the defendants, Dbuglas E. Tay-
lor and !Belle Taylor Pettit, could do or say to indicate their 
construction of the deed, for they had nothing to do with the 
control or management of the property, or any interest in it, 
during that period. On the other hand, the conduct, actions 
and statements of Mrs. Taylor herself, the beneficiary under 
the trust, her husband, H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., the Trustee in 
the deed, and her own two children, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., 
her business adviser for a number of years, and Floyd Brown 
Taylor, the complainant in this ca·se, show conclusively that 
all of them understood and construed the deed to mean that 
the said Sallie F. Taylor had only a life est~te in the property, 
Not until after the death of Mrs. Taylor, when this suit was 
brought by Mrs. Taylor's only living child, claiming the prop-
erty for herself, did any one of them assert a contrary con-
tention. 
As has been stated, H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., was in a position 
to lmow, and probably did know better than any other person, 
the, intent of the deed, and by his will dated July 20, 1926, he 
specifically disposed of bis remainder interest in the prop-
erty in case he si1ould survive his wife (R., p. 24), there-
15* · by showing co~clusively that he *construed the deed to 
vest in Mrs. Taylor a life estate only. 
H. Seldon Taylor, ,Tr., wai;; also an experienced business 
man and was associated with his father in the real estate 
business of H. Seldon Taylor & Son for many years. Re was 
one of the Executors of his fatl1er's will, and be had charge 
of the property in question for his mother after the death 
of his father. That he construed the deed to vest a life estate 
in his mother, Sallie F. Taylor, and the remainder at her 
death in the children of H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., is shown by 
his testimony, acts and deeds. In a deposition given by him 
in the suit of Dou,qlas E. Taylor v. H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., and 
others, he testified as follows: 
"Q. Can you say what provision the complainant has re-
ceivP.d or will receive from his father's property and ea-
tate? . 
'' A. He l1as receivP.d from the insurance about $3,091.12. 
The property at 322 E. Broad Street, I suppose be will have 
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a one-fourth interest therein upon the death of my mother. 
'' Q. · Did the property, I mean 322 East Broad Street, R.ich-
mond, Virginia, pass under your father's will, or is it held 
under a deed of trust T 
"A. It is held under a deed of trust. 
"Q Have you a copy of that deed of trust? 
'' A. I have. My father valued the property at $70,000.00. 
One-fourth of this amount would be $17,500.00. Of course, 
there has been a depreciation in value since then. 
"Q. Will you please produce it and file it in evidence, to 
be marked 'Defendant's Exhibit No. 5' Y 
'' A. I will. 
"Q. This paper appears to be a certified copy of the deed 
ref erred to, does it not 7 
16* *" A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. What is the reasonable value of the property 
nowf 
'' A. I would say certainly $35,000.00.'' (R., p. 69.) 
Furthermore, he caused fire insurance policies to be is-
sued on the property with the loss, if any, made payable to 
the said Sallie F. Taylor as life tenant, and he prepared and 
had executed by the said Sallie F. Taylor, as the life tenant, 
certain deeds of lease, the last two of whi-Oh contained pro-
visions as follows : 
'' It is distinctlv understood bv each Lessee that Sallie F. 
Taylor is the Life Tenant of this" property, and it is distinctly 
understood by each Lessee that upon the death of Sallie F. 
Tavlor this lease or any renewal or extension thereof, or any 
option given the said Lessees to renew or extend this lease, 
automatically ceases to be; terminates upon her death and 
becomes null and void." (R., p. 73 and R., p. 79.) 
Sallie F. Taylor herself never at any time, either before 
the death of her husband, or in the period of eight years 
whicl1 slie survived him: attempted to dispose or make use 
of any part of the corpus of the est.ate, and all of the legal 
papers in respect to the property, which she signed, were. 
signed by her a~ life tenant 011ly, the words ''life tenant'' be-
in~ in her own handwriting (R., p. 82). 
Floyd Brown Taylor, the complainant, acquiesced in this 
construction of the deed by authorizing· the acceptance of a 
deed of lease on behalf of her mother as the ''life tenant" 
(R., p. 72). 
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THE COMPLAINANT'S CONTENTIONS. 
As we understand the argument of opposing counsel in the 
trial court, they made these two major contentions in 
17• support of il(ccomplainant's claim that her mother., Sallie 
F. Taylor, took an equitable fee simple estate under 
the deed, namely: · 
(1) That by the express language of the first sentence of 
the trust clause in the deed ( quoted on page 2 hereof) Mrs. 
Taylor took such a.n estate; and, 
(2) That if their first contention be unsound and it should 
be decided that Mrs. Taylor took only a life estate in the prop .. 
erty, then that life estate was converted into a fee simple un-
der the rule of Ma.y v. Joynes. 
In support of their first position, they argue that it was 
the intention of the parties to the deed to make provision for 
two separate terms or periods of time, which are entirely 
independent of, and are not in any way related to, each other, 
namely, (1) the period of the joint lives of Sallie ·F. Taylor 
and her husband, H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., which, they stress, 
lasted tl1irty-five years, and (2) the period of Mrs. Taylor's 
survivorship of her husband-eight years-, and that the Ian. 
g·uag-e used in c.reating· the estate that Mrs. Taylor was to have 
clurin~· the first distinct period was sufficient under the law 
to create a fee simple in her, and, therefore, the language 
used in creating the estate for the second distinct period is 
void for repugnancy and inconsistency, or as being an at-
tempted limitation upon a fee simple estate. They dismiss 
without. consideration the t.hird provision, the provision for 
tl1e period of H. Seldon Taylor's survivorship, in case he 
should ~mrvive his wife, saying that, since he predeceased 
her, it h;; not necegsary to do so. (Incidentally, it may be 
rn• f,;nid that the parties certainly did not know tha.t ""such 
would be the case at the time the deed became effective, 
and this third provision must be considered, along with all 
of the rest of the deed, in order to ascertain their intent at 
that time.) 
'l'hiR is a very ingenious argument, fm· we admit the legal 
propo~ition tlmt there can be no limitation upon a fee, be-
cnuRe if Ou.• fee be p:ranted all is gone. The difficulty, however, 
from our opponents' standpoint, as we view it, is that their 
prc•mise is not sound, and the conclusion they draw is not 
,va rrant0d by the lang·uage of the deed in this case. 
Of course, if it was the primary intention: of the parties to 
vest a fee simple estate in Mrs. Taylor, she bas it, and the 
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case is ended, but we say; the intention of the parties cannot 
be ascertained by reading merely a part of the first. sentence-
in the deed, or even the whole of that senfonce. On the other· 
hand, the court must read every word in the deed and gather 
thn intention of the parties from the whole deed and not 
merely from its disjoined parts. When this is done, it is 
earnestly submitted that it is obvious that it was not the in-
tention of the parties to prescribe two separafo terms and to 
grant two separate estates, the fee in the first term and a limi-
tation upon that fee in the second, as our opponents contend, 
but, rather, it wa.s their intention to grant an estate for Mrs. 
Taylor's life, one single and entire term, with two different 
J>rovisions to meet each of two situations, one of which was 
bound to arise, and the other might or might not arise within 
that single and entire term-one provision· applicable during· 
the joint lives of Mrs. Taylor and her husband ( a con-· 
19* dition which was obliged to follow, but :1which might 
have continued for only one day instead of the thirty-
five years it actually continued) and the other applicable dur-
ing the period of her survivorship of her husband ( a condi-
tion which, it is true, did arise and continue for eight years, 
although it might not have arisen at all, or it might have 
· col).tinned for only one day or for forty-three yea~·s). In the 
fir.st situation she was given a limited power over the prop-
erty, and in the second she was deprived of that power. 
Assuming, however, that the grantor did intend to create 
two separate terms, one by the fiTst sentence and the other 
by the second, let us examine the first sentence of the tmst 
clause and see if that, standing alone, is sufficient. to create 
a fee simple estate. The first part of that sentence reads: 
'' That the said H. Seldon Taylor shall hold the same for the 
sole, separate and exclusive use and benefit of bis wife, Sallie 
F. Taylor, • • "". '' Complainant relied on and stressed these 
·words to show that Sallie F. Taylor took a fee, and then 
argued that the words immediately following, "with power 
during the joint lives of the said H. Seldon and Sallie lt. to 
sell, exchange or encumber by mortgage or deed of trust., 
upon the written request of the said Sallie F. Taylor," should 
be expunged and disregarded on the theory that they were 
meauingless, because, since the first part of the sentence gave 
her mother a fee, she was possessed of the power conferred 
on her by the second part as an incident to that fee. In other 
words, the complainant argued that the intent of the parties 
should be ascertained from the consideration of a part of a 
single sentence only. and then~ having thus establis]]ed that 
intent, no consideration should l;>e given to the remainder of 
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the· sentence, or to any other part of the deed that would in-
dicate a contrary intent, because the latter is in conflict with 
the former and is the ref ore void. 
20(t •This reasoning, we submit, is directly in conflict with 
the rules requiring a deed· to be examined from its 
"four corners" and "every word" in it to be read, and the 
''whole deed, not merely its disjoined parts" to be considered 
in order to ascertain the intention of the parties .. 
In this connection the following extract from the opinion 
of Chief Justice Marshall in the case of 8-mit1i v. Bell, 6 Pet. 
• 68; 78 L. Ed. 322. which was quoted with approval by Mr . 
• J usticP. Browning in rendering the opinion in the case of 
Hickman v. Hickrnan, 156 Va. 659, 667, i~ very pertinent: 
" 'These words give the remainder of the estate, after his 
wife's decease, to the son, with as much clearness as the pre-
ceding words give the whole estate to his wife. They mani-
fest the inteution of the testator to make a future provision 
for his son a·s clearly as the first part of the bequest manifests 
his intention to make an immediate provision for his wife. 
If the first bequest is to take effect, according to the obvious 
import of the words taken alo~e, the last is expunged from 
the will. The operation of the whole clause will be precisely 
the same as· if the last member of the sentence were stricken 
out, yet both clause·s are equally tl1e wordR of the testator, 
are equally binding, and equally claim the attention of those 
who may construe the will. We are no more at liberty to 
disreg·ard the last member of the sentene,~ than the first. No 
rule is better settled than that the wl1ole will is to be taken 
together, anrl is to be so construed as to give effect, if it l>e 
possib)P., to Hie whole.· Eitl1er the last member of the sen-
tence must be totally rejected, or it must influence thP con-
struction of the first so as to restrain the natural meaning 
of its words; either the bequest to the son must be stricken 
out, or it mm,t limit the bequest to the wife and confine it 
to her life. The limitation in remainder shows that, in tl1e 
opinion of tlie testator, the previous words had given only 
an ei.;tate for life. This was the sense in which he used them.' 
"' 'It is impm;;~ible to read the will without perceiving a 
clear intention to give tl1e personal estate to the son after 
the death of llii;; mother. '' The rP.mainder of the 
21 • •said estate. affor her decease, to be for the m~e of the 
, said .T P.SSP. Goodwin.'' Had the testator been asked 
whether he intended to give anything by this bequest to his 
son. the words of the clause would have answered the ques-
tion in ·as plain terms as our language affords.' " 
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In making this quotation, we are fully aware of the fact 
that ihe holding on the facts in the Smith v. Bell case has been 
criticizP.d as beine: i11 conflict with the Virginia doctrine of 
Ma11 v . . To11nes. (See Cole v. Onle, 79 Va. 251, 254), and we 
a.re not eiting the case as having any bearing on or in any 
wise nffecting- that doctrine, but solely to show the method 
by which the intention of the parties should be ascertained. 
The Mriu \7 , ,Toune . ..; doctrine has nothing to do with ascer-
tah·ine: the intention of the parties, but relates only to the 
effect to he given to that intention after it shall have been 
once a~certained. We shall presentlv discuss that doctrine · 
more fullv. · · 
Of com:se the whole sentence will be considered as well as 
every word in the inetrument for that is the only way the 
intent of the grantor can be ascertained. But for the sake 
of argument, let's consider the words advanced by the com-
plainm, t to suHhl.in her contention. One may have the sole, 
separate nnd c~xdusive use and benefit of an estate for life, 
for a term of yenr~, or for some other period of time, depend-
ing, of eourse, upon the terms and provisions of the instru-
mont ~reat.ing the estate. Beal'ing this in mind, we ask, 
"How Ion~· was Same F. Taylor entitled to the estate for 
her Role. separate and exclusive use and benefit?" and "What 
was the· extent of J1er interest in the estate and her power 
and control over the fee?'' It. iR manifest that answers to 
the ouestionR cannot be found in the words relied on bv the 
complainant heeanF:e those words do not stand alone and do 
not of themRPlveR inrlicate the duration of the use, or 
22t" ~110w *that Sallie F. Tavlor had anv interest in or over 
the corpuR of the eRtate. ,TudQ:e Saunders, in Davis v. 
l( midall, 1.30 Va. 175. discussed the meanin~ of the words 
"sole nsr-: and benefit.'' He cited the caHe of Hitrt v. Hurt, 121 
Vn. 413. rind stated: "In tliat case the court said: ''The 
word ''m:ie" does not in its ordinary meaning import any 
power of disposition of the corpus ref erred to-the _,jus 
di.c:-nnneni/.i of the corpus-hut the contrary; indeed, only th.e 
rhrht to use and enjoy tbe benefit. of the corpus is implied by 
the word ''u~e ".' " Bristo1.v v. Bristow, 138 Va. 67; .Hurt 
v. "urt. 121 Va. 413: McCreadJJ v. L111on, 167 Va. 103: Smith 
v. Bf.ll, 6 PeterR 68. The c.ourt. will. therefore, have to ·look to 
the deed as R whole to ascertain the duration of the use and 
the extent of the power and control Sallie F. Tavlor had if 
anv. over the corpus of the estate. · ' 
"\V c have unrlertaken to demonstrate that our opponents' 
nremise is not sound, but we also say that the conclusion thev 
draw h; not. warranted by the langtrnge of the deed in thi~ 
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case. Now, let us see, and in doing so, we will assume that 
their premise is sound. We will assume that by the first 
sentence of the trust clause, standing alone, Mrs. Taylor did 
take a fee. Does it then follow that all of the subsequent 
lang-ua.ge in the deed must be disregarded and declared to be 
void for repug-nancy and inconsistency, or as being an at-
tempted limitation upon an express fee? We think not. 
In discussing this plrnse of the case, we- again emphasize 
the fact that the doctrine of May v. Joynes has no application 
whatever to it. We understand that our opponents con-
23* cede this, and that they •rely on the alleged broad rule 
that if. a fee simple estate is expressly created in one 
l)art of an instrument, then that esta.te cannot be cut down 
or limited by a different disposition in another part, t)le lat-
ter being· repugnant to the former. 
We submit that the proper rule of construction is not as 
broad as contended, and that if the correct rule be applied in 
this case, Mrs. Taylor took only a life estate, even if it be 
conceded tbat the first sentence in the deed, standing alone, 
mfo:ht be so construed as to g·ive her a fee. 
In Barksdale v. White, 28 Gratt.. 224, at 227, the rule in 
queRtion is set. f ort.h as follows: 
'' It is a. settled rule, in the construction of instruments, 
that if an estate is conveyed, an interest given, a benefit be· 
stowed in one part by clear, unambiguous, explicit words, 
upon which no doubt could be raised to destroy or annul that 
estate, interest or benefit, it is not sufficient to raise a mist 
or create a doubt. from other terms in ai,other part of the 
instrument. Possibilities and even probabilities will not avail. 
'' The terms to rescind or cut down the estate or interest 
l>efore ~iven, 1wust be a,s clea.r and· decisive as the terms bt1 
whi~h it ·was created. If the benefit is to be taken (1/Wa'JI itt 
must be by express words, or by necessary i1nplication. This 
rule of construction thus stated in the clear and comprehen-
Rive terms of the Lord Chancellor in Thornhill v. Hall 8 
Bligh's R. 88. 107, has been substantially ado'J)ted by this 
~ourt. aR it is the established rule of the English chancery." 
(Italics supplied.) 
. The rule as expressed in the fore going language has been 
cited or quoted with approval in quite a number of Virginia 
cases, amon~ tl1em being 8ta,rk v. Lipscomb, 29 Gratt. 322; 
Gaskin.,;; v. Hwnton, 92 Va .. 528; Wofoerton, v. Hoffman, 104 
Va. nO~: Wornoni v. Iiampton}nstifote, 144 Va. 533; and 
BroW'Yl/l,n.q v. Bliiegra.c;s, 153 v~ .. 20, 27. 
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In the case of Barksdale v. Wh-ite, s11pra, the facts 
24* were· that •the testator in five separately numbered 
items of his will bequeathed or devised certain specifie 
items of property to each of five children, and in each case 
the bequest or devise was either to "her and her heirs for-
ever" or ''to him and his heirs forever,"' thereby creating 
a fee in clear and explicit language. By the ninth item, or the 
residuary clause, of bis will, he directed tl1at the balance of 
his estate be sold- and the proceeds divided among his said 
five children and ·lent to them for their lives and after their 
death to be equally divided among· their children, and imme-
diately following; in the same item, was a provision to the 
effect that if any of his children should die without issue, 
then all property "loaned or given them be equally divided 
among my grandchildren.'' The question for determination 
by the court was whether the absolute or fee simple estates 
created by the first five items ·of tbe will were to be restrict.eel 
or cut down by the terms of the residuary clause. The court 
applied the principle of the English chancery above quoted, 
and held that the limitation over applied only to the property 
devised in the residuary clause. 
In the case of Gaskins v. Httnton, supra, the testator, by the 
first -pa.rt of his will, devised certain real estate to bis five 
children in fee simple and directed that it be divided among 
them in a specified manner. He then directed that "After 
the above mentioned divisions and dispositions are made,'' 
~nd at the end of the year after his death, ''the residue ·of 
my property, not divided as above, be equally divided among 
my four living sons and daughters; if either should die be-
fore the division or without an heir, the estate of such an 
one to be equally divided amongst all of my Iiying chil-
25* dren above •mentioned.'' The question for determina-
tion by the court was whether the whole estate devised 
to the children was to be taken subject to the provisions of 
"what may be called the residuary clause of the ·will." The 
court held that the five children took fee simple estates in 
all of the property, except that referred to in the residuary 
clause, saying, "For, as we have seen, the subsequent provi-
sion of an im1trument will not limit or diminish the estate 
given in a former portion of it, ttnless the terms by which it 
is to be cut down or limiled are as clear and decisive as those 
by which it wn,s created.'' (Italic.s supplied.) 
It will be obRerved that in the foregoing cases the fee simple 
estates created by the first part. of the respective instruments 
were created by .'' clear, unambiguous, explicit words upon 
which no doubt eould be raised.to destroy or annul" such e:s-
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.tates, and that the words relied on to diminish such fee simple 
.estates were not as clear and decisive as the terms by which 
tbey were created. 
. In the instant case, however, if it be conceded that the words 
in the first sentence, standing alone, create a ·fee in Mrs. 
·Taylor, can it be said that that fee is created hy clear, un-
ambiguous, explicit words upon which no doubt could · be 
raiAed 7 We think not, especially so since we remember that 
the first sentence also contains the words ''with power dur-
ing the joint lives of the said H. Seldon and Sallie F. to sell, 
.exchange or encumber by mortgage or deed of trust upon the 
written request of the said Sallie F. Taylor." These words 
.certainly are not the clear and specific words normally em-
.ployed by one when it is his purpose to create a fee simple 
estate, and we think that the inferenc~to be drawn from 
26• their use here is that it was not •the intention of the 
parties to create a fee in Mrs. Taylor. 
Suppose, however, that the words used in the first i;:;entence, 
standing alone, are sufficiently clear to meet the requirements 
of the rule. This alone is not enough to make thei rule ap-
.plicable; for before it can be applied, 1t must also appear that 
the words used in the remaininµ; part of the deed to vest in 
Mrs. Taylor an estate for her life, with the remainder to her 
husband, in case he survived her, and to his children, in case 
hP. did nbt, are not a.s clear and dcci.c:ive as the. words ·creatin.Q 
the fee. -A mere examination of the whole ttust clause (quoted 
herein on page ·2) will demonstrate that they are equally as 
clear a.nd decisive, if not more so. The words used in the latter 
p·art of the deed cutting down or diminishing the fee, if it can 
be said that one was ~;iven by the first sentence, are clear and 
express words of definite meaning. Furthermore. under the 
very terms of the rule, a fee in the first taker may be cut down 
.by necessary implication.· Certainly the necesi;:;ary implica-
tion to be gathered from all of the words following the fir"s1 
sentence is that the grantor intended thereby to diminish 
her fee simple estate, if it can be said that she took one un-
_der the first sentence. · 
- We submit that the arg1.1ment advanced by our opponents 
to the effect that the alleged fee simple estate created by the 
·sentence of the trust provision cannot be limited or restricted 
by the subsequent language on the g·10und that the latter is 
repugnant to the former, and is therefore void, has been an-
swered adversely to their contention ·a number of times by this 
court. 
In Teniple v. 1'Vright, 94 Va. 338, Judg-e Harrison, in 
27* delivering *tl1e opinion of the court, said: 
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'' This appeal involves the construction of a deed dated De-
cember 14, 1881, from William H. ·Temple and wife to R. G. 
W light and Edward Wright, which is, so far as necessary 
to be quoted, in these words : 'That the said parties of the 
first part for and in consideration of the sum of two hundred 
dollarR to them in hand paid, and receipt whereof is hereby 
acknowledged, does Jiereby grant and sell to the said parties 
of the second part the following described land (description), 
to have and to hold the same with general warranty to them 
and their heirs forever. The condition of this deed is, that 
the said land is conveyed to R. G. W light for his special use, 
benefit, and profit, for and during his natural life, and at 
his death to his son, Edward Wright, to him and his heirs, 
or assigns, forever, with all the rights, privileges, and ap-
purtenances thereto belonging or in any wise appertaining.? 
'' Every deed is supposed to expres·s the intention of the 
parties, and however unusual the form may be, it is a pri-
mary and cardinal rule of construction, tha.t effect must be 
given to that intent whenever it is reasonably clear and free 
from doubt; and, in ascertaining the purpose and object of 
the parties, all parts of the deed must be taken and consid-
ered t.og·ether, it being a. rule of law too well settled to need 
citati()n of authority that, in the construction of any instru-
mP.t1t, it must be construed as a whole. 
''In this view it would seem too plain to admit of dispute 
that the grantor in the deed in question intended to give R. 
G. ,v right an estate for life, with remainder in fee to his son 
Edward Wright. It. is, however, contended on behalf of the 
appellees, that the deed vests in the grantees joint estates in 
'fee simple; aud that the portion of the deed which restricts 
this absolute conveyance of the fee-simple is repugnant to 
the granting· pa1't of the deed and therefore void. It is true 
that the g·rant is to both in fee, but it is connected imme-
diately, without intervening terms, with language which shows 
that by the preceding grant the intention was that·one should 
take. only a life-estate, and the other the remainder in fee. 
'' The technical common law rule relied on by appellees, 
that the habendwm clause of a deed yields to the granting 
clause where there is a repugnance between the estate granted 
and tlrnt limited in the habend11m, which is a consequence of 
tlie rnlc that deeds are construed moi;;t strongly against the 
grantor, is supported by abundant authority. It is, how-
ever, not to be invoked as a rule of construction •except 
28* in those cases where the repugnance is such that the 
intention of the grantor cannot be determined with rea-
sona blc certainty from the whole instrument, for where that 
intention can be ascertained it is controlling if no legal ob-
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stacle lies in the way. Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich. 338; 
Fogarty v. Stack, 86 Tenn. 610; Bodine's Adm'r v. Arthur, 
91 Ky. 53; 34 Amer. St. R., note p. 164; and note to Berridge 
v. Glassey, 56 Amer. R. 324. 
'' Chancellor Kent says that the habendu.,m has degenerated 
into a mere useless f onn. 4 Kent Com. 468. Certainly with 
us it has practically fallen into disuse. In the case at bar 
the language relied on as an' habendum cannot strictly be so 
considered. It is so connected with the premises that no ju-
dicial expo.qition severin.Q the two clau .. qes would be war. 
ranted. The la.tter claitse beginnrin_q with the words 'the· con-
dition of this deed,' <fc., dfo., shows clearly that it wa.c1 in-
tended to explain and qitalify the precedin,q .Qrant a;n,d thus 
become a part of it, not repitl}nant thereto, but explanatory 
o.f the .()rant.'' (Italics supplied.) 
The case of Randolph v. Wright, 81 Va. 608, which is cited 
with approval in Rinker v. Trout, 171 Va. 327, 337, involved 
the construction of a will. The testatrix had three children, 
two sons and a daughter. By her will made in 1843, she de-
vised two-thirds of her property to her son, Edward, '' and 
l1is heirs forever," and one-third to her son, Philip, '' and 
l1is heirs forever," and nothing to her daughter, Rosina. In 
1848 she added a codicil to her will, reading as follows: 
'' Should either son die without a will or lawful issue, the sur-
viving· son must heir all of the property given by me to him.'' 
Of course, the will and codicil together took effect as one in-
strument and spoke as of the death of the testatrix. The 
son, Edward, died in 1872, without. a will and without issue. 
The dau~·hter, Rosina, thereupon asserted a claim to one-
half of her deceased brot11cr 's interest in the property ( she 
nnd the surviving brother, Philip, being his only heirs) al-
leging tl1at Edward was given a fee simple estate by the 
29• first sentence of the *will and that the limitation upon 
that estate in the codicil was repugnant thereto and 
void. The lower court sustained that contention. On appeal 
the case was reversed, the court saying in itCJ opinion: 
''In t l1e construction of wills, the cardinal rule is to collec.t 
tlie intention of the testator from the whole will taken to-
gether, without regard to anything technical or to any par-
tic.ular forms of expression; and if the intent be lawful-
that is, does not create perpetuities or violate any rule of 
law-then the courts will give it effect. Shelton v. Shelton, 
1 "\Vash. 53. And where from the context of the will the 
testator lms explained Ms own meaning in the nse of certain 
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words, the' courts will take that explanation as their guide 
without resorting to -lexicographers to determine what is the 
meaning in the abstract, or to adjudicated cases to discover 
:what they h~ve been held to mean in other wills." 
Counsel for the daughter in t~at case, Randolpli v. Wri,qht, 
supra, made -a somewhat similar, if not the identical argu-
ment as the 'one advanced by our opponents in the instant case, 
and the fallowing significant comment by the court with re-
spect thereto will be found in the opinion at page 614: 
'' We have been referred to many cases and entertained 
with a learned argument to show that. 'as here "ras a previous 
devise of an absolute ownersllip, the fee simple, ''to my 
dutiful son, Edw~rd A. Johnson,'' and· his heirs forever, not 
the mere life estate to this fee, to this absolute ownership 
previously devised, was incidental the power of disposal'; and 
the question is argued here as if the property of Edward A. 
Johnson, left him under his mother's will, was his absolutely; 
and the will is commented on thus : 'I prescribe, though the _ 
property is his absolutely while he lives, &c., when he comes 
to die, I prescribe who shall· be his heirs,' &c. Now, if there 
}tad been no codicil, the properly would have been his 'lvnder 
the will; but there is a cod_icil, and that i~ a part of the w-ill 
itself, and that limits the estate of Edward A. Johnson, 'lipon 
the· happenin,q of a fitfo/re contingency, which was a condi-
tional limitation-an executory limitation which rendered his 
estate Uable to be defeated upon the happening of a con-
tingency, which contingency happened/' (Italics supplied.) 
aoe ·In Morris V. Bernard, 114 Va. 630: 
The question involved was the construction of a deed to 
determine what estate Panthea S. V. Finch took thereunder-
whether she took a life estate, wit11 vested remainder to her 
children, or did she take a fee tail converted by the statute 
into a fee simple, defeasible only upon her dying- without 
issue. -
Eliminating the non-essential parts of the deed, it appears 
that certain real est.ate was granted to John D. Alexander, 
Trustee, "for the sole, separate and exclusive use and benefit 
of the said Panthea S. V. Finch and the heirs of her body, 
free from the control of her husband when married, and if the 
said Panthea S. V. Finch should die without lawful issue sur-
viving her,'' (here follow certain other enumerated trust pur-
poses applicable in the event she should die without lawful 
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issue surviving her) and the deed continues with a provi-
sion to the effect that after the death of the said Panthea 
S. V. Finch the said Trustee '' shall c.onvey the said property 
in fee simple to the children or their descendants of the said 
Panthea S. V. Finch, if a.ny there be,'' with still further pro-
visions as to what disposition should be made if she should 
die without issue. 
Panthea S. V. Finch married one Bernard and died leav-
ing surviving her two children, but shortly bef o·re her death 
she conveyed the land in controversy to one, Morris. After 
her death.her son, B. F. Bernard, instituted the suit alleging 
that his mother took only a life estate under the deed in ·ques-
tion and that her deed to Morris conveyed only that life estate, 
· and that she being dead, he and his sister were entitled 
31 ~ to the property. The defendants below, *of course, con-
tended that Panthea S. V. Bernard., nee Finch, took a 
fee simple estate under the deed .. The court held, however, 
that she took only a life estate, and Keith, P., in speaking for 
the court, after making the observations with respect to cer-
tain rules of construction with rei;;pect to deeds (which are 
quoted b! us on page 7 hereof), said: 
· '' By the terms of the deed Alexander, the grantee, is to 
hold the property in trust for the use and benefit of Barnet 
and Ann B. Finch during their natural lives, and the life 
of the survivor of them, and after the death of both the said 
Barnet and Ann B. Finch. then for. the sole separate a.nd 
exclusive use and benefit oft.he said Panthea S. V. Finch and 
the heirs of her body. Had the deed stopped there, there 
would have been no room for doubt. Pant.hea S. V. Finch would 
have .taken a fee tail, converted by the statute into a fee 
simple, defeasible only upon her dying without issue. But 
the deed does not stop there, and as we are to give effect, if 
possible, to all the language used, we must endeavor to as-
certain what was in t11e mind of .the parties when they framed 
the subsequent provifdom; of this deed. 
''It is provided that if Pant.hea should die without lawful 
issue surviving her, then the property is to be held by the 
trustee for the use and benefit of Frances H. Ellington, as 
to one moiety thereof, and her children, and as to the other 
moiety, for the use and benefit of George E. Finch; 'and if 
the said Panthea S. V. Finch and Frances H. Ellington should 
both die without lawful issue surviving them, then the whole 
of it for the use and l)enefit of the said Geo. E. Finch.' Had 
the deed stopped there, it mig·ht plausibly have been contended 
that its provi~ions were in conflict, and that the first must be 
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~·iven its full effect, ancl tl1at Panthea S. V. ·Finch took a fee 
simple estate; or that the provision having been made in clear 
and explicit terms, giving to Panthea a fee tail convert.eel by 
statute into a fee simple, jt could only be revoked by terms 
as c]ear and explicit as those by which the first estate was 
given, and that the language of the deed immediately follow-
ing the grant to Panthea and the heirs of her body does not 
measure up to that requirement. It cannot be denied, how-
ever, t11at the effect of the language quoted is to throw doubt 
upon whether or not the term 'heirs of her body' was intended 
to be used in a technical sense as importing indefinite succes-
sion. The ~mbsequent provision which we have quoted 
32* tends to prepare the mind to •accept, if it does not com-
pel, the conclusion that it was not the purpose of this 
deed to vest an absolute fee simple in Panthea S. V. Finch. 
'' But the deed does not stop there. It is then provided 
that 'after the death of the said Barnet and Ann B. Finch 
and Panthea S. V. Finch, the said Alexander shall convey the 
said property in fee simple to the children or their descendants 
of the said Panthea S. V. Finch, if anv there be, and if by rea-
son of the death of the said PanthPa S. V: Finch without issue 
the said Frances H. Ellington and her children, and the said 
Geo. E. Finch, should become entitled to the use of the said 
property, then after the death of the said Frances H. Elling-
ton~ the said Alexander shall convey the same in fee, the· one 
moietv to thP, cllildren or t.l1eir descendants of the said Frances 
H. Ellin~·ton, and the .. othe1· moiety to the said George E. 
],inch. subject only to the life interest of the said Barnet and 
Ann B. Finch.' 
"No Remdb]e interpretation can be given to the language 
just quoted which is consistent with the use of the term !heirs 
of her body' in its technical Rense, and it is made plain to 
demonstration that the term was used as the equivalent of 
And to designate the same class of persons as the word 'chil-
dren.' 
"AA w::is said in Hurt v. Brooks, 89 Va. 496, 16 S. E. 358, 
'Where tliere is a manifest g-eneral intent, the consfa~uction 
should he such as to effectuate it, though thereby some par-
ticular or subordinate intent may be defeated, or the literal 
import of the words be departed from.' In obedience to 
that ru]e, it was held that where the testator, after giving 
certain property to his son A, then added: 'This property, 
thus ~meci:fied hv me. and given to my son A during his natural 
life. at hi~ death I give and bequeath the same to his children, 
lawfnllv beg·otten heirs of his body, and their descendants, 
if 11c sl10uld have any to die leaving children, during his 
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natural life.' 'the genera.i intent of the will was to make the 
shares of testator's children 'equal, and to limit the property 
devised and bequeathed to A a.nd to the other. children to 
the natural life of e'!ch. In the will there were· particular 
words which might raise a presumption of a fee simple estate 
in A. Held: Those particular words were controlled by the 
general intention that A should take an estate for life only, 
with remainder to his children.' '' 
. . 
33* ;ii.The court will obAerve that the words in the above 
deed, "for the sole, separate and exclusive use and bene-
fit'' of Panthea S. V. Finch, are the same words used in the 
deed involved in tl1e instant case, and that the language used 
in making the grant to Panthea S. V. Finch, standing alone, 
would have ~-iven her a fee simple, or a fee· tail, converted i.nto 
a fee simple estate. · 
In Vau_qhan v. TTau,ghan, 97 Va. 322, Riely, J., in speaking 
for the court. said: · 
'' Tl1e will to be con~trued in this case is short and concise, 
and may be quoted in full. After a. clause revoking all previ:. 
ous wills. it reads a~ follows: · 
"'I do herehv bequeath to my wife, Emma Lee Vaughan 
and to my children, all my property' of every kind, real arid 
personal, and do hereby appoint my wife my sole executrix 
witho11t ~ecmitv as Jon~· as s11e shall remain my lawfulwidow; 
should she marrv a~;ain the minor children to choose guard.:. 
ians. Rnd my wife in tl1at event to take a child's part, to 
lJe hers as lonp: as she lives, and at her death to be distributed 
arnon~st my child1·en then living. 1 further request tliat' no 
appraisement or other expense be made.' · 
"It. was argued for the appellants, that, according to the 
true construction of the will, t.11e widow and· children of the 
testator took a joint estate in the property, subject to the 
limitation of her share to her for her natural life, if she 
sl1oulcl many ago a in ; and the contention in behalf of· the ap-
11ellee was that ·she took the entire estate, a fee-simple in the 
realt:v-, and an absolute property in the personalty, subject 
to the limitation aforesaid in case she should marrv aga.in; 
and that, unless- sl1e ~hould ·marry airnin, the childi·en ·take 
no e~fate under the will in the property of the testator. · 
"If the testator had stopped at the end of the first ·clause, 
'I do hereby bequeath to my wife, Emma Lee Vaughan, and 
to my children, all my property of ·every kind, · re-al and 
personal,' if this stood alone, and constituted all that re·:.. 
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lated to the gift, it could not be doubted that she and the 
children would have taken a joint estate in all of the prop-
. erty. · This would be the plain and natural import of 
34 • the :ii.language. . It would be difficult to use plainer or 
more ~xplfoit language than the above to express the in-
tention, where the gift of a joint estate was the object of th~ 
testator. The testator, however, did not end the disposition 
of his property with the first clause, bnt went on to express 
himself further with regard to its disposition, and in the sub-
sequent clause used languag·e which negatives the idea that 
he intended to give the children a joint estate along with his 
wife.,.,. 
In Farrar v. Pemberton., 154 Va. 61, Campbell, J., in de-
livering the opinion of the court, said~ 
"The case turns upon the construction of the third clause 
of the will of Madalen A. Peyronnet, which reads: 
'' 'Third : I give the house and lot on tbe west line of First 
Street, No. 610, purchased by me from Gilbert J. Hunt, front-
ing on ·First Street twenty-one feet, and running back between 
parallel lines, one hundred and thirty-five feet, in fee simple 
.to Nellie Eugenia Pemberton, if living-, or to her issue. And 
if the said Nellie Eugenia Pemberton shall die without issue, 
then the said property shall pass in fee simple to Wallace 
Henry Pemberton, if living afthe death of said Nellie Eugenia, 
and if he is not then living; the said property shall pass in 
fee simple t.o James Peyronnet Pemberton.' '' 
Nellie Eugenia Pemberton lived many years after the death 
of the testratrix. A'fter her death without issue, Wallace 
Henry Pemberton instituted an action in ejectment to recover 
the property. The defense was that Nellie Eugenia Pember-
ton took a fee simple estate, and the limitation over was void. 
The Honorable Frank T. Sutton, Jr., held that upon a proper 
construction of t.he will, Nellie Eug·enia Pemberton took a 
defeasible fee, and that at her death without issue the fee 
vested in Wallace Henry Pemberton. He said: 
"In arriving- at the above views the court has not been 
unmindful of that rule of construction which says a. plain 
gift in one part of the will should not be cut down or di-
minished by another provision unless such latter provision 
is equally as clear and plain. Nor has the court overlooked 
that rule of construction wl1ich favors early vestinp- of an 
estate. 
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-35'* · •,'In this will the'- divesting clause is equally as clear · 
as the language in the earlier portion of the will giving 
the land to another. It divests the estate in fee simple to 
Wallace Henry Pemberton, provided he was alive at the death 
of Nellie. The defendant asks the court to construe this di-
vesting clause as having no effect unless Nellie died before 
the testatrix. The testatrix did not so limit the effect of 
this clause and so the coutt cannot.'' This ruling was af-
firmed on the appeal. 
We have undertaken to give the reasons why we say that 
the complainant's first major contention~that Mrs. Taylor 
took a fee simple estate under the first sentence in the trust 
clause of the deed-is not sound, and we will now proceed to 
point out the reasons why we think her second-that if Mrs. 
Taylor took only a life estate under the deed, _then that life 
·estate was Mnverted into a fee simple estate under the rule 
g·enerally ref erred to as the doctrine of May v. Joynes-is 
likewise unsound. 
Mau v. Joynes. 
It is· conceded, of course, that according to the early com-
mon law doctrine, a grant or devise of an estate generally, 
with the absolute and unqualified power of disposition, and 
not controlled or explained by anv other provision, carries 
the fee, for, as said in Biirwell's Exor. v. Anderson, Admr., 
3 Leigh 348: · '' Every man of ordinary capacity woulc\ un-
derstand a power to dispose of a thing as he pleased as a 
gift of the thing itself ,a. • • • ' ' This principle was recog-nized 
and applied in Virginia long before the case of May v. Jo11nes 
ever arose. 
The latter case was decided in the year 1851, although it 
was not reported until the year 1871, and it was then 
36~ held that a •devise by a testator to his wife ".during-
her life, but with full power to make sale of any part of 
the said estate, and to convey absolute titles to the purchasers; 
and use the purcl1a.se money for investment or any purpose 
that she pleases; with on]y this restriction that whatever 
remains at her death shall, after paying any debts she ipay 
owe, or any legacies that she may leave, be divided as fol-
lows : • • •,'' vested a fee simple estate in the wife, and that 
the limitation over was void. ltfay v. Joynes, 20 Gratt. 692, 
693. 
Since that decision the rule there expressed has been called 
and referred to as the doctrine of 'JJf ay v. Joynes. The prin-
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ciple has arisen and has been discussed many times. The 
decisions in many of the cases were ref erred to by Judge 
Burks in Conrad v. Conrad's Exor., 123 Va. 711, and about 
thirty of them were coJlected and analyzed by Judge Harrison 
in Davis v. Kendall, 130 Va. 175. More recently still the 
principle and the cases have been reviewed and discussed in 
QuitP. a number of cases, including Brownin.q v. Blue.Qrass, 
153 Va. 20: Skinner v. Skinner, 158 Va. 326; McOready v. 
LJ!on, 167 Va. 103; and Trice v. Powell, 168 Va. 397. 
In view of this gTeat wealth of discussion by so many 
lea.med jurists, we are quite certain that we cannot add any-
thing to what has nlready been said on the subject. Further-
more, even if we could, it would be futile for us to do so be-
cause in our judgment the doctrine of May v. Joynes has no 
application whatever to the deed now before the court. 
As we view the deed of March 22, 1895, the only function 
for the court to perform -is to ascertain the intention of 
37* the grantor *by the application of the well established 
rules of construction. The lf!J ay v. Joynes rule is not 
a rule of construction. It is a rule of law, and it has no place 
in the method or process by which the intention of a deed is 
ascertained. The doctrine does not become operative until 
the court shall have first ascertained the intention of the 
grantor · by a consideration of the whole deed, and then only 
in the event that it is manifest that the grantor had two 
separate and distinct intentions. If it be seen from the whole 
deed that the g-rantor had but one intention, then effect should 
be given to that intention without regard to the doctrine of 
May v. ,Toyn.es. On the other hand, if it be seen that the 
grantor had two intentions-the primary intention of vest-
in~· the fee simple in the first taker by giving to her the ab-
solute and unlimited power of disposition, and the secondary 
intention of giving "whatever remains wndisposed of" at 
the first taker's death over to another-then, and then only, 
is the rule of MaJt v. Joynes invoked to declare the secondary 
intention-the gift over-void, not because, as this court has 
said time and again, '' the court fails to perceive the intent, 
but because it is against the law." What lawY The law as 
estab1isl1ecl in MaJ/ v. Jovnes. 
Jn Skinner v. Skinner, 158 Va. 326, 332, Browning, J., 
quoted from the opinion in Davis v. Kendall, supraJ with ap-
proval, as follows: 
'~ 'The er,-;tate conveyed being the testator's, his will is 
t.he law of the court, unless that 1will be against the laiv of the 
land.' (Italics supplied.) 'Hence, when he plainly intends a 
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fee, even though the testator's expression is inartifieial, 
38• a fee is g·iven, but his intent to *limit a remainder on 
a fee is avoided. not that the court fails to perceive the 
in.tent, but because it is a,gainst the law.' (Italics ·supplied.)'' 
Judge Saunders, in Davis v. Kendall, supra-, said: 
''The crux of this whole matter, illustrated time and a~ain 
in the precedents which we have reviewed, and emphasized 
in Honaker v. Du.ff by the cases which it cited, and by the 
conclusions of the court, is that the fee passes, or not, accord-
ing to the intention to be derived from the words of the 
grantor, or testator, provided always that such intention is 
not contrary to law." 
vVe have said that the May v. J oJJnes rule of law has no 
application to the deed in question. This is. true because that 
rule could be applied only in the event that the court should 
first conclude from the deed as a whole that it was the in-
tention of the parties to vest in Mrs. Taylor a life estate, 
with the "full po'Wer of disposition by 'both deed and will, 
without limitation, or restriction, as to tinie, m,ode 1 or pu·r-
pose of its exercise,' " added the-reto. The fact that the deed 
gave Mrs. Taylor an estate for life, with the limited power 
of disposition of the property added, is not sufficient, for 
the doctrine of powers still exists, notwithstanding the doc-
trine of M a:11 v. J OJJn.es. This is made plain by Judge Saun-
ders wl1en lie says in Davis v. Kendall, s1,1:pra, at page 201: 
"These citations from H onake1· v. Duff indicate that the 
doctrine of powers has not been abolished in Virginia by 
the doctrine of May v. ,Joynes but that the two doctrines co-
exist in this jurisdiction, and are :fundamentally distinguished, 
tl1e whole matter 'resting upon intention.' A life tenant may 
bave a power which he may so exercise, in connection with 
the grant. of the life estate, as to pass a fee for his own uses 
and purposes, but the donee is not. on that account invested 
with the fee, when the power is not exercised • ~ *.', 
It is true that while these two separate principles 
39* exist *and are enforced, it is sometimes difficult to recon-
cile the cases dealing with them, a.nd this difficulty is 
likewise pointed out in the Davis v. Kendall case at page 196, 
where this is said : 
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''A.s stated in Honaker v. Duff, !01 Va. 675, 44 S. E. 900F 
the cases are difficult to reconcile, save on the principle of 
giving free· play to the testator's intention. That intention 
is the master key. In some of the cases cited, the expres-
sions used are rather broad, and if applied to all situations 
seemingly akin, would appear to abolish the doctrine of 
powers of appointment, and bring about a situation in which, 
in all cases of a-life tenant holding a power of appointment, 
his life estate pltis the authority to dispose of the donor's 
.:-reversion would. 'be so amalgamated as to lode-e the fee in 
the life tenant. · Yet this effect is certainly not intended by 
-the 'doctrine of May v. J ovnes,' for in the case of Honaker 
~v. Di~ff, supra, in which the doctrine of 'Jf.f ay v. Joynes is dis-
cussed, a power of appointment is established, and the first 
taker restricted to a life estate. The conclusions occasionally 
derived from opinions, and apparently supported by language 
,diRconnected from the facts, must be tested by reference to 
the facts of the cases, for, as Chief Justice Marshall aptly 
-said, 'The positive authority of a decision is co-extensive only 
with the facts on which it is made.",,. 
With these principles in mind, it becomes necessarv to care-
, fully examine the power conferred by the terms of the deed 
llpon Mrs. Taylor to see whether that power is sufficient to 
. enlarge or convert the life estate into -a fee siniple, under the 
doctrine of May v. Joynes. Especially is this true since the 
applicability or non-applicability of that doctrine in every 
case is entirely controlled by the nature and extent of the 
power conferred in each particular case. · 
POWER OF SALLIE F. TAYLOR. 
The deed is specific as to the nature and extent of tl1e power 
conferred on Sallie F. Taylor. It says "with power during 
the joint· lives of the said H. Seldon and Sallie F. to 
40"" sell, exchange or "'encumber by mortgage or deed of trust, 
upon the written request of the said Sallie F. Taylor." 
It will be observed that she was not given the itnlimited power 
of disposition. On the other hand, the power was expressly 
limited both as to time and purpose. Such power as was 
. conferred upon her expired on the death of H~ Seldon Taylor, 
Sr., and she was not given the po~er to dispose of tbe prop-
·erty by will at any time. No right or interest in the property 
was conferred upon her by the power, or -as was pointed out 
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by Judge Saunders in· Davis v. Kendall, 130 Va. 175, 202, she 
was not "given the absolute right 'to use the entire estate 
for any purpose she pleases,' or 'to appropriate it as she may , 
deem just and right,' or 'to do with it as shemaythinkproper,' 
or 'for her own comfort and convenience as she may choose,' 
or 'to possess and enjoy: the said property as if she enjoyed 
a fee simple and absolute estate,' or the like, either expressly 
or by inevitable implication; • • ""." On the contrary, if the 
power possessed by Mrs. Taylor had been exercised, any 
property taken· in exchange therefor would have been held 
subject to the same trust. 
In Brownin.q v. Bl'ltegrass, etc. Co., 153 Va. 20, :Mr. Justice 
Holt, speaking for the court, said: 
"What is a power of appointment? Judge Saunders, in 
Davis v. Kendall~ 130 Va. 175, adopts this satisfactory defini-
tion: 'It is an authority enabling one person to dispose of 
the interest which is vested in another.' * • • 
"Mr. Freeman, in a note appearing in 41 Am. Dec. 704, 
said: 'Indeed, a technical power is so inconsistent with 
absolute ownership that they cannot co-exist. The prin-
ciple is very well stated by Parker, C. J., in Eaton v. Btraio, 
18 N. H. 320, as follows: '' A general power of •ais-
41 * position does not necessarily imply ownership. In fact, 
the exi~tence of such a power, as a technical power, ex-
cludes the idea of an absolute fee simple in the party who 
possesses the power. Th~ absolute fee simple including and 
inv·olving the power of disposition, no technical power as a 
mere power could exist in the same party, separate from and 
independent of it. It would be preposterous for the owner 
of an absolute estate in fee simple to make a conveyance of 
his estate, under a technical power over it, even if the language . 
in the constitution of a power as usually expressed were 
superadded to the conveyance in fee by which he took his 
' estate." 
'' * * *. The donor of the power may wish to g·ive to the 
donee a freedom of action, a power of disposition, which he 
would not otherwise have. There is nothing inconsistent in 
such a transaction, and it may readily be distinguished from 
a case in which the donee would have the untrammeled power 
to convey to the appointee by virtue of his own ownership 
and independent of any grant from the donor.'' 
In 31 Cyc., p. 1088, this is said : 
'' A power may be· coupled with an interest, or the donee 
or grantee of a power may also have an interest or estate 
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in the property whieh is the subject of the power; but it is 
an elementary principle that the mere existence of a power 
confers no right of property or interest on the do nee or 
grantee, even wliere such power is for bis own benefit. ,It -iF •. 
"It is-very generally held that, where a life or other limited 
estate is granted and there fo1lows an additional power of 
disposal or appointment to the tenant for life, they will not 
have the effect of conferring an additional right of property 
upon the tenant by being construed to enlarge to a fee or 
absolute estate the estate which had been previously expressly 
declared to he for life or other limited term only, but will 
be carried into effect only as powers over the property given 
to the life tenant; and the same is true where no life estate 
is expressly given, but the power of disposition is limited to 
particular objects, or where there are limitations over in 
default of execution * * *. '' See, also, 31 Gyc., p. 1133. 
We have said that one cannot read the deed in this case as 
a whole, which must be done, and reach the conclusion that 
the grantor intended to convey to Sallie F. Taylor a fee 
42"" simple estate. •Especially is this true when it is re-
membered that, as Judge Saunders, in Davis v. Kendall, 
supra, at page 199, quoting from a note by .Judge Burks, says: 
''Where, however, an estate for life is given in express terms, 
ihe lang-uag-e in otl1er parts of the will, relied on to enlarge 
that estate into an absolute estate, ought to be verJJ clea1· 
indeed to have that effect." (Italics by the court.) Neither 
can it be said tl1at. it was the intention to grant her a fee be-
cause she had a limited power of disposal. Such a power is 
not property. Neither is it sufficient to enlarge the interest 
owned bv the said Sallie F. Taylor into a fee simple. This 
proposition has been definitely settled in this State, it is re-
spectfully submitted. 
In Honaker v. Duff, 101 Va. 675, Keith, P., delivering the 
opinion of the court, said: 
''vVe lrnvc quoted freely from this article, not only 011 
account of its intrinsic merit, but because the statement that 
where there is a limitation of the life estate, with full power 
of disposition over the fee 'by deed or by will,' that the 
devisee mav he held to take; not the mere life e~tate, but the 
fee bv implication, was relied upon in argument by counsel for 
anpe11ants as authority to show that in this case F.rancis C. 
Duff took an estate in fee. 
""\Ve have, however, the best authority for the statement 
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that the phrase 'by deed or by will' is not to be ·taken dis-
tributively, but as referring to the full power of disposition 
by both deed and will, as together constituting the full power 
of disposition over the fee, which, if conferred without limi-
tation or restriction as to time, mode or purpose of its exer-
~ise, would serve to enlarge the life estate expressly given 
into a fee by implication. · · · 
'' Where an es.ta te is given to a person generally, or in-
definitely as contrasted with a gift of life estate, as to A, 
with power of disposition, it is held to amount to a fee simple. 
Roberts v. Lewi8. 15-3 U.S. 367, 14 Sup. Ct. 945, 3_8 L. Ed,. 
43* 747. But even in this case, if a life *'estate only is 
plainly intended by the will, a fee simple in land, or a.n. 
absolute interest in personalty, will not be construed to pass 
to the :flrst taker, and a limitation over will be good. Stnitli 
v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68, 8 L. Ed. 322." 
In Davis v. Kendall, 130 Va. 175, .Judge Saunders said: 
'' This is a g-if t for life, with a power of disposition added. 
·while, in one view that we have considered, ¥,rs. Davis could 
dispose of the reversion by both deecl nnd will, yet she can 
l1ardly be said to have enjoyed a full power of disposition 
conferred without limitation as to time, mode, or purpose, of 
its exercise. Any deed that she might have ~ade would not 
lmve been effective to pass the rntire estate until her death. 
The devh~ees in the cases that have been reviewed, and which 
i11n~trate the doctrine of Man v. t!o11nes, were in a position to 
l)ass the entire estate presently for their purposes, by a 
sinp:le instrument. The power of the devisee, in the instant 
N1se. to dispose of' the fee is restrided, in any view that may 
be taken of the words 'at her death to be disposed of as she 
may deem proper, and think best.' She lacks that full power 
of disposition by 'both deed and will, without limitation, or 
restriction, as to time, mode, or purpose, of its exercise' which 
in the contemplation of the cases following M<111 v. Joynes, 
Rerves to enlarge a life estate expressly given into a fee by 
implication.'' 
The deed is so express as to the limited power of Salli,e F. 
Ta,vlor tha.t one cannot fail to observe that she "lacks," to 
use t.he languag·e of Judge Saunders, '' that fuU power of dis-
position lm 'both deed and will, 1without limitation, or re.stric-
tion, as to time, mode, or purpo.~e, of its exercise' which, in 
the contemplation of the cases followin,q May v. Joynes, serves 
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·to enlarge a life estate· expressly given info a fee by implica-
tion." (Italics supplied.) Bee, also, Smythe v. Smythe, 90 
Va. 638; Randolph v. Wright, Sl Va. 608; Johns v. Jolins~ 
86 Va. 333.· 
In Randolph v .. W1·ight, supra, this is said: 
"Mr. Keyes says, 'Section 168: But, without pursuing 
th~ matter, we may assert that the better opinion isy 
44* •that a -gift to one expressly for a limited period, with 
, an ab.~~lute power of disposition, does not pass the 
whole property; and the ref ore then a gift over, in default of 
disposition;'is not repugnant to the first gift.' • * * ." 
Mrs. Taylor cot1Id not have disposed of the property by a 
last will and testament under the power conferred upon her;. 
it is submitted, and, if this be true, then this alone precluded 
her from having taken a fee simple estate. Honaker v. Duff, 
101 Va. 675: Hood v. Haden, 82 Va. 588; Tiedman on Rea) 
Property, Section 567; II Minor"s Institutes, 819; Burdick 
on Real Property, 736. 
When one contrasts the language used in creating the un-
limited powers conferred upon the first takers in the May v .. 
Joynes case with the limited power conferred upon l\frs. 
Taylor by the deed of March 22, 1895, the dissimilarity of 
the two is so striking that it will be seen at once that the rule 
laid down in the former has no application to the language 
used in the latter. · 
In the May v. Joynes case itself the life tenant was ex..:. 
pressly given the power to seU the property at any time she 
chose; to use the purchase money for any purpose she 
-pleased; to consume the whole in the payment of her debts; 
and to dispose of it by will; and the limitation over applied 
only to ''whatever may remain nndisposed of at her death.',. 
In the instant case the utmost extent of Mrs. Taylor's power 
was to require the Trustee, her husband, to sell, exchange 
or encumber the property during his Iif etime only, and the 
limitation over applied to all of the property and to any taken 
in exchange the ref or. 
45*' •CONCLUSION. 
In the :final analysis, there is but one duty for· the court to 
perform in this case. That is to ascertain the intention of 
the parties as expressed in the deed, and then to give effect 
to that intention, unless it violates some _positive mle of law. 
Our opponents, we are sure, will concede this. 
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. For the reasons hereinabove · assigned, we respectfully sub-
mit that the intention of the parties does not violate any 
rule of law, and that that intention, as ascertained from a fair 
and reasonable, and the proper construction of the deed as a 
whole, was to vest in Sallie F. Taylor an equitable estate for 
her life, with the remainder at her death to H. Seldon Taylor, 
Sr., if he survived her, and if not, then to the then living 
children of the said H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., in fee f\jimple, 
share and share alike. More specifically, we submit, that 
under the proper construction of the deed as of March 22, 
1895, the time it became effective, the parties took the follow-
ing interests in the trust estate thereby created, namely: 
(1) Sallie F. Taylor, wife of H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., took 
an equitable estate for and during her natural life, with power 
of appointment-the limited power to require a sale, exchange 
or encumbrance during her husband's lifetime; 
(2) H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., took a vested remainder, in fee 
simple, subject to be divested by his dying before his wife, 
Sallie F. Taylor; and, 
(3) The children of H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., including those 
born by hi.s first marriage as well as those born by his 
46• second, took 8 ·contingent remainders-contingent upon 
Sallie F. Taylor's surviving H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., and 
contingent upon their being living at the death of the said 
Sallie F. Taylor. 
If this be the prqper construction of the deed, as we submit 
it is, it follows, of course, that since H. Seldon Taylo'i', Sr., 
died before his wife, Sallie F. Taylor, and since Floyd Brown 
Taylor, Douglas E. Taylor and Belle Taylor Pettit _are the 
only children of H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., who were living at 
the death of the said Sallie F. Taylor, they, the said Floyd 
Brown Taylor, Douglas E. Taylor and Belle Taylor Pettit, 
took the said property, in fee simple, share and share alike. 
Your petitioners accordingly respectfully pray that an ap-
peal from the said decree of the Chancery Court of the City of 
Richmond, rendered on October 27, 1939, may be allowed 
them; that the said decree may be reviewed and reversed; 
and that a final decree may be entered by this court con-
struing the said deed and directing that under its provisions 
the said Floyd Brown Taylor, Douglas E. Taylor and Belle 
Taylor Pettit took the said property, in fee simple, share 
and share alike, on the death of the said Sallie F. Taylor. 
Your petitioners aver that they have, on the 22nd day of 
January, 1940, delivered a copy_ of this petition to Henry C. 
Riely, Esq., of counsel for complainant in the trial court, in 
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person; that this petition will be filed in the office of the clerk 
of this court at Richmond; that counsel for petitioners de-
sire to state orally the reasons for reviewing the decree 
47• complained of; and that petitioners "adopt this petition 
as their opening brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DOUGLAS E. TAYLOR, 
BELLE TAYLOR PETTIT, 
ANDRE"W' J. ELLIS, 
GEORGE B. WHITE, 
By Counsel 
DAVID MEADE WHITE, JR., 
Counsel for Petitioners. 
502-504 Law Building, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
We, the undersigned counsel, practicing in the Supreme 
Court. of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in our opinion 
the decree complained of in the foregoing petition is erroneous 
and should be reviewed and reversed by the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia. 
Received January 22, 1940. 
ANDREW J. ELLIS, 
GEORGE B. WHITE. 
1\£. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Febmary 8, 1940. Appeal allowed. Bond, $1,000. 
EDW. W. HUDGINS. 
Received February 10, 1940. 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Judge of the Chancery Coutt of the City 
of Richmond, the 27th day of October, 1939. · 
Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit: On the 25th day 
of June, 1938, came the petitioner, Floyd Brown Taylor, who 
sues in her own right and as Executor under the will of Sallie 
F. Taylor, deceased, by counsel and sued out of the Clerk's 
Office of the Chancery Court subpoenas in Chancery against 
the defendants Douglas E. Taylor, Belle Taylor Pettit, Vir- -
ginia Trust Company, a corporation, as Surviving Executor 
and Trustee under the will of H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., said 
Virginia Trust Company, as Trustee under the will of Sallie 
F. Taylor, John T. Wingo, one of the Executors under the 
will of H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., Rhoda Davis Taylor, in her 
own right, and as one of the Executors under the will of H. 
Seldon Taylor, Jr., Rhoda Davis Taylor, Betty Apperson Tay-
lor (the last two named being children of said H. Seldon Tay-
lor, Jr., and his wife, Rhoda Davis Taylor), and Sutton & 
Company, Incorporated, a corporation created and existing 
under the laws of the State of Virginia, directed to the proper 
officers, a.nd returnable to third Monday in July, 1938, which 
subpoenas in Chancery and returns of the officer thereon are 
in due form. 
And at another day, to-wit: At rules held in the Clerk's 
Office of said Court, on the third Monday in July, 1938, _came 
the Petitioner, by counsel and filed her petition, with Exhibits 





In the Chancery Court of the City of Richmontl. 
Floyd Brown Taylor, who sues in her own right .and _as 
Executor under the will of Sallie F. Taylor, deceased, Pe· 
titioner,. 
v. 
Douglas E. Taylor, Belle Taylo1· Pettit, Virginia Trust Com-
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pany, a corporation created and existing under the laws of 
the State of ;'Virginia, as Surviving Executor and Trustee 
under the will of H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., said Virginia Trust 
Company, _as Trustee under the will of Sallie F. Taylor, 
John T. Wingo, one of the Executors under the will of H. 
Seldon T~yror, Jr., Rhoda Davis Taylor, in her own right 
and as one of the Executors under the will of H. Seldon 
Taylor, Jr., Rhoda Davis Taylor, Betty Apperson Taylor 
( the last two named being children of said H. Seldon Tay-
lor, Jr., and his wife, Rhoda Davis Taylor), and Sutton & 
Company, Incorporated, a corp-oration created and existing 
under the laws of the State of Virginia, Defendants. 
To the Honorable William A. Moncure, Judge of said Court : 
Floyd Brown Taylor, a resident of the City of Richmond, . 
Virginia, who sues herein in· her own right and as Executor 
under the will of Sallie F. Taylor, deceased, hereinafter called 
the petitioner, respectfully presents this, her petition, against 
the defendants above named, and also hereinafter named, and 
_ sets forth and alleges as follows : 
page 3} I. 
This proceeding is brought by the petitioner pursuant to 
the provisions of Chapter 254 .. A of the Code of Virginia of 
1936, comprising Sections 6140a and 6140b, inclusive, of said 
Code, for the ·purpose of obtaining from this Honorable Cou1·t, 
by proper hearing, decision, and decree, a binding adjudica-
tion declaratory of the right, title, estate, interest, and ownef-
ship to, in, and of the real property located in the City of 
Richmond, Virginia, known by the brief description of Num-
ber 822 East Broad Street and hereinafter more fully de-
scribed; and also for such other and consequential relief, 
with respect to said property, as may be necessary, expedient, 
and proper under the facts and circumstances set forth in 
this petition. 
II. 
By deed dated March 22, 1895, and recorded in the Clerk's 
Office of this court on March 23, 1895, in Deed Book 154-A, 
page 50, Minna Keppler, a widow, conveyed to H. Seldon Tay-
lor, Trustee, for a consideration recited in said deed of · 
$6,250.00, and with covenants of general warranty and other 
usual covenants of title, the real property above mentioned, 
which was described in said deed as follows : 
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'' All that certain lot, piece or parcel of ground, with the 
brick tenement No. 322 and all other improvements thereon, 
lying and being in the City of Richmond, Virginia, and 
bounded as follows, to-wit: Beginning at a point on the North-
. ern line of Broad Street, sixty feet, one inch, more 
page 4· ~ or less, West of its intersection with the Western 
line of Fourth Street, thence running W estwardly 
along the Northern line of Broad Street, and fronting thereon 
sixteen feet, nine inches, and extending back Northward from 
said front, between parallel lines, one hundred and twenty-
six feet to an alley ten feet wide; the Eastern and Wes tern 
lines of the land hereby conveyed pass respectively through 
the middle of the partition or dividing walls between the tene-
ment here by conveyed and the tenements adjoining it on the 
East and on the ,,..rest respectively; being the Eastern of 
four tenements which were conveyed to W. D. Thomas by 
.James Lyons, Jr., &c., Comrs. by deed dated February 9th, 
1884, and the same conveyeq to the said Minna Keppler by 
W. D. Thomas & wife by d~ed dated October 26th, 1892, re-
corded in Deed Book 147 A page 154." 
III. 
The terms of the trust on which said property was con-
veyed are set forth in said deed as follows: 
'' In Trust, nevertheless, for the following purposes, to. 
wit: That the said H. Seldon Taylor shall hold the same for 
the sole, separate and exclusive use and benefit of his wife, 
Sallie F. Taylor, with power, during the joint lives of the 
said H. Seldon and Sallie F., to sell, exchange, or encumber 
by mortgage or deed of trust~ upon the written request of the 
said Sallie F. Taylor. Should the said property, or any 
taken in exchange therefor, not be alienated in any of the 
above modes, during the said joint lives, and the said Sallie 
F. Taylor should survive her husband, the said 
page 5 ~ property shall be held by her for and during her 
natural life, for her sole and separate use, free 
from the debts, contracts and control of any future husband 
she may take, and at her death shall be equally divided among-
the children of the said H. Seldon Taylor then living, includ-
ing those by his first marriage as well as tliose by his present 
marriage. In the event that the said H. Seldon Taylor shal1 
survive his said wife, Sallie F., then the said property or 
any ta~en in exchange therefor, and not alienated in any of 
the above modes,. shall reYert to the said H. Seldon Taylor 
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in fee simple, absolutely freed and discharged from all trusts 
whatever.'' 
IV. 
A certified copy of said deed is herewith filed, marked 
Exhibit A, as a part of this petition. 
V. 
No sale, exchange, or encumbrance of the property conveyed 
in said deed has been at any time heretofore made or created 
since said deed became effective, and said property is still 
held under, and is now subject to, the provisions of said deed. 
VI. 
There have been at all times since the making of said deed 
of trust, and there are now, substantial improvements on 
said property. Said property has been likewise at all times 
during said period nuder lease to tenants, yielding thereby 
substantial net rentals. 
page 6} VII. 
H. Seldon Taylor (hereinafter called H. Seldon Taylor, 
Sr., in order to distinguish him from his son of the same 
name, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr.), the Trustee in said deed, died 
on February 13, 1930. He left a will, which was admitted 
to probate in this court on February 25, 1930, and is of record 
in the Clerk's Office of this court in Will Book 27, page 365. 
The Executors named in his will, to-wit, H. Seldon Taylor, 
Jr., and ,Virginia Trust Company, a corporation created and 
existing under the laws of the State of Virginia, having its 
principal office located in the City of Richmond, Virginia, 
qualified as s~ch Executors on the date of the probate of the 
will and thereafter jointly administered the estate in their 
hands, both as Executors and as Trustees, pursuant to the 
terms of said will, until the death of H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., 
.as hereinafter shown, since which time said Virginia Trust 
Company has remained, and is now acting, as the Surviving 
Executor and Trustee under said will. No substitution of a 
Trustee in said deed of :March 22, 1895, has been made since 
the death of I-I. Seldon Taylor, Sr. A certified copy of said 
will, consisting of the will proper and sundry codicils, is. here-
with filed, marked Exhibit B, as a part of this petition. It 
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will be seen from said will that, by Clause Tenth of the will 
proper, said H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., made disposition of all 
of his right, title, and interest in the property embraced in 
said deed of trust. · 
VIII. 
Sallie F. Taylor, the wife of H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., being 
. the saine Sallie F. Taylor mentioned in said deed 
pag·e 7 } of trust, survived him. She is now dead, having 
died on January 5, 1938. The petitioner is advised, 
and now so avers on information and belief, that the rents 
from the property conveyed in said deed of trust were paid 
over to and received by said Sallie F. Taylor, from and after 
tl1e death of said H. Seldon Taylor, until her death, but, as to 
the disposition of said rents prior thereto, the petitioner is 
not informed. Since the death of said Sallie F. Taylor, said 
rents have been collected by, and are now accumulated in .the 
hands of, the rental agents for said property, namely, Sutton 
& Company, Incorporated, a corporation created and existing 
under the laws of the State of Virginia, with its principal 
office iu the City of Richmond, Virginia, which is engaged in 
business as a real estate agent in said City. The petitioner 
is advised that it is holding said rents a.waiting a judicial 
determination of the person or persons entitled to receive 
them. The rents so held by them now amount, as the pe-
titioner believes and avers, to a considerable sum, but, as to 
the exact amount thereof, the petitioner is not advised. 
IX. 
Said H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., was twice married. His first 
marriage was to .Tulia Belle Green, of which there were born 
a number of children, but of whom only two survived said 
H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., and also said Sallie F. Taylor, namely, 
Douglas E. Taylor and Belle Taylor Pettit, both of whom 
are now living, and both are now residents of the City of 
Richmond, Virginia. The second marriage was to 
page 8} Sallie F. Brown-the same as the Sallie F. Taylor 
mentioned in said deed of trust. Of the second mar..; 
riage, there were born two children, namely, H. Seldon Tay-
lor, Jr., and the petitioner, Floyd Brown Taylor. Said H. 
Seldon Taylor, .Jr., died on October 25, 1936, being thus sur-
vived by his mother, Sallie F. Taylor, who, as above alleged, 
died on January 5, 1938. 
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X. 
Sallie F. ·Taylor left a will, which was admitted to probate 
in this court on February 3, 1938, and is of record in the 
Clerk's Office of this court in Will Book 37, page 75. A cer-
tified copy of said will, marked Exhibit C, is herewith filed 
as a part of this petition. In said will, the petitioner and the 
petitioner's brother, II. Seldon Taylor, Jr., were named as 
Executors; but said H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., having died before 
his mother qied, the petitioner duly qualified, and 'is now act-
ing, as th~ ~sple Executor under said will. The four th and 
:fifth clauses of said will are in the following terms : 
''FOURTH: All the rest and residue of my estate, real, 
personal or mixed, I give to my daughter, Floyd Brown Tay-
lor, three-sevenths absolutely and in fee simple·; I give one-
- seventh thereof to my son, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., absolutely 
· and in fee simple ; I give. three-sevenths to my son, H. Seldon 
Taylor, Jr., as Trustee for my said daughter, Floyd, said 
Trustee shall pay over the net income from this three-sevenths 
to my daughter Floyd during her lifetime and, if in the 
judgment of my said son, it shall be necessary to expend 
any portion or all of the principal of said trust fund 
page 9 ~ for the comfortable maintenance and support of 
my said daughter Floyd, then, and in such event, I 
do authorize and empower my said son, to expend so much 
of the principal thereof for that purpose ·as he, in his judg-
ment, may deem necessary. At the death of my daughter 
Floyd so much of said trust fund a~ may then remain in the 
hands of said Trustee shall pass to such persoTh or persons as 
my daughter Floyd may by an instrument in writing in the 
nature of a last Will and Testament authorize and direct, 
and, in the event that my said daughter fails to exercise such 
power of appointment, then, so much of said trust fund as 
may then remain on hand, both principal and accumulated in:-
come, not disbursed, shall pass and belong to my said son. 
H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., absolutely and in fee simple. In the 
event that my said son should die or fail to act as Trustee 
under this trust, then, in that event, I appoint the Virginia 
Trust Company of Richmond, Virginia, as Trustee in his 
stead, with like powers and discretions ai1d request that the 
court will, if necessary, ratify and approve sueh appointment. 
"FIFTH: In the event either my daughter Floyd or my 
son Seldon should die before my death occurs, then nnd in 
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that event the share of the deceased child shalJ pass and 
belong to the surviving child in fee simple.'' 
XI. 
Said H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., left a will, which was admitted 
to probate in this court on November 2, 1936, and is of record 
. in the Clerk's Office of this court in Will Book 35, 
page· 10 ~ page 362. A copy of said will, known and now 
. averred by the petitioner to be a true copy thereof, 
is herewith filed, marked Exhibit D, as a part of this petition. 
The Executors named in said will were Rhoda Davis Tay-
lor, the widow of H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., and John T. Wingo, 
who qualified as such Executors on the date of the probate 
of said will. Said H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., left surviving him 
his widow, Rhoda Davis Taylor, and two daughters, Rhod.a 
Davis Taylor and Betty Apperson Taylor, both of whom are 
now of age. Said widow and two daughters are residents 
of the City of Richmond, Virginia. 
XII. 
The petitioner avers as follows: 
1. Under said deed of l\farch 22, 1895, Sallie F. Taylor 
had an estate in fee simple absolute in said property, Number 
322 East Broad Street. 
2. In consequence, said property is subject to the provisions 
of the will of said Sallie F. Taylor, in particular· tlie fourth 
and fifth clause tl1ereof, hereinabove quoted hi Parag·raph 
Tenth hereof, by which clauses, .as will appear upon a refer-
ence thereto, she disposed of the residuum of her estate ancl 
provided also for the rights therein by survivorship, in the 
event of the death of either of her two children before her own 
death. The petitioner, however, hereby makes a special refer-
ence to said clauses for the terms and force and effect thereof. 
3. By reason of said last named provisions and the death of 
the petitioner's brother, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., be-
page 11 } fore that of his mother, Sallie F. Taylor, all in-
terest in said property passed, and now belongs, to 
the petitioner, to be used ancl enjoyed by her in accordance 
with said terms and provisions of said Sallie F. Taylor's 
will, to which ·will, as filed herewith, special reference is 
hereby ·again made for more particular information with re-
spect to the matters set out in this paragraph. . 
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4=. for the same reasons last above set forth, neither the 
estate of said H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., nor ~~Y beneficiary 
thereof, under his will or otherwise, has any estate or in-
terest in said property. 
5. Under the provisions of said deed of March 22, 1895, 
said H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., had no interest or estate in said 
property, and consequently nothing on which the dispositions 
made in the Tenth Clause of his will could operate. 
6. By reason of the fee simple estate in Sallie F. Taylor 
created in said trust property and the provisions of her 
will, neither said Douglas E. Taylor nor Belle Taylor Pettit 
had, or has, any estate or interest in said property. 
XIII. 
The petitioner is advised, and now so avers on information 
and belief, that said Douglas E. Taylor and Belle Taylor 
Pettit deny the correctness of the interpretation of said de~d 
of trust, as hereinabove alleged and relied on by the pe-
titioner in this petition, anc1 claim, on the contrary, that, by a 
construction of said deed of trust, which they con-
page 12 ~ tend to be the true construction, they are entitled 
to a substantial interest in said property. The 
petitioner is not advised as to what, if any, claim in said 
property under sE.iid deed of trust is made by the Executors 
and by the widow and children of said H. Seldon Taylor, Jr. 
XIV.· 
As appears from the allegations of this petition, a case 
of actual controversy is presented in this petition for the de~ 
cision and adjudication of this court. 
xv. 
The petitioner, therefore, prays that she may be allowed 
to file this petition, and she prays further as follows: 
1. Tliat Doug·las E. Taylor, Belle Taylor Pettit, Virginia 
Trust Company, a8 Surviving Executor and Trustee under 
the will of H. Seldon 'raylor, Sr., Virginia Trust .Company, 
as Trustee under the will of Sallie F. Taylor, John T. Wingo, 
one of the Executors under the will of H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., 
Rhoda Davis Taylor, in her own rig·ht and as one of the Execu-
tors under the will of H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., Rhoda Davis 
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Taylor, Betty Apperson Taylor {the last two named being 
children of said H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., and his wire, Rhoc:Ja 
Davis Taylor) and Sutton & Company, Incorporated, may be 
made parties defendant to this petition and process duly 
served on each and an of them; -
~. That said defendants, and each of them, may be required 
to make answer to this petition, but not under oath, 
page 13 t which oath is hereby expressly waived; 
3. That the court will construe the terms and 
provisions of said deed of March 22, 1895, jn their effect on 
the title and ownership of said property, Number 322 East 
Broad Street, Richmond, Virginia ; · 
4. That the court will adjudicate and decree that said Sallie 
F. Taylor had an estate in fee simple absolute in said prop-
erty, under the terms and provisions of said deed of trust, and 
that consequently said property passed pursuant to the pro-
visions of said Sallie F. Taylor's will; · 
5. That consequently, there being no specific disposition 
of said property in the will of said Sallie F. Taylor, the court 
will further adjudicate and decree that said property passed 
pursuant to the provisions of the Residuary Clause of h~r 
said will; 
6. That tl1e court will further adjl1dicate and decree that the 
petitioner, l)y virtue of the failure of her brother, H. Seldon 
'Taylor, Jr., to survive his mother, is the sole beneficiary of 
said property under the Fourth Clause of said Sallie F. Tay-
lor's will and is, therefore, entitled to said property, to be 
used and enjoyed as provided in said will; 
7. That the court will decree that the rents derived from 
said property and now in the hands of said Sutton & Com-
pany, Incorporated, belong to the petitioner and will direct 
the payment of said rents to her accordingly; 
8. That all such proceedings as may be neces-
page 14 }- sary, proper, and required for the fixing Qf record 
of the title to said property in the petitioner by 
deed or other written instrument may be taken herein; 
9. That this petition, so far as may be proper, necessary, or 
expedient, may be treated as a bill in equity.,. invoking the 
general equitf jurisdiction of this court, as to the matter~ 
herein set forth; 
10. That the court will grant all such relief and apply all 
sucl1 remedies as may he consequential, incidental, necessary, 
and proper in order to fully dispose of this cause in accordance 
with the statute in such case made and provided and the facts 
and circumstances herein alleged; and 
11. That the petitioner may have all such other and fur-
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ther and general relief as may be necessary and proper in 
the premises. 
And the petitioner will ever pray, etc .. 
FLOYD BROWN TAYLOR, 
.. In her own right and as Executor under 
the will of Sallie F. Taylor, deceased .. 
McGUIRE, RINLY, EGGLESTON & BOCOCK, 
Counsel for :Petitioner .. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit~ 
I, Louise T. Haley, a Notary Public for the City of Rich-
mond, in the State of Virginia, do certify that Floyd Brown 
Taylor, whose name is signed to the foregoing pe-
page 15 r tition, this day personally appeared before me in 
my said City and State and made oath that the 
allegations of said petition are true to the best of her in-
formation, knowledge, and helief .. 
Given under my hand this 14th day of July,. 1938. 
LOUISE T. HALEY, 
Notary Public. 
EXHIBIT "A" WITH THE PETITION, BEING COPY 
. OF_J?EEU OF TRUST OF MARCH 2?,_ 1895. 
This deed, made this 22nd day of March, in tl1e year 18!15,. 
between Minna Keppler ( widow) party of the first part, and 
H. Seldon Taylor, Trustee, party of the second part, 
Witnesseth, that, in consideration of the sum of Six thou-
sand two hundred and fifty dollars, the said party of the first 
part doth grant unto the said party of the . second part, with 
general warranty, All that certain lot, piece or parcel of 
ground, with the brick tenement No. 322 and all qther improve-
ments thereon, lying and being in the City of Richmond, Vir-
ginia, and bounded as follows, to-wit: beginning at a point 
on the Northern line of Broad Street, sixty feet, one inch, more. 
ot less, West of its intersection with the Western line of 
Fourth Street, thence running westwardly along the Northern 
line of Broad Street, and fronting thereon sixteen feet, nine 
inches and extending back_ N orthwa.rd from said front, between 
parallel lines, one hundred and twenty-six feet to an alley 
D. E. Taylor, et al., v. F. B. Taylor, .. and others. 47 
ten feet wide ; the Eastern and Wes tern lines of the land here-
by conveyed pass respectively through the middle 
page 16 ~ of the partition or dividing walls between the tene-
ment hereby conveyed and the tenements adjoin-
ing it on the East and on the West respectively; being the 
Eastern of four tenements which were conveyed to W. D. 
Thomas by James Lyons, Jr. &c., Comrs., by deed dated Feb-
ruary 9th, 1884, and the same conveyed to the said Minna 
Keppler by W. D. Thomas & wife by deed dated October 26th, 
1892, recorded in Deed Book 147-A, page 154. 
In trust, nevertheless, for the following purposes, to-wit: 
That the said H. Seldon Taylor shall hold the same for the 
sole, separate and exclusive use and benefit of his wife, Sallie 
F. Taylor, with power, during the joint lives of the said H. 
Seldon and Sallie F. to sell, exchange, or encumber by mort-
gage or deed of trust, upon the written request of the said 
Sallie F. Taylor. Should the said property, or any taken 
in exchange therefor, not be alienated in any of the above 
modes, during the said joint lives, and the said Sallie F. Tay-
lor should survive her husband, the said property shall be 
held by her fo1=' and during her natural life, for her sole and 
separate use, free from the debts, contracts and control of 
any future husband she may take, and at her death shall be 
equally divided among the children of the said H. Seldon Tay-
1or, then living, including those by his first marriage, as well 
as those by his present marriage. In the event that the said 
H. Seldon Taylor shall survive his said wife, Sallie F. then 
the said property, or any taken in exchange therefor, and 
not alienated in any of the above modes, shall revert to the 
said H. Seldon Taylor, in fee simple, absolutely freed and 
· discharged from all trusts whatever. 
page 17 ~ The said Minna Keppler covenants that she has 
the right to convey the said land to the grantee; 
that she has done no act to encumber the said land; that the 
grantee shall have quiet possession of the said land, free from 
encumbrances, and that she, the party of the first part, will 
execute such further assurance of the said land as may be 
requisite. · 
Witness the following signature and seal: 
l\tIINN A KEPPLER, (Seal) 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit : 
I, H. T. Richeson a Notary Public for the City aforesaid, 
in the State of Virginia, do certify that Minna Keppler, whose 
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name is signed to the writing hereto annexed, bearing date on 
the 22nd day of March, 1895, has acknowledged the same be-
fore me in my City afore said. · 
Given under my hand this 23rd day of March, 1895. 
H. T. RICHESON, 
Notary Pu~lic. 
City of Richmond, to-wit : 
In the Office of the Court of· Chancery for said City, the 
23rd day of March, 1895, 
This deed was presented, and, with the certificate annexed 
admitted to record at 12 o'clock M. 
Teste: 
CHAS. vV. GODDIN, Clerk 
A Copy, Teste : 
CHAS. 0. SA VILLE, Clerk. 
By JOHN F. SA VILLE, D. C. 
EXHIBIT ''B" ·w1TI-I THE PETITION, BEING COPYOF 
THE vnLL AND CODICILS OF 
H. SELDON TAYLOR. 
In the name of God, Amen. 
I, H. Seldon Taylor, of the City of Richmond, Virginia, 
do make this my last Will and Testament, hereby 
page 18 ~ revoking any and all Wills or Testamentery papers 
I may have heretofore made. 
FIRST : I desire my funeral expenses and any debts I 
may owe to be paid as soon after my death as practicable, out 
of any money there may be to my credit on the books of H. 
Seldon Taylor and Son, at the time of my death. 
If any of this fund remains after paying funeral expenses 
and debts, I direct that the same shall be invested by my 
Executors and Trustees, hereinafter named as they may think 
best. Said investment to be held by them during the lifetime 
of my Wife and the income therefrom to be paid regularly 
to her. And after her death, whatever remains of this fund, 
the same shall be equally divided between my son H. Seldon 
Taylor, Jr., and my daughter Floyd B. Taylor, or the issue 
of either one of them who may have passed away. 
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SECOND: I give and bequeath to my dear wife, Sallie 
F. Taylor, to do with as she pleases, all of my household and 
kitchen furniture and furnishing·s, china, silver and plated 
ware, and also my automobiles_ 
At the death of my dear wife I will and direct that what-
ever of said property is not used up or dispos~d of by said 
legatee in her lifetime shall pass and belong to my daughter> 
Floyd, in fee simple. 
THIRD: All of my stocks, l10nds and other securities, I 
give and bequeath to my wife, Sallie F. Taylor, for her com-
fortable support and enjoyment during her lifetime, with 
power to use and dispose of same, for her own en-
page 19 } joyment, as sl1e may see fit, but whatever remains 
of these securities at my Wife's death, two-thirds 
thereof shall pass to my daughter Floyd in fee simple, and 
the remaining one-third thereof to my son Seldon in fee sim-
ple. 
FOURTH: I give and devise to H. Seldon Taylor, J :r;., 
Trustee, for my daughter, Mary Belle Pettit, three certain 
parcels of land lying and being in the City of Richmond, Vir-
ginia, c.onsisting of House and Lot No. 409 N. First Street 
east side between Marshall and Clay Streets, House and 
Lot No. 106, west side of North Lombardy Street, between 
Grove. and Floyd Avenues, House and Lot No. 14 South Pine 
Street, between Main and Cary Streets, Richmond, Virginia, 
to he held and managed by him a.swill best preserve them aiid 
make them productive of the largest income; said income to 
lw 11~ed by i;;aid H. Seldon Taylor~ tTr., Trustee, during· Belle's 
lif P.timo, towards her, Relle 's maintenance and support, and 
shall he paid out by said H. Seldon Taylor, .Jr.~ Trustee, to 
such nerRon or persons, and :for such '3onsidera.tion as he, the 
Raid H. Seldon Taylor, .Jr.~ T.ru~tee, 8ha11 think proper, it 
being- specificall:v intended that Be1lc herself, shall have no 
rlaim upon the said income nor ag·ainst the Trustee in respect 
to th(_) i:-mmo; tl1e ()Xpendit.ures therefrom for 
H. SELDON TAYLOR, 
her benefit, being left as a personal trust, entirely to the judg-
ment and decision of said H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., Trustee. 
If at any time during the continuation of this trust, it shall 
be desirable in the judgment of said H. Seloon Taylor, Jr., 
Trustee, to sell either or all of said houses and lots, No. 409 
N ort11 First Street, No. 106 North Lombardy 
-page 20 }- Street, a11d No. 14 South Pine Street, and rein-
vest the proceeds in other property, real or per-
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sonal, he may do so, or if he s~o~1ld, at any time,. deem it neces-
sary for the purpose· of prov1dmg a proper and comfortable 
support for my daughter, Belle, then, in that event,. the said 
H. Seldon Taylor, J.r., Trustee, is hereby authorized and em-
powered to sell said. houses and lots, or any other property 
which may have been substituted therefor, and reinvest the 
proceeds in other property, real or personal, either he may 
think best, or apply the proceeds of such sale, or sales, or 
so much thereof as he, the said H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., Trustee, 
may deem necessary from time to time, to the support of my 
daughter, Mary Belle Pettit. In case of a sale of either of 
said houses and lots, or any property, real or personal, sub-
stituted therefor, the said H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., Trustee, 
is hereby authorized and empowered to execute all necessary 
deeds and other writings to carry out such sale or sales, and 
reinvestments, bnt no purchaser, or- purchasers, shall be re-
quired to see to the application of any of the purchase money. 
If these houses and lots are not sold during Belle's lifetime, 
or if they have been sold, then whatever property may have 
been substituted the ref or, and remaining undisposed of, shall 
pass in fee simple to any child, or children, that she, the said 
Mary Belle Pettit may have at the time of her death; and if 
she leaves no issue, then the said property, or any other prop-
erty, real or personal, substituted therefor, shall come back 
to my estate and become a par.t of the rest and residue there-
of, and be disposed of, as I will hereinafter direct ,vith respect 
to the holding of, and distribution of the rest and 
pa.ge 21 ~ residue of my estate. The trust hereby created 
is in the nature of a personal trust, and confidence, 
in said H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., but if he should die. or fail to 
act, then and in that event I appoint the Virginia Trust Com-
pany of Richmond, Virginia, in his stead, with like powers 
and discretion, a.nd request that the Court wilI, if necessary, 
ratify and approve such appointment. I direct that the value 
of the said houses and lots No. 409 North FirRt Str~et, No. 106 
North Lombardy Street and No. 14 South Pine Street, shaU 
not be deducted from Belle's share or interest in my estate 
at the time of final division thereof. 
FIFTH: I have five insurance policies on my life ; one in 
the Northwestern Mutual Insurance Company of Milwaukee, 
Wis., dated January 28th, 1891, No. 222958, for $3,000.00; one 
in the Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company of Philadelphia, 
Penn., No. 69932, for $2,500.00, one in the Northwestern 
Mutual, Like Iusura~ce Company of Milwaukee, Wis., No. 
254494, for $1,000.00; one in the Penn Mutual Life Insurance 
Company of Philadelphia, Penn., No. 81280, for $1,500.00; one 
in the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company of Mil-
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waukee, Wis., No. 388686, for $2,000.00 makin~ in all $10,000.00 
a part of which fund I now dispose of as rollows, viz: To 
my daughter, Floyd Brown Taylor, I give and bequeath the 
sum of $2,500.00; and to my son H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., t1=ie 
sum of $3,500.00 and. to my daughter, Mary Belle Pettit, the 
sum of $2,000.00; and to my son, Douglas E. Taylor, the sum 
of $500.00; and the balance or residue of said $10,000.00 fund, 
viz; $1,500.00, my personal representatives may, if they think 
best, apply to the payment of my debts if neces-
page 22 ~ sary, but if the said $1,500.00 be not applied to the 
pay.ment of my debts, then it shall 
H. SELDON TAYLOR. 
be invested by my personal representatives in some good 
bank stock, Virginia State Bonds, Richmond City Bonds, or 
some good real estate with brick improvements thereon, which 
shall be held as hereinafter provided, with respect to the resi-
due of my estate. I direct that the above mentioned $2,500.00 
given to my daughter, Floyd Brown Taylor; and the $.':l,500.00 
given to my son, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., and the $2,000.00 
given to my daughter, Mary Belle Pettit; and the $500.00 
given to my son, Douglas E. Taylor, shall not be deductecl 
from their respective shares, or interest, in my estate at the 
time of final division thereof. 
· SIXTH: I give to my son, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., all of 
my interest in the Real Estate Business now conducted by my-
self and him, under the firm name of H. Seldon Taylor and 
Son, including the good will, office :fixtures and furniture, iron 
safes and the lease on our office ; all of these things belong 
to me and not to the firm of H. Seldon Taylor and Son. No 
money, bills receivable, or any debts due me, are to be in-
cluded with, or regarded as a. part of the Real Estate Business 
just disposed of by me. 
SEVENTH: I give and devise the two houses and lots, 
No. 112 Lombardy Street, and No. 218 East Main Street, 
Richmond, Virginia, at the death of my wife, to my son, H. 
Seldon Taylor, Jr., Trustee, in trust for the use and benefit of 
my daughter, Floyd, with po,ver in said Trustee to sell either 
or both of said properties, upon the written request of Floyd, 
and to reinvest the proceeds from such sale in 
page 23 ~ other improved real estate, or some good Bank 
Stock, Trust Co. Stock, or Richmond City Bonds, 
and no purchaser shall be required to see to the application 
of the purchase money from sucl1 sale or sales. My daughter, 
Floyd, shall have the right to dispose by will of this property, 
or any that may be substituted therefor. .Should Floyd die 
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intestate as to this property, leaving issue, the same sha.11 be 
equally divided between such issue, and if she leave no issue, 
then the same shall pass to Belle and Seldon, or their issue 
per stirpes, to do with as they please. 
EIGHTH: I give and devise to my son, H. Seldon Taylor, 
Jr., my real estate at the Southwest corner of Eighth and 
Franklin Streets, and designated by two street numbers, viz., 
30 North Eighth Street and 715 East Franklin Street, but 
upon condition that during my Wife's lifetime he shall pay 
her a reasonable rent therefor. Should Seldon die before 
I die, then this property shall pass to his children, subject, 
however, to the right of my Wife to receive the rents there·of 
during her lifetime. I direct that the value of this property 
shall not be deducted from. Seldon 's share or interest in my 
estate at the time of final division thereof. 
NINTH: I give and de-dse all my right, title and interest 
in and to that house and lot in the City of Richmond, Vir-
ginia, known as No. 1022 ·west Franklin Street, conveyed by 
me and my Wife, Sallie F. Taylor, to A. vV. Patterson, Trus-
tee by deed of October 30th, 1911, and recorded in the Clerk's 
Office of the Chancery Court of the City of Rich-
page 24 ~ mond, in Deed Book 216-A page 481; if unsold, or 
such other property, real or personal, as may have 
been taken in exchange therefor, which according to the terms 
and conditions of said deed, in the event of the death of my 
said Wife prior to my death, will vest in me, in fee simple, 
and free from all trusts whatsoever, to my Executors and 
Trustees, to be held by them in trust, upon the following terms 
and conditions, uses and trusts, to-wit : For the sole and 
separate use, benefit and enjoyment, 
H. SELDON TAYLOR. 
first, of my daug·htcr, Floyd Brown Taylor, if she is living at 
the time of my death, free from the debts and control of any 
husband. she may take; upon the death of said Floyd Brown 
Taylor, next, for the sole and separate use, benefit and en-
joyment of my daughter, Mary Belle Pettit, if she be then 
living, for and during her natural life, free from the debts 
and control of any husband she may then have, or thereafter 
take; upon the death of said Floyd Brown Taylor and Mary 
PellP Pettit. next, for the use, benefit, and enjoyment of my 
son, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., if he he then living, for and during 
his natural life; and upon the death of said Floyd Brown 
Taylor, Mary Belle Pettit, and H. Seldon Taylor, ,Jr., lastly, 
to pass in fee simple and free from all trusts whatsoever, to 
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such person or persons, who according to the Statute of 
Descents of the State of Virginia, now in force, shall be my 
heirs-at-law as of the time of my death, as if I should have 
died intestate, seized of said property, in fee simple .. 
TENTH: I give and devise all of my right, title and in-
terest in the house and lot No. 322 East Broad 
page 25 } Street, Richmond, Virginia, to my son, H. Seldon 
Taylor, Jr., as Trustee upon the trusts hereinafter 
declared. This property was conveyed to me as Trustee, 
by Minna Keppler, widow, by deed dated March 22, 1895, 
and recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Richmond Chancery 
Court in Deed Book 154-A, page 50, and provides that should 
1 survive my dear "'\Vife, Sallie F. Taylor, then said house 
and lot shall, if unsold, revert to my estate. 
I direct that H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., as: Trustee, shall divide 
the rents and income from said property among my four chil-
dren in the following proportions, viz: To my daughter Floyd, 
three and one-half tenths ; to my son Seldon three and one-
lialf tenths, to my daughter Belle two tenths; and to my son 
Douglas one tenth. 
I authorize and empower said Trustee to sell said real estate 
whenever in his judgment it is best to do so and to execute 
all such deeds or other writings as may be proper to effec-
tuate such sale, and to divide the proceeds of sale among 
my four children in the same proportion as is above provided 
in respect to the income therefrom; and no purchaser of said 
real estate from said Trustee shall be required to see to the 
application of the purchase money. But any sums, whether 
of income or principal, which would go under the above pro-
visions to my daughter Belle shall be paid to my son I-I. Seldon 
Taylor, Jr., as Trustee for her, to be held by him and dis-
posed of upon prec.isely the same terms and conditions as 
are specified in the Fourth Clause of this ·wm in respect 
to the trust therein declared for the benefit of my said daugh-
ter Belle. 
ELEVENTH: All the rest and residue of my 
page 26 ~ estate, botl1 real and personal, shall be held by my 
personal representatives, hereinafter named, upon 
the following trust, to-wit: That the net annual income de-
rived from tl1is part of my estate shall by my personal repre-
sentatives, be paid to my dear Wife as long as she lives, for 
the support of herself and o~r daughter, Floyd Brown Taylor, 
as long as Floyd is unmarried. At the death of my dear 
Wife, this net annual income received by her as above pro-
vided, shall go to my two daughters; Belle to receive on~-
third thereof, and Floyd two-thirds thereof, until said Floyd 
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shall marry or dies; and should Belle die before Floyd is 
married, .her .s1=Iare of this net annual income shall go to he1" 
children and be equally divided between them. Upon the+ 
marriag·e or death of Floyd, said residuum of my estate shall 
then be equally divided between my three children, Mary Belle 
Pettit, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., and Floyd Brown Taylor, or 
the issue of:-either of them. If either one of these should 
de-
H. SELDON TAYLOR. 
part this life before I do, leaving issue, such shall take that 
share, which share shall be equally divided between the issue-
of the departed one bnt if there be no issue, then that s~are 
shall be divided between the survivors of my three children 
above named. · 
TWELFTH: The property, real and personal, whieh my 
daughters, Belle and Floyd, get in the final division of my 
estate, I direct shall be held in trust for them, free from the 
debts and control of any husband either of them may have, 
and I hereby appoint my son, H. Seldon Taylor1 Jr., Trus-
tee, for each of my daughters, Belle . and Floyd,. 
page 27 ~ bnt their respective shares shall be held by him 
separate and distinct one from the other. If Belle 
dies after the final division of my estate, without issue, then 
_the property she gets under this clause and held in trust 
for her, shall pass to her brother, Douglas E. Taylor; and 
if Floyd dies without issue, after the final division of my 
estate, then the property she gets under this Clause and held 
in trust for her, shall go to her brother, H. Seldon Taylor,. 
Jr. I direct that no security be required of H. Seldon Tay-
lor, J r.1 as Trustee for either of my daughters, Belle or 
Floyd. 
. THIRTEENTH: If any legatee or devisee under this vVilI 
attempts to sell or assign his or her share of my estate, or 
the income therefrom, before the time for final distribution, 
he or she shall forfeit the same, but this does not apply to 
my interest in the Real Estate Business, which I have given 
to my son, Seldon by the Sixth Clause of this ·wm. My 
personal repres·enta.tives, whom I will hereinafter name, may, 
at any tjme, when requested in writing, by my Wife and two 
daughters, or by my Wife and one son and one daughter, sell 
and convey any part of the trust estate and reinvest the 
proceeds from such sale, or sales, in improved City Real 
Estate, or first class Bank Stocks, Trust Co. Stocks, Railroad 
Bonds, Richmond City Bonds, or Bonds of the State of Vir-
ginia. The receipt of my personal representatives shall be a 
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full acquittance to the purchaser of such property, who is 
not required to see to the reinvestment, or application, of the 
purchase money. 
FOURTEENTH: Should anv le 0 ·atee or devisee contest 
this Will, he or she shall thereupon forfeit all claim upon my 
estate, and take nothing whatsoever. 
page 28 } FIFTEENTH: Should any beneficiary under 
this Will suffer· a forfeiture, either, under clause 
thirteen, by attempting to sell or assign his or her share or 
interest in my estate before the time of final distribution, or, 
under clause fourteen, by contesting this will; then the share 
so forfeited, shall pass to my other children then living, and 
be equally divided between them. 
SIXTEENTH: I he.re direct that the value of any real 
or personal property which I give to any one of my children 
by this Will, or any that I may have given either of them 
during my lifetime, shall not be deducted from his or her 
share or interest in my estate, when the time comes . for the 
final settlement and distribution thereof, and I also direct that 
no interest be charged any one of my children on any gifts, 
or advancements, I have made them during my lifetime or by 
this Will. 
SEVENTEENTH: Any money that either of my children 
may owe me at the time of my death, no matter what it is 
for, or how it is 
H. SELDON TAYLOR. 
evidenced, I hereby give the same to him or her. If my sister, 
:Mrs. Rosa L. Leath, is living at the time of my death, I here-
by give her any money she may owe me at that time. 
EIGHTEENTH:. All of the trusts created by this Will, 
where my son, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., is made sole Trustee, 
are in the nature of personal trust and confidence in him, 
therefore, I direct that no security be required of him in 
either case, but should he die, resign, or fail to act, then I 
hereby appoint the Virginia Trust Company of 
page 29 } Richmond, Virginia, in his stead, as such Trus-
tee, with the same powers and discretion. 
NINETEENTH: I hereby nominate and appoint my son, 
H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., and the Virginia. Trust Company of the 
City of Richmond, Virginia, Executors and Trustees of thh~ 
my last Will and Testament, and request that no security 
be required of either of them by the Court, and I direct that 
no appraisement shall be made, or inventory taken of my 
household and kitchen furniture, etc., given my dear Wife by 
the second clause of this Will. 
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I authorize and empower my said Executors to sell, at such 
times and in such manner as they may deem in the best in-
terests of my estate, any property belonging to my estate, 
either real or personal, and to reinvest the proceeds of sale 
in such other property, good Bank Stocks, Trust Co. Stock, 
Railroad Bonds, Richmond City Bonds, Bonds of the State 
of Virginia, or improved City real estate, as they may think 
to the best interest of my estate, and no purchaser of any 
such property so sold by my said Executors shall be required 
to see to the application of the purchase money. 
TWENTIETH: I hereby direct that nny and all inheritance 
taxes and levies shall be paid out of my estate, and not 
charged against the several legatees, and it is my desire that 
in the administration of my estate, whatever matters arise 
· requiring legal attention, be put in charge of my friend A. W. 
Patterson. 
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto signed my name to 
this my Last Will and Testament, which consists of six (6) 
pages, each page of which is signed by me this 
page 30 t 20th day of July, 1926. 
H. SELDON TAYLOR. 
Signed, published, and declared by H. Seldon Taylor, to 
be his Last Will and Testament, in the presence of us, who 
in his presence and at his request, and in the presence of each 
other, have hereunto signed our names as Witnesses thereto, 
this 20th day of July, 1926. 
GEO. W. WATT 
CHAS. P. WORD 
J. H. HUNT 
CODICIL NO. 1. 
Mr. H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., 
City. 
Dear Seldon. 
Richmond, Va., July 11th, 1927. 
Yon will find attached to this letter two certificates of the 
Virginia Electric and Power Company's 7% Pfd. Stock, for 
Five hundred dollars each, and numbered R. 0. 1845 and R. 0. 
1846. I do hereby give this Stock to my two granddaughters 
namely, Certificate No. R. 0. 1845 to Bettie Apperson Taylor 
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for $5QO. and Certificate No. R. 0. 184·6 to Rhoda Davis Tay-
lor for $500. 
After I have departed this life I ,1mnt you to take possession 
of this Stock, and when you think it best to have this Stock 
transferred to them you will please do so, and I hereby con-
stitute and appoint you my Attorney· in fact, to exenute .any 
paper or papers which may be necessary to transfer this 
Stock. I want it clearly understood, that tlie 
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shall not· be deducted from any interest they may 
have in my estate, at the time of the final division thereof. 
I will collect all dividends on this Stock during my life-
time and rriake such use thereof as I see fit. 
Affectionately your father, 
Witness. E. M:. DOGGETT. 
Witness. J. H. HUNT. 
H. SELDON TAYLOR. 
CODICIL NO. 2. 
I, H. Seldon Taylor, of the Cit:v of Richmond, do make this 
Codicil to my last Will a·nd Testament, which bears date July 
20th, 1926, as follows: 
FIRST: ·By the third Clause of my said Will I did direct 
i:bat whatever of my stocks, bonds and other securities should 
remain at. my wife's dP.a th, should b(1 divided two-thirds there-
of to my daughter Floyd in fee simple, and the remaining one-
third to my son Seldon, in fee simple. 
I do now revoke and annul that division of said stocks, bonds 
and other securities, and in lieu thereof, I do now will and 
direct tliat whatever stocks, bonds and other securities, shall 
remain at my wife'~ death Rhall be divided as follows, Three-
sevenths thereof, I do give a.nd bequeath to my daughter, 
Floyd, in fee simple ; another three-sevenths thereof, I do give 
to my son H. Seldon Taylor, Junior, as Trustee for my said 
daughter, Floyd, the said Trustee shall pay over the income 
from this three-sevenths to my daughter Floyd 
page 32 ~ during her life time, and if in the judgment of 
my said son, it shall be necessary to expend any 
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portion, or all of .the said trust fund :for the comfortable main-
tenance and support of my said daughter, Floyd, then, and in 
such event, I do authorize and empower my said son, to ex-
pend so much of the principal thereof for that purpos·e as 
he in his j~dgment may. deem necessary. At the death of my 
daughter Floyd; so much of the said trust fund as may then 
remain in the ;hands of the said Trustee, shall pass to such 
person or pers~n1s, as my said daug·hter Floyd may by an in-
strument in writing in the nature of her last Will and Testa-
ment authorize ·and direct.. 
In the event that my said son should die, or fail to aet as 
1 Trustee under this trust, then in that event, I appoint the-
Virginia Trust Company, of the City of Richmond, Virginia,. 
as Trustee in his stead with like powers and discretions, and 
request that the Court will, if necessary ratify and approve-
such appointment. 
The remaining One-seventh of such stocks, bonds and other 
securities as -may remain on hand at my wife's death, I do 
give and bequeath to my son, H. Seldon Taylor, Junior, to 
do with as he pleases. 
SECOND: By the fourth Clause of my said Will, I did 
give and devise to H. Seldon Taylor, Junior, as Trustee for 
my daughter Mary Belle Pettit, three certain 110uses and lots 
therein described, upon certain trust fully set forth in said 
Clause in my Will. 
I, do ·now will, and direct, that this Clause in my Will shall 
not become effective until after the death of my wife, to the 
end that my wife may during her lifetime receive the rents 
and profits arising therefrom. 
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disposing of the proceeds of certain life insurance 
policies on my life, I did give to my son, H. Seldo11 Taylor, 
Junior, out of s~id proceeds the sum of $3,500.00, and to my 
daughter Mary Belle Pettit, the sum of $2,000.00, I do now 
alter and amend that Clause of my Will to this extent only; 
that my son H. Seldon Taylor, Junior, sball recehre out of 
said proceeds the sum of $2,500.00, and my daughter l\Iary 
Belle Pettit, shall receive out of said proceeds ·the sum of 
$3,000.00. 
FOURTH: I have two life insurance policies of tl1c Mutual 
Life Insurance Company of New York, One #182,880 for 
$5,000.00, in favor of Julia B. Taylor, deeeasecl, who was my 
wife, and the other #182,881 for $5,000.00 in favor of my 
children. Whatever interest I may have in these two policies, 
under and by virtue of my son, Hunter Taylor's Will, I give 
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and bequeath to my daughter Mary Belle Pettit, to do with 
as she pleases. 
In all other respects, I do now republish and re-affirm my 
said Will. 
Given under my hand and seal this Seventh day of April, 
1928. 
H. SELDON TAYLOR (Seal) 
Signed, published, and declared by H. Seldon Taylor, to 
be a Codicil to his last Will and Testament, in the presence 
of us, who in his presence, and at his request, and· in the 
presence of each other, have hereunto signed our names as 
witnesses thereto, this 7th day of April, 1928. 
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GEO. :w. ·w ATT 
CHAS·. P. WORD 
J. H. HUNT 
CODICIL NO. 3. 
I, H. Seldon Taylor, of the City of Richmond, Virgima, do 
make this codicil, number two, to my last Will and Testa-
ment, which bears date on July 20th, 1926, as follows: 
FIRST: By the third clause of my said Will I did give 
all of my stocks, bonds and other securities to my wife, Sal-
. lie F. Taylor, for her comfortable support and maintenance 
during her lifetime, with the provision that at her death such 
of these securities as should then remain on hand should be 
divided between my daugh~r, Floyd, and my son, Seldon, in 
the proportions therein mentioned; arid by the first cla!ise of 
the codicil dated April 7th, 1928, to said Will, I did change 
the disposition of such securities as between my said daugh-
ter and my said son after the death of my wife. 
I do now, by this codicil, alter and change the said clause 
of my said Will, and the said clause of said codicil, in the 
following- respects, namely: 
(a) At .:rµy death I do give and bequeath to my son, H. Sel-
don Taylor, Jr., all of the shares of stock owned by me in 
the Virginia Trust Company. 
(b) By the said first clause of said codicil I did give to 
my son, Seldon, as Trustee for my daughter, Floyd, after 
the death of my said wife, three sevenths of the stocks, bonds 
and securities then remaining on hand, with the provision 
that in his discretion he could expend any part of the prin-
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cipal of said trust fund for the comfort~ble maintenance and 
support of my said daughter, and at the death of 
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may then remain in the hands of said Trustee 
should pass to such person as she might appoint by her last 
'\Vill and Testament. 
I do now will and direct that in the eyent that my said 
daughter fails to exercise such power of appointment, then 
so much of said trust fund as may then remain on hand shall 
go and belong· to my said son, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., 
SECOND: By the ninth clause of my said Will I did give 
and devise al.l of my right, title and interest in the house and 
lot of land in the City of Richmond, Virginia, known as No. 
1022 West Franklin Street, to my Executors and Trustees, 
to be held by them upon certain trusts fully set forth in the 
said Will, and among· others, that it should be held by the 
said Executors a.nd Ttustees for the sole benefit of my daugh-
ter, Floyd Brown Taylor, during her lifetime, and upon her 
death for the use and benefit of my daughter, Mary Belle 
Pettit. 
I do now alter and change that clause of my Will to this 
extent only; That at the death of my said daughter, Floyd 
Brown Taylor, the said house and lot shall go and belong, in 
fee simple, to my son, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., if he be living· 
at that time, and if he is not living· at that time, then the said 
house and lot shall go and belong, in fee simple, to his chil-
dren, share and share alike. 
In all other respects I do now republish and confirm my 
said Will, and the codicil number one thereto. 
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October, 1928. 
H. SELDON TAYLOR (Seal) 
Signed, sealed published and declared as and for a codicil 
to his last Will and Testament, which bears date on the 20th 
day of July, 1926, by H. Seldon Taylor, in the presence of 
us, who in his presence, at his request and in the presence 
of one another, have hereunto set our hands as attesting 
witnesses. 
GEO. W. WATT 
CHAS. P. WORD 
J. H. HUNT 
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CODICIL NO .. 4. 
Richmond, Va. Nov. 4/29 
To the Executors of my last will & testament 
Gentlemen 
On ,Sept 16th, 1929 I bought thirty shares First & Merchants 
Natl. Bank. stock, evidenced by two certificates, one No. B 211i 
for twenty .five shares, and one No. b 2112 for five shares. If 
I own this stock at the time of my death, I give the same to 
my son H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., and hereby authorize my Ex-
ecutors to deliver the same to him at once. 
This gift is not to interfere in any way whatsoever with 
the provisions I have made for my son Seldon in my will-
Witness my hand and seal this 4th day of November, 1929. 
Witness 
E. M. DOGGETT 
J. H. HUNT 
H. SELDON TAYLOR 
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I, H. SELDOlN TAYLOR, of the City of Richmond, Vir-
ginia, do make this codicil Number Three to my last will and 
testament, which bears date July 20, 1926, as follows: 
FIRST: In lieu of and as a substitute for the first clause 
of my said will, I now will and direct as follows: 
The three small dwelling· houses situated on the East side 
of Cherry Street and designated by the Street Numbers 209%, 
215, and 215% South Cherry Street, and also, if necessary 
to_ provide for the payment of debts and taxes as hereinafter 
expressed, the .property designated by the Street Number 
106 North Lombardy .Street (all of said property being lo-
cated in the City of Richmond, Virgini~) shall be sold as 
soon as practicable after my death, said sale to be made 
by my Executors hereinafter named, who are hereby given 
full power to make any necessary conveyance to the pur-
chaser. who shall be under no obligation to see to the applica-
tion of the purchase money. The proceeds of such sales shall 
be used and applied as follows: 
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(1) To the payment as soon as practicable after my death 
of my funeral expenses and any debts I may owe. 
(2) Next, to the payment of all inheritance taxes, State and 
Federal, that may .be chargeable against my estate or any be-
quest or devise, or. other gift therefrom. 
(3) Should the proceeds derived from. the sale of said 
houses be insuffi~ient to pay all of said debts and taxes in 
full, then I direct. that a sum sufficient to provide for the pay-
. ment thereof in full shall be taken from any 
page 38 ~ money to the credit of my General Account on the 
books of H. Seldon Taylor and Son at the time of 
my death. 
( 4) The residue of said fund to the credit of my General 
Account on the books of H. Seldon 1Taylor and Son, if there 
be any, after the use thereof, so far as may be necessary, for 
the payment and satisfaction of said funeral expenses, debts, 
and inheritance taxes, and the entire amount thereof, if no 
part thereof is needed for such payment, I give to my son, 
H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., provided he· is living at my death, 
and, if not, then to his two children, Betty and Rhoda, in equal 
portions, this gift to be absolute and in fee simple. 
(5) ·Whatever money there may be to the credit of my Rent 
Account on the books of H. Seldon Taylor and Son, and also 
any money that I may have in the Savings Bank and Trust 
Company, of Richmond, I give to my wife, Sallie F. Taylor1 
and to our daughter, Floyd B. Taylor, share and share alike, 
to do with as they please. 
(6) The provision herein for the payment of inheritance 
taxes shall be read in connection with the Twentieth Clause 
of my said will and is intended to be supplemental thereto. 
(7) The provision herein for the sale of the property desig-
nated as Number 106 North Lombardy Street, if necessary, is 
intended to modify, in case such sale shall be necessary, the 
devise of this property under the Fourth Clause of my said 
will to H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., trustee for my daughter Mary 
Belle Pettit. If, however, said sale is not necessary, then 
said devise of said property shall take effect as provided ,in 
the ;Fourth Clause of my said will. · 
H. -SELDON TAYLOR. 
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said will, by the First Clause of the codicil to said 
will, dated April 7, 1928, and by codicil Number Two to said 
will, dated October 20, 1928, made provision for the disposi-
tion of my stocks, bonds, and other securities. I now by this 
provision of this codicil, in lieu of and as a substitute for 
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said provisions in said will and codicils, state my will and 
direction as to the disposition of said stocks, bonds, and other 
securities, as follows, to-wit: 
(1) I give to my son, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., all of the 
shares of stock owned by me in the Virginia Trust Company 
of Richmond, Virginia. 
(2) All the rest and residue of my said stocks, bonds, and . 
other securities, I g·ive and bequeath to my wife, Sallie F. 
Taylor, for her comfortable support and enjoyment during 
her lifetime, with power to use and dispose of the same for 
her own enjoyment as she may see fit. On the death of my 
said wife, I will and direct that whatever remains of said 
residue of said stocks, bonds, and other securities shall be 
disposed of as follows : · 
(a) I give three-sevenths thereof to my daughter Floyd, 
absolutely and in fee simple. 
(b) I give one-seventh thereof to my son, H. Seldon Tay-
lor, Jr., absolutely and in fee simple. 
( c) I give three-sevenths thereof to my son, H. Seldon Tay-
lor,- Jr., as trustee for my said daughter, Floyd. Said tr-µs-
tee shall pay over the net income from this three-sevenths 
to my daughter Floyd during her lifetime;·and, if in the judg-
. ment of my said son, it shall be necessary to ex-
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trust fund for the comfortable maintenance and 
support of my said daughter Floyd, then, and in such event, 
I do authorize and empower my said son to expend so much 
of the principal thereof for that purpose as he, in his judg-
ment, may deem necessary. At the death of my daughter, 
Floyd, so much of said trust fund as may then remain in the 
hands of said trustee shall pass to such person or persons as 
my daughter Floyd may by an instrument in writing in the 
nature of a last will and testament authorize and direct; and, 
in the event that my said daughter fails to exercise such 
power of appointment, then so much of said trust fund as 
may then remain on hand, both principal and accumulated 
income not disbursed, shall pass and belong to my said son, 
H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., absolutely and in fee simple. In the 
event that my said son should die or fail to act as trustee un-
der this trust, then, in that event, I appoint the Virginia 
Trust Company, of the City of Richmond, Virginia, as trus-
tee in his stead, with like powers and discretions, and request 
that the court will, if necessary, ratify and approve such ap-
pointment. 
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THIRD: I have in my said will and in codicils Number 
One and Number Two thereto and in this codicil Number Three 
made Sundry provisions for my said wife, .Sallie F. Taylor, 
,vith further provisions for the disposal of the property cov-
ered by such provisions to other persons after the death of 
my said wife. In the event that she should die before my 
death occurs, then all such provisions, so far as they re-
spectively remain in force under the terms of this will and 
the codicils thereto, shall take effect to and for the persons 
specified, respectively, as if my said wife had sur-
page 41 } vived me and then died. 
H. SELDON TAYLOR 
F'OURTH: I have by the Thirteenth Clause of my said 
will empowered my personal representatives to sell and con-
vey any part of the trust estate created under said will and 
to reinvest the proceeds from any sale so made as provided 
in my said will, any such sale to be made when requested in 
writing by my wife and two claug·hters, or by my wife and 
one son and one daughter. I now will and direct that on the 
death of my said wife, and also in case she should die before 
my own death occurs, then, in either event, any such sale 
. may be made on the joint request of my son, H. Seldon Tay-
lor, Jr., and my daughter Floyd. 
FIFTH: In the Twentieth Clause of mv said ·will I have 
directed that in the administration of my estate whatever 
matters arising may require legal attention be put in charge 
of my friend A. W. Patterson. I now desire to change said 
direction and direct my executors in such case to put all such 
matters in charge of Henry C. Riely, a member of the bar 
of the City of Richmond. 
SIXTH~ In aJI other respects-that is to say, except as in 
this codicil otherwise provided and directed-I do now re-
publish and re-affirm my said will and said codicils thereto. 
Given under my hand and seal this 22nd day of November, 
1929. 
H. SELDON TAYLOR (Seal) 
Signed, sealed, published, and declared as and for a codicil 
to bis last will and testament, which bears date on the 2oth 
day of Jul~T' 1926, by H. Seldon Taylor, in the 
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in his presence, at his request, and in the presence 
of each other, all present together at the same time, have 
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hereunto subscribed our names as attesting witnesses., this 
22nd day of November, 1929. 
Virginia: 
GEO. W. WATT 
CHAS. P. WORD 
J. R HUNT 
In the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, the· 25th day 
of February, 1930. 
A paper writing, bearing date the 20th day of July, 1926, 
.and five codicils thereto annexed, and numbered for purpose 
of identification, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, bearing dates respectively, 
July 11th, 1927, April 7th, 1928, October 20th, 1928, Novem-
ber 4th, 1929, and November 22nd, 1929, purporting to be 
the last will and testament of H. Seldon Taylor, deceased, 
late of this City, were this day produced to the Court and 
offered for proof. 
And George vV. ·watt and Charles P. ,vord, two of the sub-
scribing witnesses to the said paper writing hearing date the 
20th day of July, 1926, and to each of the three codicils, num-
bered 2, 3, and 5, bearing dates respectively, April 7th, 1928, 
October :Wth, 1928, and November 22nd, 1929, personally ap-
pearec.1 in Court, and being· first duly sworn, severally testi-
fied that they, the said Georg·e vV. ·watt and Charles P. Word, 
were present together a.t the same time and in the presence of 
the said H. Seldon Taylor, when he, the said tes-
page 4:3 } tator, signed, acknowledged and declared the said 
paper writing and codicils to be his will, and that 
at the request of the testator, in his presence and in the pres-
ence of each other, they, and each of them, signed their names 
as attesting witnesses, and they further testified that the said 
testator was of sound mind and memory and capable of mak-
ing a will at the time said paper writing and codicils were 
executed. 
And E. l\L Doggett and George W. Watt, being first duly 
sworn for the purpose, severally testified that they were not 
interested in the subject matter of the said two codicils, num~ 
bered 1 and 4, bearing· dates respectively, July 11th, 1927, 
and November 4th, 1929, and that they are well acquainted 
with the handwriting of the said H. Seldon Taylor, deceased1 
having· frequently seen him write, and that each of said codi-
cils and the signatures thereto are wholly in the handwrit-
ing· of the said H. Seldon Taylor, deceased, and they further 
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deposed that at the time said codicils bear date, the said H. 
Seldon Taylor was of sound mind and memory. 
Thereupon the said paper writing bearing date the 20th 
day of July, 1926, together with the five codicils thereto an-
nexed, each bearing· dates respectively, July 11th, 1927, April 
7th, 1928, Oct9ber 20th, 1928, November 4th, 1929, and No-
vember 22nd, 1929, are established and ordered to be re-
corded as and for the true last will and testament of the said 
H. Seldon Ta.ylor, deceased. 
And on_ the.:motion of H. Seldon Taylor, Junior:r and The 
Virginia Trust Company of Richmond, Virginia, the Execu-
tors named in said will, they were permitted by the Court to 
qualify as such; and thereupon the said H. Seldon Taylor, 
Junior, and the Virginia Trust Company of Rich-
page 44 ~ mond, Virginia, by P. B.· Watt, its Trust Officer,. 
this day appeared in open Court, made oat:n as 
the law directs, and entered into and acknowledged separate 
bonds as such Executors in the penalty of Two Hundred and 
Fifty Thousand Dollars ·each, payable and conditioned ac-
cording to law, but witho~t security, the said will directing 
that none should be reqmred of them. 
And ce1·tificate is granted the said H. Seldon Taylor, Junior 
and The Virginia Trust Company of Richmond, Virginia, for· 
obtaining a probate of the said will in due form. 
Teste: 
CHAS. 0. SAVILLE, Clerk. 
A Copy, Teste: 
CHAS. 0. SA VILLE, Clerk. 
EXHIBIT "C'' WITH THE PETITION, BEING COPY OF 
THE WILL OF S.ALLIE F. TAYLOR. 
In the name of God, Amen. 
I, SALLIE F. TAYLOR, of Richmond, Va., do make this 
my last Will and-Testament, -hereby revoking all other Wills 
and Testamentary papers I may heretofore ha.ve made. 
FIRJSiT: Out of the money I have in banks or invested in 
mortgages, I direct that my debts and funeral expenses be 
paid; FIVE HUNDRED and 00/100 ($500.00) Dollars be 
given to my step-daughter, Mary Belle Pettit, if living at tlie 
time of my death; FIFT~ and 00/100 ($50.00) Dollars be 
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given to Mrs. Mattie Morse of Richmond, Va., if 
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00/100 ($50.00) Dollars be given to my faithful 
servant, Nettie Johnson, of Richmond, Va., if working for me 
at the time of my death, and the balance divided between my 
daughter, Floyd B. Taylor, and my son, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., 
giving Floyd two-thirds and Seldon one-third, each in fee sim-
ple, to do with as they please. 
·SECOND: I give to my daughter, Floyd Brown Taylor, 
all my household and kitchen furniture, wearing apparel, 
jewelry, silver, rugs and autumobiles, in fee simple, to do 
with as she pleases. 
THIRD : The following· stocks and bonds or any that are 
substituted in place thereof, or what remains of them or what 
remains of those substituted for them, be equally divided be-
tween my daughter, Floyd Brown Taylor, and my son H. 
Seldon Taylor, Jr., in fee simple, to do with as they please: 
Five shares, Savings Bank & Trust Co. certificate No. 152. 
Three shares, Norfolk & Western Rwy. Co. certificate No. 
20525·. 
Four shares, Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. certificate No. 
01239. 
Eight shares, United States Steel Corp. certificate No. 
C 217045. 
Two shares, Atlantic Coast Line Rwy. Co. certificate No. 
B 10830. 
Eleven shares, Atlantic Coast Line Rwy. Co. certificate 
No. 16703. 
R 
Two shares, Southern Rwy. Co., certificate No. D 223. 
Six shares, Southern Rwy. Co. certificate No. 
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D208 
One hundred shares Tidewater Oil & Gas Go. certificate 
914 
Va. Carolina Chemical Warrant for Subscription for 15 
shares, No. 3600. 
FOURTH: All the rest and residue of my estate, real, per-
sonal, or mixed, I give to my daughter, Floyd Brown Taylor, 
three-sevenths absolutely and in fee simple; I give one-seventh 
thereof to my son, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., absolutely and in 
fee simple; I give three-sevenths to my son, H. Seldon Taylor, 
Jr., as Trustee for my said daughter Floyd, said Trustee shall 
pav over the net income from this three-sevenths to my daugh-
ter Floyd during her lifetime and, if in the judgment of my 
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said son, it shall be necessary to expend any portion or all 
of the principal of said trust fund for the comfortable main-
tenance and support of my said daughter Floyd, then, and 
in sueh event, I do authorize and empower my said son, to 
expend so much of the principal thereof for that purpose as 
he, in his judgment, may deem necessary. At the death of 
my daughter Floyd so much of said trust fund as may then 
remain in the hands of said Trustee shall pass to such person 
or persons as my daughter Floyd may by an instrument in 
writing in the nature of a last ·wm and Testament author-
ize and -direct, and, in the event that my said daughter fails 
to exercise such power of appointment, then, so much of said 
trust fund as may then remain on hand, both principal and 
accumulated income, not disbursed, shall pass and belong to 
my said son, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., absolutely and in fee 
simple. In the event that my said son should die or fail lo 
act as Trustee under this trust, then in that event 
page 47 ~ I appoint the Virginia Trust Company of Rich-
mond, Virginia, as Trustee in his stead, with like 
powers and discretions and request that the court will, if 
necessary, ratify and approve such appointment. 
FIF.TH: In the event either my daughter Floyd or my 
son Seldon should die before my death occurs, then and in 
that event the share of the deceased child shall pass and be-
long· to the surviving child in fee simple. 
SIXTH: :My Executors are to have the right to sell any 
Real Estate I might own at the time of my death and no pur-
chaser is to see to the application of the purchase money. 
SEVENTH: I appoint my so'n, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., and 
my daughter, Floyd B. Taylor, my Executors, and direct that 
no security be required of them and no appraisal of my es-
tate is to be made or any inventory taken thereof, except 
such as is necessary for the proper carrying out of my Will, 
and the Executors fee for their services are not to exceed 
$100.00 each. 
Witness my hand and seal this 19th day of Nov. 1934. 
SALLIE F. TAYLOR (Seal) 
Signed, published and declared by Sallie F. Taylor, to be 
her last ·wm and Testament, in the presence of us, who in 
her presence, and at her request, and in the presence or each 
other have hereunto signed our names as witnesses thereto 
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page 48 ~ Virginia : 
In the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, the 3rd day 
of February, 1938. 
A paper writing bearing date the 19th ,day of November, 
1934, purporting to be the last will and testament of Sallie F. 
Taylor, deceased, was this day produced to the ·Court and 
offered for proof. 
It appearing to the Court that the said Sallie F. Taylor 
was a resident of the City of Richmond, and that she departed 
--this life ou the 5th day of January, 1938; and Julia Kuegele, 
E. l\L Doggett and J. H. Hunt, the subscribing witnesses 
thereto, being first duly sworn, severally deposed and said 
that they were present together at the same time, and in 
the presence of the said Sallie F.' Taylor when she signed, 
sealed, acknowledged and declared the said paper writing 
to be her will, and that at her request, in her presence, and 
in the presence of each other, they, and each of them, signed 
their names as attesting witnesses thereto, and they further 
cteposed and said that the said Sallie F. Taylor was of sound 
mind and memory, and capable of making a will. 
Thereupon the said paper writing bearing date the 19th day 
of N ovembcr, 1934, is established and ordered to be recorded 
as and for the true last will and testament of the said Sallie 
F. ':Paylor, deceased. 
I-I. Seldon Taylor, Junior, one of the Executors named in 
said will, having departed this life, on the motion of Floyd 
B. Taylor, the other Executor named therein, she 
page 49} was permitted b:y the Court to qualify as such; 
thereupon the said Floyd B. Taylor this day ap-
peared in open -Court, made oath as the law directs, and en-
tered into and acknowledged a bond as such Executor in the 
penalty of Twenty-five Thousand Dollars, payable and con-
ditioned according· to law, but without security, the said will 
directing that none should be required of her. 
And certificate is granted the said Floyd B. Taylor for 
obtaining- a probate of the said will in due form. 
The testator, in her will, directing· that no appraisement 
be had of her estate, no appraisers are appointecl by the 
Court. 
Teste: 
CHA:S. 0. SA VILLE, Clerk. 
A Copy, Teste : 
CHAR 0. SA VILLE, Clerk. 
By JOHN F . .SA VILLE, D. C. 
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EXHIBIT "D'' WITH THE PETITION, BEING A COPY 
OF THE WILL OF- H. SELDON TAYLOR, J~. 
I, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., of the City of Richmond, State of 
Virginia, do make this my last will and testament. 
ITEM I. I direct that my funeral expenses and just debts 
be paid as soon after my death as practicable. 
· ITEM II. I devise to my wife, Rhoda Davis Taylor,. all of 
the household and kitchen furniture, and my personal ef-
fects in my dwelling at the time of my death, to be hers ab-
solutely. 
page 50 ~ -~ ITEM III. I devise to my executors hereinafter 
·named, all of the rest and residue of my property, 
real, personal and mixed wheresoever situated to have and 
to hold as trustees, upon the following trusts and conditions, 
namely: my said executors shall have and hold one-third (1/3) 
of the same for the use and benefit of my said wife for and 
during her life or so long as she shall remain my widow; my 
executors shall have and hold two thirds (2/3) of the same 
for the use and benefit of my children in equal shares. The 
share of each daughter shall be held by my executors for 
such daughter until she shall have arrived at the age of 
twenty five ( 25 )" years, when if she shall so elect the same 
shall be delivered over to her, free from any and all trusts, 
and the share of any son shall be held by my executors for 
such son until he shall have arrived at the age of twenty one 
(21) years, when if he shall so elect, the same shall be de-
livered over to him. If my wife shall desire to occupy my 
dwelling or any other dweliing that may be purchased with 
the proceeds of sale of my present dwelling, as a home for 
herself, or as a home for herself and her children, during 
her life or so long as she shall remain my widow, she may 
do so, and the property so occupied by her or by her and 
them shall not be chargeable with any rent, nor shall the 
same be computed as being in such case a part of the one-
third (1/3) share so set aside for her. At and upon the 
death of my wife or in the event she shall marry again, there-
upon the one-third (13/) share so devised to her a~d my 
dwelling, or any other dwelling that may be purchased with 
the proceeds thereof shall be divided among my children in 
equal shares, subject to the provisions of my will 
page 51 ~ with respect to the other property so held in trust 
for their benefit. 
The shares of my daughters shall be their sole and sepa-
rate property free from the marital rights of any husband 
they may have, and free_ from the debts, obligations and en-
gagements of such husbands to the same effect as if such 
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daughters were unmarried. In the event any of my daughters 
shall marry and shall die before having· attained the age of 
twenty-five (25) years leaving· issue, such issue shall take its 
parent's share. 
My executors are given full power and authority to sell 
and convey any or all of my property, real, personal and 
mixed, or the property representing a re-investment of any 
such property, when in their discretion they may deem best 
for the intei·est of my estate, and in the event of any such 
sale the same shall be made either publicly or privately, and 
upon such terms and conditions as my executors shall deem 
best, and the purchaser or purchasers from my exe~utors 
shall not.in any case be made responsible or liable for the re= 
investment of the proceeds thereof, hut the receipt of my. 
executors shall be a full acquittance to any such purchaser. 
Any money coming into the hands of my executors and 
the proceeds of sale of any of my .property sold by my execu-
tors shall be re-i~vested in notes or bonds secured by first 
mortgage or deed of trust secured upon improved real es-
tate situated in the City of Richmond, Virginia, to yield not 
less than five per centum (5%) per annum, except that money 
coming into their hands from the sale of my home may be 
re-invested in the purchase of another home as herein pro-
~~d . 
page 52 ~ The rents, issues and profits of any and all of 
my property so held by my executors shall be paid 
to my wife and my children· in the shares or proportions, 
. stated above, at such time and times as my executors shall 
deem advisable. During the minority of my children the 
share of each inf ant child shall be paid over by my executors 
to my wife to be by her expended for the support, mainte-
nance and education of such infant child as my wife shall in 
her discretion deem best; and the receipt of my wife shall 
be a full acquittance to my said executors for amounts so 
paid over to her for such purposes. 
My wife may, in the event she deems it necessary to do so, 
use a sufficient amount of the principal or corpus of my es-
tate for the purpose of educating and maintaining my chil-
dren, or either or any of them, and may for such purpose 
demand and receive from my executors such principal or 
corpus of my estate, and such expenditures shall be charged 
to the share of the child so receiving the benefit thereof as 
an· advancement on account of its share in the distribution of 
my estate as herein provided. 
I nominate and appoint the first and Merchants National 
Bank, Richmond, Virginia, and my wife, Rhoda Davis Tay-
lor, as executors of this my will. , 
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In testimony whereof, I have hereunto signed my name 
and affixed my seal this the 16th day of May, 1928. 
H. SELDON TAYLOR JR. (Seal) 
Sig·ned, sealed, published and aclmowledged by the tes· 
tator, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., as and for his last will and tes, 
tament, w·ho in his presence and in the presence of 
page 53 ~ each other, and at his request, have hereunto 
signed our names as witnesses : 
E. l\L DOGGETT 
JULIA KUEGELE 
J. H. HUNT 
I, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., of the City of Richmond, State 
of Virginia, do make this the codicil to my last will and 
testament bearing date on the 16th day of May, 1928, I desire 
to change the time when the share of each daughter shall be 
delivered to her; 
The share of each daughter shall be held by my executors 
for such daughter until she shall have arrived at the age of 
thirty ( 30) years, when if she shall so elect the same shall 
be delivered over to her, free from any and all trusts. 
Also in the event any of my daug·hters shall marry and 
shall die before having attained the age of thirty (30) years 
leaving issue, such issue shall take its parent's share. 
I hereby affirm my said will in all other respects. 
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto sig11ed my name 
and affixed my seal this 26th day of April, 1930. 
H. SELDON TAYLOR, JR. (Seal) 
Signed, sealed, published and declared by the testator H. 
Seldon Taylor, Jr. as and for · his last will and testament, 
who in his presence and in the presence of each other, and at 
his request, have hereunto signed our names as witnesses. 
LORETTA A. MOCCA 
JULIA KUEGELE 
E. M. DOGGETT 
page 54 ~ I, I-I. Seldon Taylor, Jr., of Richmond, Virginia, 
do make this Codicil to my last Will and Testa-
ment bearing· date on the 16th day of May, 1928. 
In my "\Vill elated May 16, 1928, I nominated a~d appointed 
the Fi1=st and Merchants National Bank of Richmond, Rich-
D. E. Taylor, et al:, v. F. B. Taylor, and others. 73 
mond, Va., as one of my Executors. I now wish to substitute 
in the place of the First and :Merchants National Bank of 
Richmond, John T. Wingo, an attorney of Richmond, Va.> 
as one of my Executors, my wife Rhoda Davis Taylor re-
maining as the other one of my Executors. 
I direct my Executors to sell my Real Estate Business im-
mediately upon my death. · 
In my ·wm I have directed that investments be made only 
in notes or bonds secured by first mortgage deed of trust. 
I now wish to limit these investments to individual first mort-
_gages, meaning that my Executors cannot invest in a part 
of a first mortg·age but must hold the entire mortgage and 
110 first mortgage investment must be for a greater amount 
than $5,000.00. If this character of mortgage is not available 
then they-0an invest in United States Government bonds, Vir-
ginia State bonds or Richmond City bonds. 
I hereby affirm my said Will in all other respects. 
In testimony whereof I have hereunto signed my name 
and affixed my seal this 4th day of June, 1934. 
H. SELDON TAYLO.te., JR. (Seai) 
Signed, sealed, published and declared by the testator H~ 
Seldon Taylor, Jr., as and for his last Will and Testament, 
who hi his presence and in the presence of each 
})age 55 ~ other, and at his ·request, have hereunto signed our 
names as witneRses. 
JULIA KEUGELE 
LORETTA A. MOCCA 
E. l\L DOGGETT 
I, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., of R.ichmond, Virginia, do make 
this Codicil to mv last ·wm and T~tament which bears date 
of 16th of May, i928. _ 
In my Will, which is dated 16th of May, 1928, I stipulated 
a~ follows: 
'' Any money coming into the hands of my executors and 
the proceeds of sale of any of my property sold by my execu-
tors shall he re-invested in notes or bonds secured bv first 
mortgage or deed of trust secured upon improved real es-
tate situated in the City of Richmond, Virginia, to yield not 
less than five per centum (5%) per annum, except that money 
coming into their hands from the sale of my home may be 
1·e-invested in the purchase of another home as herein pro-
vided.'' 
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Realizing it is not always possible or practical to carry 
out the terms of the above, I wish to leave it to the discretion 
of my Executors to decide the rate of interest and to make 
loans on improved real estate in Henrico and Chesterfield 
Counties as well as in the City of Richmond. 
In my Will, ,vhich is dated 16th of Mayt 1928, I stipulated 
as follows : -
'' The rents, issues and profits of any and all of my prop-
erty so held by my executors shall be paid to my 
page 56 } wife and my children in the shares or proportions, 
stated above, at such time and times as my execu-
. tors shall deem advisable.'' 
. Realizing the rents, issues and profits may not at all times 
be sufficient for the maintenance of my wife and each of my 
children, I authorize my Executors, during such times, to 
supplement the income by additional sum or sums from the 
corpus of my Estate that will equal $150.00 per month for 
my wife, and $150.00 per month for each of my children. 
This tq operate until the final division of my Estate. Any 
sums so advanced by my Executors shall be deducted from 
their respective shares in the final settlement of my Estate. 
Nothing herein is to cancel or nullify the contents of Codi-
cil to my Will dated June 4, 1934. 
I hereby affirm my said Will in all other respects. 
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto signed my name 
and affixed my seal this 31st day of July, 1936. 
I I -l : . . 
H. SELDON TAYLOR, JR. (Seal) 
Signed, sealed, published and declared by the Testator H . 
.Seldon Taylor, Jr., as and for his last Will and Testament, 
who in his presence and in the presence of each other, ~nd 
at his request, have hereunto signed our names as witnesses. 
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JULIA KUEGELE 
J. H. HUNT 
E. l\tI. DOGGETT 
In the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, the 2nd day 
of November, 1936. 
A paper writing bearing date the 16th day of l\fay, 1928, 
and three codicils thereto annexed, bearing dates respectively, 
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April 26th, 1930, June 4th, 1934, and July 31st, 1936, pur-
porting to be the last will and testament of H. Seldon Tay-
lor, Junior, deceased, were this day produeed to the Court 
and offered for proof. 
It appearing to the Court that the said H. Seldon Taylor, 
Junior, was a resident of the City of Richmond, and that he 
departed this life on the 25th day of October, 1936. 
The said paper writing bearing date the 16th day of May, 
1928, and the said codicil thereto annexed, bearing date the 
31st day of July, 1936, were each fully proved in all respects 
to the satisfaction of the Court by the oaths of E. M. Dog-
gett, Julia Kuegele and J. H. Hunt, the subscribing witnesses 
thereto, who, being first duly sworn, severally deposed and 
said that they were present tog·ether at the same time, on 
the respective dates of the execution of the above described 
paper writings, and in the presence of the said H. Seldon 
Taylor, Junior, when he, the testator, signed, sealed, ac-
knowledged and declared the said paper writing of May 16, 
1928, to be his will, and the paper writing of July 31st, 1936, 
to be a codicil to his will, and that at the request of the tes-
tator, in his presence, and in the presence of each other, they, 
and each of them, signed their names as attesting witnesses 
thereto, and they further deposed and said that 
page 58 ~ the said H. Seldon Taylor, Junior, was of sound 
mind and memory, and capable of making a will. 
The other two codicils bearing dates respectively April 
26th, 1930, and June 4th, 1934, were each fully proved in all' 
respects to the satisfaction of the Court by the oaths of Lo-
retta A. Mocca, .Julia Kuegele and E. M. Doggett, the sub-
scribing· witnesses thereto, who, being first duly sworn, sev-
erally deposed and said that they were present together at 
the same time, on tho dates of the execution of the said paper 
writings, and in the presence of the said H. Seldon Taylor: 
Junior, when he, the testator, signed, sealed, acknowledged 
and declared the said paper writings to be codicils .to his 
will, and that at the request of the testator, in his presence, 
and in the presence of each other. they, and each of them, 
signed their names as attesting witnesses thereto, and they 
further deposed and said that the said H. Seldon Taylor, 
Junior, was of sound mind ijnd memory and capable of making 
a will. 
Thereupon the said paper writing· bearing date the 16th 
day of May, 1928, and the said three codicils bearing dates 
respectively, April 24th, 1930, .June 4th, 1934, and July 31st, 
1936, are established and ordered to be recorded as and for 
the true last will and testament of the said H. Seldon Taylor, 
Junior, deceased. 
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On motion of Rhoda Davis Taylor and John T. Wingo, 
the Executors named in said will, they were permitted by 
the Court to qualify as such Executors, and also as Trustees 
for the trusts created under, and by, said will; thereupon the 
said Rhoda Davis Taylor and John T. Wingo, this 
page 59 ~ day appeared in open Court; made oath as the law 
directs, and, together with the United States Fi-
delity and Guaranty Company, their surety, by E. Leslie 
Spence, Junior, its duly authorized attorney-in-fact ( the 
Court being first satisfied, however; from an examination of 
the said E. Leslie ,Spence, on oath as to the sufficiency of 
said Company) entered into and acknowledged a bond as such 
Executors and Trustees in the penalty of One Hundred and 
F'ifty Thousand Dollars, payable and conditioned according 
to law. 
And certificate is granted the said Rhoda Davis Taylor 
and John T. ·wingo for obtaining a probate of the said wil1 
in due f otm. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, To-,vit: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Chancery Court of the City of 
Richmond. 
I, Charles 0. Saville, Clerk of the Chancery Court of the 
City of Richmond, in the State of Virginia, do hereby cer-
tify that the foregoing· is a true transcript from the records 
of said Court, and that the powers of the said personal rep-
resentative * ,x, * are now in full force and effect. 
In testimony whereof, I have hereto set my hand and af-
fixed the Seal of the said Court, this 25th day of November, 
1936. 
(Signed) CHAS. 0. SA VILLE, Clerk. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, To-wit: 
I, \Villiam A..-Moncure, only .Judge of the Chancery Court 
of the City of Richmond. in the State of Virginia, 
page 60 ~ do hereby c.ertify that .Charles 0. Saville, whose 
._ name is signed to the foregoing Certificate, is, and 
was at the time of signing the same, Clerk of said Court, duly 
qualified; that his attestatfon is in due form of law; that his 
signature is genuine, and that all his official acts are entitled 
to ful] faith and credit. 
Given under my hand this 25th day of November, 1936. 
(Sig-ned) WILLIAM A. l\fONCURE, Judge. 
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Commonwealth of Virginia, To-wit: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Chancery Court of the Citv of 
Richmond. .. 
I, Charles 0.. Saville, Clerk of the Chancery Court of the 
City of Richmond, in the ,State of Virginia, do hereby cer.;. 
tify that the Honorable William .A.. Moncure, whose name 
is signed to the foregoing Certificate, is, arid was at the time 
of signing the same, only Judge of the said Court duly quali-
fied. 
Given under my hand this 25th day of November, 1936. 
(Clerk) CHAS. 0. SA VILLE, Cl~rk . 
.ANSWER OF RHODA D.A VIS TAYL01:t, !N OWN RIGHT 
AND AS ONE OF EXECUTORS UNDER WILL OF 
H. SEf.,DON TAYLOR, JR., JOilN T. WINGO ON}1 
OF EXECUTORS UNDER WILL OF H. SELDON 
TAYLOR, JR., BETTY APPERSON. TAYLOR AND 
RHODA TAYLOR TOMPKINS, :FILED IN OOURT 
UNDER DECREE OF JULY 26, 1939: 
The joint answer of Rhoda Davis Taylor in her own right 
and as one of the executors under the will of H. Seldon Tav-
lor, Jr.; John T. ·wingo one of the executors un-
J)age 61 } der the will of H. Seldon. Taylor; J 1·., Betty Ap-
person Taylor and Rhoda Taylor Tompkins to the 
petition exhibited against them and others by Floyd Brown 
Taylor in her own right and as executrix under the will of 
Sallie F. Taylor, deceased. 
These responde11ts saving to themselves the benefit of all 
just exceptions to the said petition, for answer thereto or to 
so much thereof as they are advised it is material they should 
answer, answer and say: 
1. That they admit the correctness of the allegations of 
fact contained in paragraphs Numbers I, II, III, IV, V, VI, 
VII, VIII, IX and X of said petition filed herein. They als9 
admit that the alleg·ations of fact contained in paragraph 
XI of the petition filed herein are true, except that since the 
petition was filed Rhoda Davis Taylor, daug·hter of H. Sel-
don Taylor, Jr., has intermarried with William F. Tomp.;. 
kins, Jr., making the correct designation of her name a-0-
cording· to present usage, Rhoda Taylor Tompkins. 
2. And for further answer to the said petition these re-
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spondents deny the conclusions of law set forth in paragraph 
XII of t~e said petition filed herein, and also deny the al-
legations of fact contained in said paragraph XII based upon 
said conclusions of law. 
3. And for further answer to said petition these respond-
ents allege that -under and by 1·eason of the deed dated March 
22, 1895, from l\Iip.na Keppler to H. Seldon Taylor,. Trustee, 
the fee simple title to the said real estate conveyed 
page 62 ~ by said deed became and was vested jointly in Sal-
lie F~--~ylor and H. Seldon Taylor, subject to the 
life estate of .Sallie F. Taylor, and to the further condition 
that if H. Seldon Taylor had survived his wife he would have 
been entitled to the entire fee simple estate; accordingly at 
the time of his death H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., owned a one-
half undivided interest in the property No. 322 East Broad 
Street, which passed under the terms of his will ~ three and 
one-half tenths to Floyd Brown Taylor, three and one-half 
tenths to H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., and two-tenths tf> Belle Tay-
lor Pettit and one-tenth to Douglas E. Taylor; and that the 
one-half undivided interest owned by Sallie F. Taylor passed 
under the terms of her will to Floyd Brown Taylor. ' 
And now having fully answered, these respondents pray 
to be hence dismissed with their reasonable costs in this be-
half expended, and they will ever pray, etc. 
RHODA D. TAYLOR, 
In her own right and as one of the executors un-
der the will of H. Seldon Taylor, Jr. 
JOHN T. WINGO, 
As one of the executors under the will of 
H. .Seldon ·Taylor, Jr. 
BETTY .APPERSON TAYLOR, 
RHODA TAYLOR TOMPKINS. 
JORN T. WINGO, 
Atty. for named def end.ants. 
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On motion of Rhoda Davis Taylor in her own right ancl 
as one of the executors under the will of H. Seldon Taylor, 
Jr., John T. Wingo one of the executors under the will of H. 
Seldon Taylor, Jr., Betty Apperson Taylor and Rhoda Davis 
Taylor (now Rhoda Taylor Tompkins) by counsel, the decree 
nisi heretofore entered at rules against the said defendants 
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is set aside, and leave is granted them to file their answer 
herein, and thereupon by leave of court the joint answer of 
the defendants above named is this day filed, to which answer 
the petitioner replied generally. 
JOINT AND SEPARATE ANSWER OF DOUGLAS E. 
TAYLOR .AND BELLE TAYLOR. PETTIT. FILED 
AT RULES HELD IN CLERK'S OFFICE iQN 1ST 
MONDAY IN AUGUST, 1938. 
The joint and separate answer of Doug-las E. Taylor ancl 
Belle Taylor Pettit to a petition filed against them and others 
in the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond. · 
Respondents answering the said petition, or so much 
thereof as they are advised it is material to answer, answer 
and say: 
(1) That they do not deny the matters set out in paragraph 
1 of the said petition. 
(2) That they admit the matters alleged in paragraphs II, 
III, IV, V, VI and VII of the said petition. 
' (3) That they admit the matters alleged and set 
page 64 ~ out in paragraphs VIII and IX of the said peti-
tion. 
(4) That they do not deny that Sallie F. Taylor left a will 
which was admitted to probate in this court on Fehruary 3, 
1938, and they believe that the fourth and fifth clauses of 
the will of the said Sallie F. Taylor, deceased, are correctly 
copied in paragraph X of the said petition. 
(5) That they admit that H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., left a will 
which was probated in this court on November 2, 1936, and 
that the said H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., left surviving his widow, 
Rhoda Davis Taylor, and two daug·hters, Rhoda Davis Tay-
lor and Betty Apperson Taylor, as alleged in paragraph XI 
of the said petition. 
(6) Respondents deny that Sallie F. Taylor, the wife of 
H. Seldon Taylor, took an estate in fee simple absolute in 
the real property conveyed to H. Seldon Taylor, Trustee, by 
deed from Minna Keppler (widow) dated March 22, 1895, 
and recorded in the Clerk's Office of this court in D. B. 154-A, 
page 50, a certified copy of which deed is filed as Exhibit 
A, with the said petition. Respondents aver that the said 
Sallie F. Tavlor did not have such an interest in the said 
real estate as would pass under her said will, and that peti-
tioner, the said Floyd Brown Taylor, has no claim, right, or 
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title to the said property, or any part thereof, by virtue of 
the terms and provisions of the last will and testament of 
her mother, the said Sallie F. Taylor, deceased. Respond-
ents aver that their father, the said I-I. Seldon Taylor, fur-
nished and supplied the consideration for the said convey-
ance of March 22, 1895, and that it was not the in-
page 65 ~ tention of the parties to the said deed that the 
said Sallie F. Taylor should take a fee simple title 
or interest in and to the said real estate, or any part thereof, 
and that she did not in fact have a fee simple right or title 
to the said property or any part thereof. Respondents aver 
that the said Sallie F. Taylor had an estate for and during 
her natural life in and to the said real property mentioned 
and described in the said deed dated March 22, 1895, and 
known as No. 322 E. Broad Street, Richmond, Virginia, and 
that at her death the said real estate passed according· to the 
terms and provisions of the deed from the said Minna Kep-
pler (widow) to H. Seldon Taylor, Trustee, dated March 22, 
1895, to these respondents, Douglas E. Taylor and Belle 
Taylor Pettit, and the petitioner, Floyd Brown Taylor, in fee 
simple and share and share alike, they being all of the chil-
dren of the said H. Seldon Taylor who were living at the 
death of the said Sallie F. Taylor, and that the said Douglas 
E. T!)ylor, Belle Taylor Pettit, and Floyd Brown Taylor have 
each an undivided one-third .interest in and to the said real 
estate. 
(7) Respondents aver that they and the said Floyd Brown 
Taylor are entitled to all of the profits, income, and rent_~ 
from the said property since the death of the said Sallie F. 
Taylor, share and share alike, and tha~ one-third of the said 
profits, income and rents should be paid to respondent, Dou-
glas E. Taylor, one-third to respondent, Belle Taylor Pettit, 
and one-third to petitioner, Floyd Brown Taylor. 
And now having fully answered, respondents pray to be 
hence dismissed with their reasonable costs in this 
page 66 ~ matter expended, and they will ever pray, etc. 
DOUGLAS E. TAYLOR, and 
BELLE TAYLOR PETTIT, 
DAVID l\IEADE WHITE, 
ANDREW J. ELLIS, 
GEO. B. WHITE, 
p. d. 
By Counsel. 
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STIPULATIO,N DATED OCTOBER 4, 1938. FILED IN 
COURT UNDER DECREE OF OCTOBER 27, 1939. 
It is stipulated by the parties hereto as follows: 
1. That the correctness of the allegations of fact contained 
in Paragraphs Numbers I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX 
and X of the petition herein is admitted. 
2. The allegations of fact contained in Paragraph XI of 
the petition hereh1 are true, except that, since the petition 
was filed, Rhoda Davis Taylor has intermarried with Wil-
liam F. Tompkins, Jr., making the correct designation of her 
name now, according to her present usage, Rhoda Taylor 
Tompkins. 
Executed this October 4, 1938. 
FLOYD BROWN TAYLOR, 
By McGUIRE, RIELY, EGGLESTON & BOCOCK, 
Her Counsel. 
\Vho sues in her own right and as Executor 
under the will of Sallie F. Taylor, deceased. 
DOUGLAS E. TAYLOR, 
By DAVID :VIE.ADE WHITE, 
BELLE TAYLOR PETTIT, 
By DAVID MEADE "\VHITE, 
His Attorney. 
Her Attorney. 
VIRGINIA TRUST COMP ANY, 
By J. M. CARTER, JR., Secretary. 
As surviving Executor and Trustee under 
the Will of H. Seldon Taylor, Sr. 
page 67 ~ VIRGINIA TRUS.T COMPANY, 
By ,J. l\L CARTER, JR, Secretary. 
As Trustee under the will of Sallie F. Taylor. 
JOHN T. WINGO, 
As Executor under the will of H. Seldon Taylor, Jr. 
RHODA D. TAYLOR, 
Bv J.ORN T. "'WINGO, her Atty. 
: In her own right and as Executor under the 
will of H. Seldon Taylor, Jr. 
BETTY A. TAYLOR, 
By JOHN T. WINGO, her Atty. 
RHODA T.AYIJOR TOMPKINS, 
By JOHN T. WLNGO, her Atty . 
.SUTTON & COMP ANY, INCORPORATED, 1 
By HOW ARD SUTTON, President. 
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STIPULATlON DA.TED JANUARY 14,. 1939, FILED IN 
OOURT UNDER DEGREE OF OCT.OBER 27, 1939·. 
It is stipulated and agTeed by and between counsel for the 
petitioner ·and counsel for the defendants, Douglas E. Tay-
lor and Belle Taylor Pettit, as follows: 
(1) That the photographic copy of a certain deed of lease 
dated·the 11th day of May, 1934, and made between Mrs. Sal-
lie F. Taylor, life tenant,. lessor, of the one part, and ,Joseph 
Massad and. J..ulia Mas sad, lessees, of the other part, and the 
supplementar agreement made between the same parties and 
one, Kameel~.J\fassad, dated January 8, 1935, which are hereto 
attached and made a part hereof,. may be introduced and read 
as evidence in behalf of the said defendants, Douglas E. Tay-
lor and Belle Taylor Pettit, in the trial of this case, with 
the same f 01·ce and effect as if the originals of the 
page 68 } said two papers had been introduced and duly 
proven in the formal taking of depositions, but 
counsel for the petitioner reserves the right to make such 
legal objections to the admissibility of such evidence as he 
would have the right to make if the original papers were of-
fered for proof in the formal taking of depositions; 
(2) That the photographic copy of a certain letter dated 
November 29, 1938, signed by E. M. Doggett, a notary public,. 
_ and addressed to Mr. Douglas E. Taylor, which is hereto at-
tached and made a part hereof, may be introduced and read 
as evidence in behalf of the said defendants, Doug·las E. Tay-
lor and Belle Taylor Pettit, in the trial of this case, with the 
same force and effect as if the said E. M. Doggett had testi-
fied to the matters set forth in the said letter in the formal 
taking of his deposition, but counsel for the petitioner re-
serves the right to make such legal objections to the aclmissi-
bility of such evidence as he would have the rigl1t to make if 
the same was offered for proof in the f 01mal taking· of depo-
sitions; 
(3) That the following extract taken from the deposition 
of H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., when he was examined on April 
23, 1936, as a witness in behalf of the defendants in the suit 
of Douglas E. Taylor against H. Seldon, Taylor, Jr., and oth-
ers, then pending in the Chancery Court of the City of Rich-
mond, may be introduced and ·read as evidence in behalf of' 
the said defendants, Douglas E. Taylor and Belle Taylor 
Pettit, in the trial of this case, with the same force and ef-
fect as if the statements contained in the said extract had 
been duly proven in the formal taking of deposi-
page 69 ~ tions, but counsel for the petitioner reserves the 
right to make such legal objections to the admis-
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sibility of such evidence as he would have the right to make 
if the same was offered for proof in the formal taking of 
depositions, namely : 
'' Q. Can you say what provision the complainant has re .. 
ceived or will receive from his father's property and estate? 
A. He has received from insurance about $3,091.12. The 
property at 322 East Broad Street, I suppose he will have 
a one-fourth interest therein upon the death of my mother~ 
Q. Did that property, I mean 322 East Broad Street, Rich:-
mond, Virginia, pass under your father's will, or is it held 
under a deed of trust 1 · 
A. It is held under a deed of trust. 
Q. Have you a copy of that deed of trustf 
A. I have. My father valued the property at $70,000.00. 
One-fourth of this amount would be $17,500.00. Of c.ourse, 
there has been a depreciation in value since then. 
Q. Will you please produce it and file it in evidence, to be 
marked "Defendant's Exhibit No. 5"? 
A. I will. 
Note: Paper filed and marked "Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 5". 
Q. This paper appears to be a certified copy of the deed 
referred to, does it not¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is the reasonable value of the property now Y 
A. I would say certainly $35,000.00. '' 
(4) That the "deed of trust" referred to by H. Seldon 
Taylor, Jr., in the above quoted testimony is the deed from 
Minna Kepplar to H. Seldon Taylor, Trustee, .dated :March 
22, 1895, and recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Chancery 
Court of the City of Richmond, in Deed Book 154-A, page 50; 
the construction of which is sought in this suit. 
(5) That if E. M. Doggett, if examined as a wit-
page 70 ~ ness, would make the following statement, and such 
statement may be introduced and read as evidence 
in behalf of the said defendants, Douglas E. Taylor and Belle 
Taylor Pettit, in the trial of this case, with the same force 
and effect as if the same were duly proven in the formal taking 
of his deposition, but counsel for the petitioner reserves the 
right to make such legal objections to the admissibility of such 
evidence as he would have the right to make if the same were 
offered in the formal taking of his ·deposition, namely: 
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That he, the said: E. M. Doggett, was a bookkeeper and em-
ployee of H. Seldon Taylor & Son for the period of twelve 
years immediately prior to the death of H. Seldon Taylor, 
Jr., and was familiar with the manner in which the property, 
No. 322 East Broad Street, was handled by the firm during 
that period; 
That during the lifetime of H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., the rents 
collected from the property, No. 322 East Broad Street, were 
placed to the personal credit of H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., on 
the books of the firm and he withdrew the same from time to 
time, but as to what disposition the said H. Seldon Taylor, 
Sr., made of the money he did not know; 
That during the life of H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., the property 
No. 322 East Broad Street, was insured against loss by fire in 
the Mutual Assurance Society of Virginia, and under the pro-
visions of the policy the loss was payable to '' I-I. Seldon Tay-
lor, Trustee for :Mrs. Sallie F. Taylor"; 
That on April 24, 1930, about two months after the death 
of H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., 
page 71 ~ had the following endorsement made upon the fire 
insurance .policy issued by the Mutual Assurance 
Society of ,Virginia, namely: '' On and after date the as-
sured hereunder is recognized as Mrs. Sallie F. Taylor, 
tenant for life''; 
That the said policy stood in that form until after the 
death of H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., when the following endorse-
ment was made upon the said policy on December 31, 1937, at 
the request of Sutton & Company, in pursuance of the instruc~ 
tions of John T. "Wingo, attorney, namely: "On and after 
date the assured hereunder are recognized as Mrs. Sallie F. 
Taylor and others as their respective interest may appear 
under deed from Minna Kepplar to H. Seldon Taylor, Trus-
tee, dated March 22, 1895"; 
That the firm of H. Seldon Taylor & Son was an agent 
for the Virginia Fire & Marine Insurance Company of this 
City and the property, No. 322 East Broad Street, was also 
insured against fire in that Company; 
That after the death of H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., the fire in-
surance policies on the property, No. 322 East Broad Street, in 
the Virginia Fire & Marine Insurance Company were issued 
and signed from time to time by H. Seldon Taylor & Son, by 
H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., as agents for the said Company, and 
in each of those policies the assured was d·esignated as, or 
the loss was made payable to, "Sallie F. Tayl~~' Life tenant"; 
That on December 1, 1937, a new lease of the property, No. 
322 East Broad Street, was made by Sallie F. Taylor, life 
D. E. Taylor, et al., v. F. B. Taylor, and others. 85 
tenant, to J. A. Massad and Kameel Massad ·and a 
page 72} copy of the said lease is hereto attached marked 
Exhibit E. :M:. D. # 1; 
That at the time this lease of December 1, 1937, was made 
Mrs. Sallie F. Taylor was quite ill and was unable to trans-
act any business, and her daughter, Floyd Brown Taylor, 
acted for her with respect to the said lease; 
That he, E. M. Doggett, went over the lease with the said 
Floyd Brown Taylor and explained the purport thereof to her 
in detail, and t11at she thereupon authorized the execution or 
acceptance of that lease in behalf of her mother as the life 
tenant and lessor. 
Dated this 14th day of January, 1939. 
FLOYD BROWN TAYLOR, 
who sues in her own right a.nd as 
Executor under the will of Sallie 
F. Taylor, deceased. 
By McGUIRE, RIELY, EGGLESTON & 
BOCOCK, 
Her Attorneys. 
DOUGLAS E. TAYLOR and 
BELLE TAYLOR PETTIT, 
By DAVID MEADE WHITE, 
Their Attorney .. 
Richmond, Va., Jan. 8, 1935. 
For and in consideration of One Dollar and other valuable 
considerations, it is mutually agreed between the parties to 
lease elated May 11, 1934, between Sallie ~- Taylor, Life 
Tenant, and Joseph l\fassad and Julia :M:assad, his wife, cover-
ing a portion of pren1ises No. 322 East Broad St., Richmond, 
Va., as follows: 
FIRST: That Kamcel Massacl, brother of1 Joseph Massad, 
shall become a party to this lease as one of the lessees from 
December 1, 1934, and the said Kameel Massad 
page 73 ~ signified by his signing and sealing this agreement 
does become one of the Lessees under this lease. 
SECOND: That from December 1, 1934, to November 30, 
1935, the said Lessor will refund to the said Lessees each 
month $12.50 of the rent called for in this lease, thus making 
the net rent $137.50 per month for each month from Decem-
ber 1, 1934, to November 30, 1935; this refund to be made 
by a credit of $12.50 on each month's rent bill. 
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'11HIRD: That the said Lessees have the privilege of ex-
tending this lease from December 1> 1935,. to November 30, 
1936, at the monthly rental of $150.00; such extension is to 
be subject to all the terms and · conditions of this lease, in-
sofar as they will apply. 
It is distinctly understood by each Lessee that Sallie F. 
Taylor is the Life Tenant of this property, and it is distinetly 
understood by each Lessee that upon the death of Sallie ],. 
Taylor this lease or any renewal or extension thereof, or any 
option given the said Lessees to renew or extend this lease,. 
automatically cease~ -to be; terminates upon her death and 
becomes null and void. 
Attached to an<;l . forming a part of lease dated May 11,. 
1934, between_Sallie F. Taylor, Life Tenant, and Joseph Mas-
sad and Julia Massad, covering premises above referred to. 
Witness the following signatures and seals this 8th day of 
January, 1935, at Richmond, Virgir~ia. 
SALLIE F. TAYLOR Life Tenant (Seal) 
JOSEPH MASS.AD (Seal) 
JULIA MASSAD (Seal) 
KAMEEL MASSAD (Seal) 
page 7 4 } State of Virginia, 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
I, E. M. Doggett, a Notary Public for the City aforesaid 
in the State of Virginia, do certify that· Sallie F. Taylor, 
Life Tenant, Joseph Massad, Julia Massad and Kameel Mas-
sad, whose names are signed to the above lease, bearing date 
on Jan. 8, 1935, have acknowledged the same before me in 
my City aforesaid, and I further certify that my commission 
expires on the 21st day of August, 1938. 
Given under my hand and official seal this 28th day of 
January, 1935. 
(Seal) 
E. M. DOGGETT, 
Notary Public .. 
This Deed of Lease, made this 11th day of M a.y, in the 
year 1934, between Mrs. Sallie F. Taylor, Life Tenant, Lessor, 
of the one part, and Joseph Mas sad and Julia Massad, his 
wif e1 Lessees, of the other part; 
Witnesseth, That the saiid parties of the first part do 
demise unto the said parties of the second part the following 
property-to-wit: Store Floor and cellar of premises No. 
D. E. Taylor, et al., v. F. B. Taylor, and others. 87 
322 East Broad Street, R~chmond, Virginia. This lease does 
not include the Second and Third Floors. 
The premises hereby leased are to be used as a Confec-
tionery Store and Restaurant, from the First day of June, 
1934, for the term of Eighteen months from thence next en-
suing, and to expire on the Last day of November, 1935, yield-
ing- therefor, during the said term, the rent of 
page 75 ~ Twenty-four Hundred and Seventy-Five and 
00/100 ($2,475.00) Dollars, payable to the order of 
and at the Office of H. Seldon Tayler & Son, Agents, as fol-
lows, to-wit: $100.00 on the 1st day of each month for the 
:first three months; $125.00 on the 1st day of each month for 
the next three months, and $150.00 on the 1st day of each 
month for the next twelve months, the first installment to 
become due on the First day of July, 1934. 
It is mutually agreed between the parties to this lease that 
if said building shall be so injured by fire as to render it 
untenantable, this lease shall terminate, and the said Lessees 
hereby covenant, jointly and severally, to remove all of their 
effect~ and rubbish that may be on said premises, and to pay 
rent until this has been done. The said Lessees covenant, 
jointly and severally, to pay the rent in the manner above 
stated; that they will not assign or sub-rent the said premises, 
or any part thereof, without the written consent of tl1e said 
Lessors; that they will leave the premises in good repair, 
natural wear and tear excepted; that the premises shall not 
be used during the said term for any other purpose or pur-
poses than those above specified. A written notice of at least 
three months shall be given by the said Lessees should they 
desire to vacate said premises at the termination of thi~ lease 
-viz., on the 30th day of November, 1935; and should the said 
Lessors desire possession, a like notice shall be required. And 
after such written notice to terminate lease shall have been 
given by either party, the said Lessees herQ.hy covenant and 
agree to allow the said Lessors, their agents or assigns, to 
placard the said premises for rent in one or more conspicuous 
· places, and also to allow the said Lessors, their 
page 76 ~ agents or assigns, the privilege of showing these 
premises at any time to any person desiring to rent 
the same. And it is further covenanted and agreed, by and 
between the parties of this lease, that in the event no such 
notice is given by either party, then this lease shal) continue 
in force from year t.o year, at the same rent and subject to 
all the covenants and conditions herein contained. The said 
Lessees covenant and agree, jointly and severally, that they 
will keep the Heating Plant, Ranges, Stove, Water Pipes, 
88 Supreme Cour~ of Appeals of Virginia. 
Water and Gas Fixtures, Electric Fh:tures, ·wiring, and all 
attachments thereto belonging in order, natural wear and tear 
excepted; and to replace all Glass, including Plate Glass, 
broken during the tenancy, at tl~eir own expense; and also 
that they will unstop all waste-pipes, vVater Closets and Cul-
verts that may become choked; that they will repair all vVater-
pipes and .fixtures that may leak; that they will pay all bills 
for gas, water and electricity used on the said premises dur-
ing· this tenancy. It is also understood and agreed between 
the parties hereto that the Lessors are not to be liable for 
any damage caused by water getting into the basement or 
cellar, or from leaks in the roof, or from overflow or lea.king 
of any of the Water-Pipes or Water Fixtures on these 
premises, or from failing plastering; nor are the said Lessors 
to be liable for any damage whatsoever, to person or prop-
erty, that the Lessees or any other person may sustain while 
on these premises during the life of this lease. 
It is further understood and agreed that if, during the life 
of this lease, or any r~newal or extension thereof, the build-
ings, or any part of same, should be con¢Iemned 
page 77 ~ by the public authorities, and required to be de-
molisl1ed or repaired the Lessors shall be in no 
wise responsible for the resulting inconvenience or damage 
to the Lessees. If, at any time during the life of this lease, 
or any continuation, extension, or renewal thereof, proceed-
ings iu bankruptcy shall be instituted by or against the Les-
sees, or if a Receiver or Trustee sliall be appointed of the 
Lessees' property, or if this lease shall, by operation of law, 
devolve upon or pass to any person or persons other than 
the said Lessees, then and in each of said cases all rent agreed 
upon for the full term of this lease shall at once become due 
and payable, or this lease may be terminated at the option 
of the said Lessors, their heirs or assigns. 
The said Lessees further covenant, jointly and severally, 
that they will,. at their own cost, duri_ng the continuation of 
this lease, keep in good repair and safe running order the 
Elevators and all attachments belonging thereto, including the 
enclosures thereof; also the Electric motor, and- its attach-
ments and machinery used in connection with said elevator, 
provided, however, these premises contain an elevator or one 
is installed during the life of this lease. 
The said Lessees hereby agree to show these premises to 
prospective purchasers at any time. 
The Raid Lessees hereby affirm that the furniture and stock 
of goods which they will put on these premises is owned by 
them and is in no way encumbered by deed, bill of sale, or 
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otherwise. It is mutually agreed between the parties here-
to that no change sh&..1.1 be made in this contract except by 
writing setting forth the terms of the agreed modi-
page 78 } fication; nor shall the said Lessors, be charge-
able with any liability for negligence or otherwise 
in making any repairs or improvements to the property here-
by leased, unless such repairs or improvements· are expressly 
called for by the terms of this lease. The said Lessees also 
covenant that they will not use or permit to be used the 
roof, walls, or fences on these premises for advertising pur-
poses; nor to overload any part of said building beyond its 
carrying capacity, and when they vacate these premises they 
will remove therefrom at their own cost, all ashes and rubbish 
of every kind. 
The said Lessees further covenant that the Lessors may 
re-enter and take possession ( without legal process) for de-
f a ult of five days in the payment of any installment of rent, 
or for the breacl1 of any covenant or agreement herein con-
tained, and the said Lessees also covenant and agree that 
a notice by the Lessors to terminate this lease may be served 
in any of the modes prescribed by law, or by posting it on 
the door of the leased premises, and that such re-entry sha11 
not prejudice the right· of the Lessors to recover all rent ac-
crued or made payable as hereinbefore provided. Said Les-
'Sees also covenant and agree that the notice above referred 
to may be served by the Lessors' agent, or any employee of 
said agent, in like manner and with the same effect as if served 
by the Sheriff, Constable or Sergeant. 
Feminine or neuter pronoum are to be substituted for 
those of the masculine form, and the singular is to be sub-
stituted for the plural number, in any place or places herein 
in which the c-ontext may require such substitution. 
In the event the said Lessee abandons, deserts or 
page 79 ~ absconds these premises, this lease can at once be 
terminated a11d possession taken by Lessor, at the 
option of the said Lessor, without notice to the said Lessee 
and without legal process. 
Said Lessor hereby agrees to do the following work: Paper 
the side walls of the store; paint the wood trim and ceiling 
of the store; paint the kitchen walls and wood trim therein; 
take coal range and ice box out of kitchen; take mirrors out of 
the store; take cabinet be bind the counter out of store: take 
counter out of store; take out all electric fans ; repair floor 
where 11ecessary; repair furnace where needed; paint wood 
work on lower store front; install A. C. Current; install toilet 
"' 
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_ and washstand and toilet enclosures in the . store using the · 
:fixtures that are on the second· floor. 
The Lessees reserve the right to cancel this lease March 
1, 1935, by giving written notice of their intention s·o to do 
' prior to December 1, 1934. In the event this notice is not 
given prior to December 1,. 1934,. the lease is to continue just 
as if this right had not been reserved and run subject to 
all the covenants herein contained .. 
It is distinc~y understood by the Lessees that Sallie F .. 
Taylor is the lif ~ tenant of this property, and it is distinctly 
understood by' lhe Lessees that upon the death of Sallie F .. 
Taylor this lease or any renewal or extension thereof, auto- . 
matically ceases to be; terminates upon her death and becomes 
null and void. 
In the event that the present tenant fails to vacate in tim()' 
. for this work to be completed by June 1, 1934, then 
page 80} and in that event the said Lessees hereby agree 
. to wait for possession until the same can be se-
cured through due process of law; after w-hich the said Les-
sor agrees to do the work as fast as possible and the said 
Lessees agree to take possession as soon a.s the same is com-
pleted and to pay renl from that time; this, however, is not to 
effect the expiration of the lease. 
Said Lessor agrees to repair the cellar steps; put in neces-
sary broken window glass ; remove the ventilating fan from · 
rear window. Permission is hereby given to said Lessees to 
use the two rear most rooms on the second floor for stock 
rooms. 
'"'Lease not .binding until signed by all parties and delivered 
to H. Seldon Taylor & Son.'' 
Witness the following signatures and seals: 
SALLIE F. TAYLOR (Seal) 
Life Tenant 
JOSEPH MASSAD 
. JULIA M4"SSAD 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
In consideration of Five Dollars, the receipt whereof is 
hereby acknowledged, I bind myself as security for and, dur-
ing the life of this lease, or any continuation or extension 
thereof, for the fulfillment on the part of the Lessees of all 
the obligations and covenants contained in the within lease,. 
and entered into by the said Lessees, and hereby waive my 
homestead and all other exemptions as to this obligation. 
Witness my hand and seal this day of , 19 . 
page 81 } . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Seal) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Seal) 
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Taylor, Sallie F ., Life Tenant 
To) Lease 
Mas sad, Joseph & Julia 
Phone No. - · 
No. 322 E. Broad St. 
$2,475.00 Per Term 
Expires Nov. 30, 1935. 
Three months notice required 
Recommended by-
Kameel Massad is the brothers 
name that stays in the store 
H. Seldon Taylor & .Son 
Real Estate Agents 
EntL. M. 
18 North Ninth Street, Richmond, Va. 
Mr. Douglas E. Taylor, 
815 E. Franklin St. 
Richmond, ;virginia 
Dear Sirs: 
Richmond, Va. Nov. 29, 1938. 
In response to your inquiry I beg to hereby affirm that the 
lease dated Ma.y 11, 1934 for the rental of property 
page 82 ~ #322 East Broad Street to Massad as Lessee and 
Mrs. Sallie F. Taylor, Life Tenant as Lessor was 
written in the office of H. Seldon Taylor & Son by Mr. H. Sel-
don Taylor, Jr. 
I wish to state that I was the firm's bookkeeper at that 
period. 
Mrs. Sallie F. Taylor signed her name to lease as life tenant 
and also an attached paper dated January 8, 1935 and ac-
knowledged before me as Notary Public. This attached paper 
shows that Mrs. Sallie F. Taylor in her own handwriting 
signed, "Sallie F. Taylor, Life Tenant", and I hereby certify 
that Mr. H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., her son, was present at the 
signing of the lease also this attached paper bearing date 
January 8, 1935. 
I solemnly affirm that the above is a true statement. 
E. M. DOGGETT, 
Notary Publie. 
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Memo. E. 1\:L Doggett, N. P. as above is now and has been 
for some time bookkeeper for Sutton & Company, Real Estate. 
This Deed of Lease, made this 1st day of December, 1937, 
between Mrs. Sallie F. Taylor, Life Tenant, of the first part, 
and J. A. Massad and Karn eel Massad, of the second part; 
Witnesseth, That the said pfJ,rty of the first part doth de-
mise unto the said party or tbe second part, the following 
property, to-wit: Store floor and cellar of #322 E. Broad 
Street, Richmond, Va. 
The premises hereby leased are to be used as and for Con-
fectionery Store and restaurant from the 1st day 
page 83 ~ of December 1937, for the term of 5 years from 
thence next ensuing·, and to expire on the 1st day 
of November, 1942, yielding therefor, during the said term, 
the rent of Ten thousand, one hundred forty and no/100 
($10,140.00) Dollars, payable as follows, to-wit: In equal 
monthly installments of $165.00 &. $175.00 on the 1st day of 
each and every month during the term of this lease, in ad-
vance $165.00 per month for the first three years and $175.00 
per month for a term of hvo years at the office of Sutton & 
Company, Inc., Agents, without demand being made therefor, 
the first installment to become due on the 1st day of De-
cember, 1937. The Lessee hereby waives the benefit of any 
exemption under the homestead or bankruptcy laws as to 
the obligation of this lease, and agrees to pay all expenses 
incurred in collecting the same, including fifteen per cent at-
torney's fees in case the· same shall not be paid when due.· If 
the said building shall be so injured by fire or otl1erwise, be-
yond the control of the Lessee, as to render it untenantable 
this lease shall remain in full force and effect until its ex-
piration and a rebate of rent will be allowed the Lessee while 
the repairs to the building are being made. The Lessee cove-
nants not to overload the building·. It is further understood 
and agreed that should any part of the building be condemnecl 
by public authorities and required to be repaired, the Lessor 
sl1all be in no way responsible for the resulting inconvenience 
or damage to the Lessee. 
The said Lessee covenants to pay the rent in the manner 
above stated; not to assign or sub-rent the said premises 
or any part thereof without the written consent of the Lessor; 
to leave the premises in good repair, natural wear 
page 84 r and tear excepted; that the premises shall not 
be used during the said term for any other purpose 
. than those above specified. If the Lessee abandons the said 
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premises du~ing the term, or any renewal or extension there-
of, then the entire amount of rent then owing upon the lease, 
or any renewal or extension thereof, whethn accrued or not, 
may become due and payable at the option of the Lessor as 
of the date of such abandonment, and the Lessor is authorized 
to take possession of said premises without notice to the Les-
see and may re-rent the said premises .for the account of the 
Lessee at any price or rate that the Lessor may consider 
proper under the circumstances, and collect any deficit from 
the Lessee up to the end of said term . 
.A. ·written Notice of Three Months shall be given by the 
said Lessee should he desire to vacate said premises at the 
termination of this lease; and should the said 'Lessor desire 
possession, a like notice shall be required. And after such 
written notice shalf have been given by either party, the said 
Lessee hereby c9venants and agrees to allow the said Lessor, 
agents or assigns to placard the said premises for rent or 
otherwise in one or more conspicuous places and also to allow 
the said Lessor, agents or assigns, the privilege of showing 
these premises to any person desiring to rent or purchase 
the same. Lessee also agrees to allow Lessor or agent, the 
privilege of showing the premises hereby leased, to prospec-
tive purchasers at any time during the term of this lease. 
And it is further covenanted and agreed by and between the 
parties of this lease that in the event no such notice is given 
by either party, then this lease shall continue in 
page 85 ~ force from year to year, at the same rent, and sub-
ject to all the conditions and covenants herein con-
tained. · 
The Lessee covenants and agrees should there be an eleva~ 
tor on the premises to keep same and its equipment in good 
order and in a safe condition to meet insurance requirements. 
Lessee covenants and agrees that he will keep all the plumb-
ing, electric wiring and the heating system in good order, re-
place all glass and plate glass broken during his tenancy at 
his own expense, regardless as to the manner in which samfl 
may be broken, and in general to keep the premises in good 
repair at his own expense, and not to use the outside walls 
of the building for advertising purposes without the conse11t 
of the Lessor. Lessee hereby agrees that upon vacating the 
premises hereby leased he will have all rubbish removed and 
leave the premises thoroughly cleaned. In event of his failure 
so to do, he agrees to reimburse Lessor or assigns the ex-
pense incurred for cleaning said premises. 
It is also understood and agreed between the parties hereto 
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that the Lessor, agents or assigns, is not to be liable for any 
damage caused by water getting into the basement or cellar~ 
or from leaks in the roof, over.flow, leaking of any of the water 
pipes or water fixtur.es on these premises; and for falling of 
plastering; nor is the said Lessor, agents or assigns, to be 
,liable for any damage whatsoever, to person or property that 
the Lessee or assigns, or any other person or persons may 
sustain while on these premises, during the term of this lease. 
It is further understood and agreed that if additional toilets 
are required on the premises during this lease, then such addi-
tional toilets as may be required by public authori-
page 86 ~ ties or otherwise are to be installed by the Les-
. see at his own expense. 
It is mutually agreed between the parties hereto that no 
change shall be made in this contract except by a ,,.,.riting 
setting forth the terms of the agreed modification, nor shall 
the Lessor be chargeable with any liability for negligence or 
otherwise in making any repairs or improvements which he 
may undertake to make to the property herehy leased, unless 
the same are particularly called for by this contract. The 
said Lessee hereby affirms that the furniture and stock of 
goods which he will put in said premises, is owned by him, 
fully paid for, and is in no wa.y encumbered by deed, bill of 
sale or otherwise. The said Lessee further covenants that the 
Lessor may re-enter for the breach of any covenant herein 
contained, and especially for or on account of non-payment 
of rent, actual demand thereof by the landlord being hereby 
expressly waived, ans:1 may re-rent the said premises for 
the account of the Lessee at any price or rate that the Lessor 
may consider proper under the circumstances, and collect any 
deficit from the Lessee up to the end of said term. 
·The Lessee further covenants and agrees that a notice by 
the Lessor to terminate this lease may be served in any of 
the modes prescribed by law, or by posting it on tbe door of 
the leased premises, and that such re-entry shall not prejud_ice 
the right of the Lessor to recover all rent accrued or made 
payable as hereinbef ore provided. Said Lessee also covenantg 
and agrees that the notice above referred to may be served 
by the Lessor's agent, or any employee of said agent, in like 
manner and with the same effect as if served by the Sheriff, 
Constable or Sergeant. 
page 87 ~ Feminine or neuter pronouns are to be substi-
tuted for those of the masculine form, and tl1e 
plural .is to be substituted for the singular number hi any 
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place or places herein in which the context may require such 
substitutions. 
The Lessor hereby covenants and agrees with the Agent 
that in consideration of the services of the Agent in procuring 
this lease, the Agent shall be entitled to a commission of five 
( 5) per centum of the rent paid during the existence of this 
lease, or any continuance or renewal hereof, at the same or 
different rent or with the same or different covenants, as well 
as during the occupancy of the premises by the Lessee or his 
successors or assigns, and no transfer or assignment or re-
lease by the Lessor shall affect this contract of agency as 
herein set forth. And it is especially covenanted that the 
Agent shall be entitled to said commission on all rents, irre-
spective of whether said rents be collected by or paid to the 
Agent, or the Lessor, or some other person, firm or corpora-
tion. , 
The Lessor agrees to do the fallowing repairs : 
Paper a.nd paint interior of store. Install toilet in rear 
of store. Install black glass under plate glass on. outside 
and repair rear steps. 
. Witness the following signatures and seals: 
(Signed) J. A. MASSAD 
(Signed) KA:MEEL MASSAD 
Exhibit E M D #1 . 
page S8} . : : .. SE.CU~J'rY .. BOND. 
(Seal). 
(Seal) 
In consideration of Five ($5.00) Dollars, the receipt where-
of is hereby acknowledged, .... bind .... as security for the 
fulfillment on the part of the Lessee of all obligations and con-
venants entered into by .... as within, and for as long as .... 
continues to occupy the premises mentioned in this lease and 
. . . . hereby waive . . . . homestead and all other exemptions 
as to this obligation, and further notice of default and ex-
hausting of remedies. 
·witness hand and seal this . . . . day of . . . . . 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
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.tucJunond, Va. . .... 
As evidenced by the following signatures and seals, and 
for and in consideration of One Dollar cash in hand paid by 
each of the undersigned parties to the other, and for other 
valuable considerations, the receipt whereof is hereby ac-
knowledged, the within lease, with all its covenants, conditions 
and obligations, at the request of the lessee, and with the con-
sent of the lessor therein named, is hereby assigned by said 
lessee and assumed by the undersigned assignee, beginning as 
of .... on the express condition, however, that the lessee men-
tioned in said lease hereby agrees and binds himself, his heirs, 
personal representatives and assigns, that he or they will 
remain primarily liable to said lessor, jointly and severally 
with the said assignee, for the payment of rent and for 
the faithful performance of ·all covenants and conditions con-
tained in said lease, with the same rights and reme-
page 89 r dies reserved to· the said lessor against said lessee, 
his heirs, personal representatives and assigns, as 
if this assignment had not been made, the said lessee waiving 
any right which he might hav~, or might ever assert, to re-
quire said lessor, before proceeding against said lessee, to pro-
ceed against or to exhaust any rights or remedies which 
said lessor might have against said assignee. 
It is also agreed that no further assignment of the said 
lease, and no sub-lease of the said premises, or any part 
thereof, shall be made without the written consent of the 
said lessor. 
·witness the follmving signatures and seals: 
Mrs. Sallie F. Taylor, Life Tenant 
To) Lease 
J. A. Massad and Kameel Massad 
Term 
$10,140 per annum 
Expires November 30, 1942 
No. #322 E. Broad St. 
Sutton & Co. (Incorporated) 
Real Estate Brokers 




D. E. Taylor, et al., v. F. B. Taylor, and others. 97 
page.90 ~ STIPULATION DATED JANUARY 16, 1939, 
FILED IN COURT UNDER DECREE 
OF OCTOBER 27, 1939. 
Without a waiver by the petitioner of her objections, on 
legal grounds, to the admissibility in evidence of certain docu-
ments and statements of fact contained in a written stipu-
lation of counsel, which stipulation is made on behalf of the 
defendants, Douglas E. Taylor and Belle Taylor Pettit, it is 
further stipulated by the parties that the following shall be 
considered as facts duly introduced in evidence herein on 
behalf of the petitioner, subject to such objection, on legal 
grounds, to the admissibility of such facts in evidence as coun-
sel for any party hereto may desire to make, to-wit: 
Mrs. Sallie F. Taylor suffered a stroke of paralysis in 
September, 1924. After the acute symptoms following the 
stroke had subsided, Mrs. Taylor enjoyed good general health, 
though she had only a limited use of her right arm and a slight 
lameness of her right leg. Except for these disabilities, she · 
was able to participate in her usual activities, though she had 
a nurse in attendance on her to aid her in dressing and as a 
companion from the time of the stroke until her death. How-
ever, she went daily about her home, visited her friends, went 
to her church and her circle, and motored and traveled about 
the countryside almost daily. She learned to write with her 
left hand. Her mental condition remained throughout active 
and unimpaired, in keeping with her age, and until a short 
time before her death. 
All of. her business affairs were attended to by her husband 
until his death in February, 1930, and thereafter by 
page 91 ~ her son, II. Seldon Taylor, Jr., until his death ~n 
the fall of 1936. She relied implicitly on them, and 
in all business matters, including the signing of leases and 
other papers, she followed their suggestions and advice. 
Mrs. Taylor died on January 5, 1938, at the age of 78 years. 
Executed this January 16, 1939. 
FLOYD BROWN TAYLOR, 
by :McGUIRE, RIELY, EGGLESTON 
BOCOCK, 
her Counsel. 
w·ho sues in her own right and as Execu-
tor unde1· the will of Sallie F. Taylor, 
deceased. 
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DOUGLAS E. TAYLOR, 
by DAVID MEADE WHITE, 
his attorney. 
BELLE TAYLOR PETTIT, 
by DAVID MEADE WHITE, 
her attorney. 
VIRGINIA TRUST COMPANY, 
By ... · ...................................... . 
. .... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................ . 
· · ,• As Surviving Executor and Trustee 
under the will of H. Seldon Taylor,. 
Sr. 
VIRGINIA TRUST COMP ANY, 
B-y ....................................... .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... .. 
As Trustee under the will of· Sallie F. 
Taylor. 
As Executor under the will of H. Seldon 
Taylor, Jr. 
In her own right and as Executor under the 
will of H. Seldon Taylor, Jr. 
SUTTON & COMPANY, INCOR-
PORATED, 
by ...................................... . 
MEMO. OF COURT. MADE PART OF RECORDS BY 
DECREE OF OCTOBER 27, 1939. 
Virginia: 
In the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond. 
Floyd Brown Taylor, who sues, etc. 
'V. 
Douglas E. Taylor and others. 
Having carefully considered the pleadings and exhibits in 
this cause; the stipulation of counsel; the very a:ble arguments 
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of counsel, both oral and written, as well as the authorities 
cited, I am of opinion: 
1. That under the terms of the deed of March 22nd, 1895, 
from Minna Keppler, widow, to H. Seldon Taylor, Trustee, 
and duly recorded, Sallie F. Taylot· took an equitable estate 
in fee simple. 
2. The limitations over are void. 
The papers are with the Clerk. 
To : Mr. Henry C. Riely 
Attorney at Law 
Mutual Building, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
WILLIAM A. MONCURE. 
September- 27, 1939. 
Mr. David Meade White 
Mr. George B. White 
Mr. Andrew J. Ellis 
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This cause, which has been heretofore duly matured at 
rules and docketed and set for hearing, came on this day 
to be heard on the petition of the petitioner, Floyd Brown 
Taylor, suing in her own right and as Executor under the, 
will of Sallie F. Taylor, deeeased, and the exhibits with said 
petition; on the joint and separate answer of the defendants 
Douglas E. Taylor and Belle Taylor Pettit, to said petition; 
on the joint answer to said petition of the defendants Rhoda 
Davis Taylor, in her own right and as one of the Executors 
under the will of H. Seldon Taylor, Jr. John T. Wingo, one 
of the Execut.ors under the will of said II. Seldon Taylor, Jr., 
Betty Apperson Taylor, and Rhoda. Taylor Tompkins, which 
petition and answers have been all heretofore duly filed; on 
the general replication of the petitioner to said answers; on 
the bill taken for confessed as to the defendants, :Virginia 
Trust Company, as Surviving Executor and Trustee under the 
will of H. Seldon Taylor, Sr., and as Trustee under the will 
of Sallie F. Taylor, and Sutton & Company, Incorporated; 
and on three written stipulations, signed by the parties here-
to or their counsel, which were heretofore tendered to the 
court and are now duly filed, and which said stipulations are 
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dated respectively October 4, 1938, January 14, 1939, and 
January 16, 1939; and this cause was thereupon 
page 94 } argued by counsel, both orally and in writing. 
On Consideration Whereof, the Court, pursuant 
to a written memora,,ndum of the court dated September 27, 
1939, and now filed· and made a part of the record herein, 
is of the opinion and accordingly doth Adjudge, Order, and 
Decree as follows: ·. 
1. That by the first sentence of the trust provisions con-
tained in the deed dated March 22, 1895, from Minna Keppler, 
widow, to H. Seldon Taylor, Trustee, conveying the property 
situated in the City of Richmond, Virginia, briefly designated 
as Number 322 East Broad Street, and duly recorded, Sallie 
F. Taylor took an equitable estate in fee simple in said prop-
erty, which provision of said deed is as follows : · 
"In Trust, nevertheless, for the following purposes, to-wit: 
That the said H. Seldon Taylor shall hold the same for the 
sole, separate and exclusive use and benefit of, his wife, Sallie 
F. Taylor, with power, during the joint lives of the said H. 
Seldon and Sallie F., to sell, exchange, or encumber by mort-
gage or deed of trust, upon the written request of the said 
Sallie F. Taylor." 
2. That the limitations over of said property that are con-
tained in the trust provisions of said deed following said 
above quoted provision thereof, are accordingly void and of 
no effect. 
3. That said property, therefQre, passed pursuant to the 
will of said Sallie F. Taylor, a certified copy of which will 
is filed as an exhibit with the petition herein. 
page 95 } 4. That the net rentals derived from said prop-
erty which have accumulated since the death of 
said Sallie F. Taylor and are now in the hands of the def end-
ant Sutton & Company, Incorporat~d, pass and belong to the 
person or persons entitled to said property as bereinabove 
determined and set forth. 
But the court hereby expressly reserves, for such later con-
sideration and decision as may be necessary or expedient, all 
questions that may be raised as to the person or persons who, 
pursuant to the provisions of the will of said Sallie F. Tay-
lor, are entitled to said property and who are consequently 
entitled to said net rents accumulated therefrom. 
At tl1e instance of the defendants, Douglas E. Taylor and 
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Belle Taylor Pettit, who desire to present to the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia a petition for an appeal from 
this decree, it is ordered that the execution of this decree 
shall be suspended for a period of 90 days from the date of 
the entry of this decree, by counsel of the parties by counsel 
no suspending bond is required. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, Charles 0. Saville, Clerk of the Chancery Court of the 
City of Richmond, hereby certify that the foregoing is a true 
transcript of the record, as was ordered by Counsel, and that 
notice in obedience to Section 6339, Code of Virginia, has been 
duly given. 
Teste: 
CHAS. 0. SA VILLE, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste : 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. I 
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